Economic liberalization and the antecedents of top management teams: evidence from Turkish 'big' business

There has been an increased interest in the last two decades in top management teams (TMTs) of business firms. Much of the research, however, has been US-based and concerned primarily with TMT effects on organizational outcomes. The present study aims to expand this literature by examining the antecedents of top team composition in the context of macro-level economic change in a late-industrializing country. The post-1980 trade and market reforms in Turkey provided the empirical setting. Drawing upon the literatures on TMT and chief executive characteristics together with punctuated equilibrium models of change and institutional theory, the article develops the argument that which firm-level factors affect which attributes of TMT formations varies across the early and late stages of economic liberalization. Results of the empirical investigation of 71 of the largest industrial firms in Turkey broadly supported the hypotheses derived from this premise. In the early stages of economic liberalization the average age and average organizational tenure of TMTs were related to the export orientation of firms, whereas in later stages, firm performance became a major predictor of these team attributes. Educational background characteristics of teams appeared to be under stronger institutional pressures, altering in different ways in the face of macro-level change

Hawks and doves in segmented markets : a formal approach to competitive aggressiveness

Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected markets segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equiibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition

Hawks and doves in segmented markets: a formal approach to competitive aggressiveness

Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition.

Hawks and doves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness

Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition.

Future Agribusiness Challenges: Strategic Uncertainty, Innovation and Structural Change

The IFAMR is published by the International Food and Agribusiness Management Association.(IFAMA) www.ifama.orgStrategic uncertainty, innovation, structural change, Agribusiness, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Risk and Uncertainty, ISSN #: 1559-2448,

Why Engage? Understanding the Incentive to Build Nonprofit Capacity

The literature regarding nonprofit capacity building is expanding as funders, infrastructure support organizations, researchers, and others interested in strengthening the sector work to develop a better understanding of how to build organizational capacity effectively. In the spirit of this inquiry, The Forbes Funds commissioned Judith Millesen, at the Voinovich Center for Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University, and Angela Bies, at the Bush School of Government & Public Service at Texas A&M University, to examine the incentives associated with engagement in capacity building. Specifically, the research team used organizational theory to frame an examination of the ways in which environmental characteristics, institutional attributes, and financial characteristics relate to the incentive to engage in capacity building

The Relationship Between Risk, Performance-Based Pay, and Organizational Performance

In this study, we argue that much of the recent agency-based research on performance based pay virtually omits the role of risk. This compensation research has predominantly taken the positive perspective and focused on the incentive properties of performance-based pay, thereby overlooking the important role that risk plays in normative formulations of agency theory (Holmstrom, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling; 1976). Building on previous research, such as Beatty and Zajac (1994), we re-introduce risk by investigating its effects on the formation and outcomes of performance-based pay contracts. Specifically, our study examines both the main effects of risk on the structure of compensation contracts and the joint effects of risk and performance-based pay on firm performance. This study is based on data of incumbent managers from 356 companies over the period 1981 to 1988. Financial performance and market data were drawn from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT

Unions and the Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining in a Globalising World.

An interesting finding in recent research is that strategic considerations and collective bargaining structure often influence foreign direct investment. In this paper, I argue that the support for the decentralisation of collective bargaining may ba an optimal response by unions to the growing global nature of the firms that employ their members.INVESTMENTS ; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ; WAGES ; WORKERS' REPRESENTATION

Increasing the effectiveness of mergers and acquisitions within the management consulting industry

School of Managemen