5 research outputs found
Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market
mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the
economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices,
meaning that the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased.
Equilibria for linear prices are known to be exactly the maximum Nash welfare
allocations.
\emph{Price curves} allow the cost of a good to be any (increasing) function
of the quantity purchased. We show that price curve equilibria are not limited
to maximum Nash welfare allocations with two main results. First, we show that
an allocation can be supported by strictly increasing price curves if and only
if it is \emph{group-domination-free}. A similarly characterization holds for
weakly increasing price curves. We use this to show that given any allocation,
we can compute strictly (or weakly) increasing price curves that support it (or
show that none exist) in polynomial time. These results involve a connection to
the \emph{agent-order matrix} of an allocation, which may have other
applications. Second, we use duality to show that in the bandwidth allocation
setting, any allocation maximizing a CES welfare function can be supported by
price curves.Comment: Appeared in WINE 201
Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation
In bandwidth allocation, competing agents wish to transmit data along paths
of links in a network, and each agent's utility is equal to the minimum
bandwidth she receives among all links in her desired path. Recent market
mechanisms for this problem have either focused on only Nash welfare, or
ignored strategic behavior. We propose a nonlinear variant of the classic
trading post mechanism, and show that for almost the entire family of CES
welfare functions (which includes maxmin welfare, Nash welfare, and utilitarian
welfare), every Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is optimal. We also prove
that fully strategyproof mechanisms for this problem are impossible in general,
with the exception of maxmin welfare. More broadly, our work shows that even
small modifications (such as allowing nonlinear constraints) can dramatically
increase the power of market mechanisms like trading post.Comment: Working pape
Fair and Efficient Allocations with Limited Demands
We study the fair division problem of allocating multiple resources among a
set of agents with Leontief preferences that are each required to complete a
finite amount of work, which we term "limited demands". We examine the behavior
of the classic Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) mechanism in this setting and
show it is fair but only weakly Pareto optimal and inefficient in many natural
examples. We propose as an alternative the Least Cost Product (LCP) mechanism,
a natural adaptation of Maximum Nash Welfare to this setting. We characterize
the structure of allocations of the LCP mechanism in this setting, show that it
is Pareto efficient, and that it satisfies the relatively weak fairness
property of sharing incentives. While we prove it satisfies the stronger
fairness property of (expected) envy freeness in some special cases, we provide
a counterexample showing it does not do so in general, a striking contrast to
the "unreasonable fairness" of Maximum Nash Welfare in other settings.
Simulations suggest, however, that these violations of envy freeness are rare
in randomly generated examples.Comment: Presented as a Conference Paper at AAAI 202
Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing
We study market mechanisms for allocating divisible goods to competing agents
with quasilinear utilities. For \emph{linear} pricing (i.e., the cost of a good
is proportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states
that Walrasian equilibria maximize the sum of agent valuations. This ensures
efficiency, but can lead to extreme inequality across individuals. Many
real-world markets -- especially for water -- use \emph{convex} pricing
instead, often known as increasing block tariffs (IBTs). IBTs are thought to
promote equality, but there is a dearth of theoretical support for this claim.
In this paper, we study a simple convex pricing rule and show that the
resulting equilibria are guaranteed to maximize a CES welfare function.
Furthermore, a parameter of the pricing rule directly determines which CES
welfare function is implemented; by tweaking this parameter, the social planner
can precisely control the tradeoff between equality and efficiency. Our result
holds for any valuations that are homogeneous, differentiable, and concave. We
also give an iterative algorithm for computing these pricing rules, derive a
truthful mechanism for the case of a single good, and discuss Sybil attacks.Comment: Accepted to WINE 202
Markets for Public Decision-making
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with
multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a
preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies
to this setting, focusing on binary issues. Issues have prices, and each agent
is endowed with artificial currency that she can use to purchase probability
for her preferred alternatives (we allow randomized outcomes). We first show
that when each issue has a single price that is common to all agents, market
equilibria can be arbitrarily bad. This negative result motivates a different
approach. We present a novel technique called "pairwise issue expansion", which
transforms any public decision-making instance into an equivalent Fisher
market, the simplest type of private goods market. This is done by expanding
each issue into many goods: one for each pair of agents who disagree on that
issue. We show that the equilibrium prices in the constructed Fisher market
yield a "pairwise pricing equilibrium" in the original public decision-making
problem which maximizes Nash welfare. More broadly, pairwise issue expansion
uncovers a powerful connection between the public decision-making and private
goods settings; this immediately yields several interesting results about
public decisions markets, and furthers the hope that we will be able to find a
simple iterative voting protocol that leads to near-optimum decisions.Comment: Appeared in WINE 201