How High Performance Human Resource Practices and Workforce Unionization Affect Managerial Pay

Using data from a nationally representative sample of telecommunications establishments, this study finds that HR practices and workforce unionization influence managerial pay levels and the ratio of manager-to-worker pay. High performance HR practices, including investment in the skills of the workforce, in computer-based technologies, and in performance-based worker pay practices, are all positively related to managerial pay; but the use of workforce teams, which shift some managerial responsibilities to workers, has the opposite association. High performance HR practices also are associated with lower manager to- worker pay differentials. In addition, workforce unionization is positively associated with managerial pay levels, with worker base pay mediating the relationship between managers\u27 pay and unionization

Managerial Discretion and Takeover Performance

We investigate the relation between long run takeover performance and board share ownership in the acquiring company for a sample of 142 UK takeovers completed between 1985-95. We find evidence of a non-linear relationship both between board ownership and takeover profitability, and between board ownership and post-takeover share returns. We cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework using non- linear two-stage least squares, and find that our results are robust to this alternative specification. The results are therefore consistent with a managerial alignment / entrenchment trade-off.Corporate takeovers; board ownership; profitability; long run share returns

Do Bankers Sacrifice Value to Build Empires? Managerial Incentives, Industry Consolidation and Financial Performance

Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon that may enhance stakeholders' value if managers do not sacrifice value to build empires. We find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment at U.S. bank holding companies that have higher levels of managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset size. At banks without entrenched management, both asset acquisitions and sales are associated with improved performance. At banks with entrenched management, sales are related to smaller improvements while acquisitions are associated with worse performance. Consistent with scale economies, an increase in assets by internal growth is associated with better performance at most banks. Key Words: consolidation, acquisitions, managerial incentives, efficiency, agency problems, corporate control, stochastic frontier

MANAGEMENT AND RESCUE FROM CRISIS

Management is the primary factor for overall amplification of efficiency, effectiveness and competitiveness of the companies and economy. In this context, is significant to highlight promotion of strategic management, managerial reengineering, improving organizational and managerial culture, privatization of state management companies, professionalization of managers and management. All this, conceived on the generating causes of strengths and weaknesses, resulted on managerial and economic diagnosis of economic operators, can be integrated into a model of efficient management, whose operationalization will result in obtaining managerial performance and thus economic.management, crisis management, managerial skills, management reengineering

Incentive Contracting versus Ownership Reforms: Evidence from China's Township and Village Enterprises

We use a unique data set to study the implications of introducing managerial incentives and, in addition to incentives, better defined ownership for a firm's financial performance. The data set traces the ten-year history of 80 Chinese rural enterprises, known as township and village enterprises. During this period, these originally (mostly) community owned, local government controlled socialist collective firms were first allowed to introduce managerial incentive contracts and then to change to ownership forms of more clearly defined income and control rights. The study finds that introducing managerial incentives had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on these firms' performance measured by accounting return on assets or return on equity. It also finds that the performance is significantly better under ownership forms of better-defined rights than under community ownership even when the latter is supplemented with managerial incentive contracts. The findings shed lights on some important theoretical and policy issues. Classification-JEL:

Firm performance and managerial turnover: the case of Ukraine

The paper studies whether and how CEO turnover in Ukrainian firms is related to their performance. Based on a novel dataset covering Ukrainian joint stock companies in 2002-2006, the paper finds statistically significant negative association between the past performance of firms measured by return on sales and return on assets, and the likelihood of managerial turnover. While the strength of the turnover-performance relationship does not seem to depend on factors such as managerial ownership and supervisory board size, we do find significant entrenchments effects associated with ownership by managers. Overall, our analysis suggests that corporate governance in Ukraine operates with a certain degree of efficiency, despite the well-known lacunas in the country’s institutional environment

Small firm innovation performance and employee involvement.

It is known that small firms rely mainly on the CEO’s individual knowledge for developing innovations. Recent work suggests that this approach is inefficient since it underutilizes other employees’ knowledge. We study to which extent using CEOs, managers and non-managerial employees’ ideas enhances small firms’ innovation performance. A Heckman selection model on 305 small firms shows that not only CEO’s and managers’, but also non-managerial employees’ ideas contribute to innovation performance. However, contributions depend heavily on the individuals’ area of expertise and on whether product or process innovation is desired. Our findings enrich the current view on the entrepreneurial team, but also warn against the implementation of one-size-fits-all employee involvement programs in small firms.employee involvement; upper echelon; non-managerial employees; innovation performance; small firms;

Invisible Wounds: The Impact of Six Years of War on the Mental Health of Syria's Children

The TDR Results Report illustrates progress made against the 23 key performance indicators that are part of the monitoring and evaluation matrix, in line with the current Performance Assessment Framework.The report shows progress made on various performance indicators related to three overarching categories related to not only on what is done (technical expected results), but also on how it is done (application of organizational core values and managerial performance).The report notes a high implementation rate, numerous new health tools that are being used in critical areas, and an expanded education and training programme, particularly focused on researchers in disease endemic countries. It provides summaries of activities to increase equity, such as increasing opportunities for women. The report includes a series of lessons learnt that have further improved the Programme's managerial effectiveness

Publicness, Organisational Characteristics and Performance

This paper reports an exploratory study utilising a publicness model in which the impact of ownership, funding and mode of control on performance is moderated by organisational characteristics such as goals, structure and management. It describes the testing in 164 English hospital pharmacies of four health sector-relevant characteristics; diffusion of ownership (number of owners), priority of financial goals, congruence of core purpose (goals of sub-unit compared to organisation), and proximity of control (hierarchical levels between sub-unit and top management). Associations between these and four indicators of performance (managerial effectiveness, utilisation of human resources, work quality and employee satisfaction) were examined. Statistically significant relationships were seen between three of the organisational characteristics and some aspect of performance. Priority of financial goals was associated with perceptions of managerial performance, and proximity of control with use of human resources, work quality and employee satisfaction. Further elucidation of such characteristics may be justified.</jats:p

Corporate Fraud, Governance and Auditing

We analyze corporate fraud in a model where managers have superior information but, due to private benefits from empire building, are biased against liquidation. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To restrain fraud, shareholders optimally choose auditing quality and the performance sensitivity of managerial pay, taking into account external corporate governance and auditing regulation. For given managerial pay, it is optimal to rely on auditing when external governance is in an intermediate range. When both auditing and managerial incentive pay are used, worse external governance must be balanced by heavier reliance on both of these incentive mechanisms. In designing managerial pay, equity can improve managerial incentives while options worsen them.accounting fraud, auditing, managerial compensation, corporate governance, regulation