Measuring Risk Aversion Model-Independently

We propose a new method to elicit individuals' risk preferences. Similar to Holt and Laury (2002), we use a simple multiple price-list format. However, our method is based on a general notion of increasing risk, which allows classifying individuals as more or less risk-averse without assuming a specic utility framework. In a laboratory experiment we compare both methods. Each classies individuals almost identically as risk-averse, -neutral, or -seeking. However, classications of individuals as more or less risk-averse dier substantially. Moreover, our approach yields higher measures of risk aversion, and only with our method these measures are robust toward increasing stakes

Measuring Risk Aversion Model-Independently

We propose a new method to elicit individuals' risk preferences. Similar to Holt and Laury (2002), we use a simple multiple price-list format. However, our method is based on a general notion of increasing risk, which allows classifying individuals as more or less risk-averse without assuming a specic utility framework. In a laboratory experiment we compare both methods. Each classies individuals almost identically as risk-averse, -neutral, or -seeking. However, classications of individuals as more or less risk-averse dier substantially. Moreover, our approach yields higher measures of risk aversion, and only with our method these measures are robust toward increasing stakes.Risk Aversion; Multiple Price-List; Elicitation; Laboratory Experiment; Holt and Laury Method; Mean Preserving Spreads; Non-EUT; Increasing Risk

The New Basel Accord and the Nature of Risk: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a non-strategic model setting (measuring event risk stochastically) to a more general strategic model setting (measuring behavioral risk adequately) comes true. Knowing that a game is any situation in which the players make strategic decisions – i.e., decisions that take into account each other's actions and responses – game theory is a useful set of tools for better understanding different risk settings. Embedded in a short history of the Basel Accord in this article we introduce some basic ideas of game theory in the context of rating procedures in accordance with Basel II. As well, some insight is given how game theory works. Here, the primary value of game theory stems from its focus on behavioral risk: risk when all agents are presumed rational, each attempting to anticipate likely actions and reactions by its rivals --New Basel Accord,event risk,behavioral risk,rating,simple game,Nash-equilibrium,game theory

Modelling, Estimation and Visualization of Multivariate Dependence for Risk Management

Dependence modelling and estimation is a key issue in the assessment of portfolio risk. When measuring extreme risk in terms of the Value-at-Risk, the multivariate normal model with linear correlation as its natural dependence measure is by no means an ideal model. We suggest a large class of models and a new dependence function which allows us to capture the complete extreme dependence structure of a portfolio. We also present a simple nonparametric estimation procedure. To show our new method at work we apply it to a financial data set of zero coupon swap rates and estimate the extreme dependence in the data

Failure dynamics of the global risk network

Risks threatening modern societies form an intricately interconnected network that often underlies crisis situations. Yet, little is known about how risk materializations in distinct domains influence each other. Here we present an approach in which expert assessments of risks likelihoods and influence underlie a quantitative model of the global risk network dynamics. The modeled risks range from environmental to economic and technological and include difficult to quantify risks, such as geo-political or social. Using the maximum likelihood estimation, we find the optimal model parameters and demonstrate that the model including network effects significantly outperforms the others, uncovering full value of the expert collected data. We analyze the model dynamics and study its resilience and stability. Our findings include such risk properties as contagion potential, persistence, roles in cascades of failures and the identity of risks most detrimental to system stability. The model provides quantitative means for measuring the adverse effects of risk interdependence and the materialization of risks in the network

Measurement of Farm Credit Risk: SUR Model and Simulation Approach

The study addresses problems in measuring credit risk under the structure model, and then proposes a seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR) to predict farms’ ability in meeting their current and anticipated obligations in the next 12 months. The empirical model accounts for both the dependence structure and the dynamic feature of the structure model, and is used for estimating asset correlation using FBFM data for 1995-2004. Farm credit risk is then predicted by copula based simulation process with historical default rates as benchmark. Results are reported and compared to previous studies on farm default.Credit Risk Measurement, Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model, Simulation, Agribusiness, Agricultural Finance, Farm Management, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty,

VOLUNTARY ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK TRADEOFFS IN CROP PROTECTION DECISIONS

An indirect utility model is employed for measuring farmers willingness to voluntarily accept yield losses for a reduction in environmental risk by decreasing pesticide use. Results support the hypothesis that farmers have self-described risk perceptions that enable them to make assessments of risk-yield tradeoffs. Policies designed to encourage and assist farmers making voluntary pesticide reductions can result in environmental risk reduction.pesticides. regulation, environmental policy, Crop Production/Industries, Environmental Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,