Concave many-to-one matching

We propose a notion of concavity in two-sided many-to-one matching, which is an analogue to the balancedness condition in cooperative games. A stable matching exists when the market is concave. We provide a class of concave markets. In the proof of the existence theorem, we use Scarf's algorithm to find a stable schedule matching, which is of independent interest

Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching

In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of "many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, "matching without preferences over colleagues." We give an explicit reduction of any problem of the latter type to a problem of the former type. This construction leads to the first algorithm which finds all stable matchings in the setting of "matching without preferences over colleagues," for any set of preferences. Our construction directly extends to generalized matching settings.Many-to-one matching Stability Matching algorithms

Cooperative and strategic games in network economics

Es ist wohlbekannt, dass die Taten und Entscheidungen jedes handelten Subjektes - sei es ein einzelnes Individuum, eine Organisation oder sogar ein ganzes Land - sich unweigerlich mit den Handlungen anderer Subjekte verknüpfen und diese sich untereinander beeinflussen. In Abhängigkeit des jeweiligen Kontextes induzieren diese gegenseitigen Interdependenzen netzwerkartige Beziehungsgeflechte, die in vielfältigen Formen auftreten können. Da dieses Phänomen insbesondere im Ökonomischen Alltag zu finden ist, wurde der Theorie ökonomischer Netzwerke in den vergangenen Jahren ein stetig steigendes Maß an Aufmerksamkeit zuteil. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist nun, kooperative und strategische Spiele in der Netzwerktheorie näher zu beleuchten und diesen Aspekt zu ergänzen. Genauer: Die Hauptmotivation besteht darin, ausgewählte ökonomischen Probleme, die in diesem Forschungszweig behandelt werden, realistischer zu modellieren, um das Feld der möglichen Anwendungen zu erweitern. Dies wird durch eine flexiblere Gestaltung der Grundstruktur der Standardansätze umgesetzt.It is a well-accepted fact that doings and decisions of virtually every acting subject - whether it is an individual, an organization, or even an entire country - do inevitably influence and connect to the actions of other subjects. Depending on the context, these mutual interdependencies induce network-like relationships which may take various forms. Consequently, since the phenomenon occurs in many situations of economic life, for many years now more and more attention has been devoted to the study of economic networks and the number of publications dealing with this subject is continuously increasing. The objective of this thesis is to highlight cooperative as well as strategic games in this field of research in order to explore this aspect in more detail and to complement it by analyzing issues which have not been covered so far. More precisely: The main goal is to model the economic problems addressed in network economics more realistically in order to enlarge the field of possible applications. This is done by allowing for more flexibility in the formal substructure of the standard approaches.Tag der Verteidigung: 26.05.2014Paderborn, Univ., Diss., 201