The modal account of luck revisited

According to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck [e.g. Pritchard (2005)], an event is lucky just when that event occurs in the actual world but not in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world. This paper argues, with reference to a novel variety of counterexample, that it is a mistake to focus, when assessing a given event for luckiness, on events distributed over just the nearest possible worlds. More specifically, our objection to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck reveals that whether an event is lucky depends crucially on events distributed over all possible worlds–viz., across the modal universe. It is shown that an amended modal account of luck which respects this point has the additional virtue of avoiding a notable kind of counterexample to modal accounts of luck proposed by Lackey (2008)

Moral luck : control, choice, and virtue

In this thesis I propose a solution to the problem of moral luck. It is sometimes assumed that luck has no bearing on morality. However, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, in their papers entitled ‘Moral Luck’, show how this assumption could be erroneous. When making moral judgements it is usually thought that we abide by the ‘Control Principle’. This principle requires any moral judgements about an individual to be made only in cases where they were in control of their actions. The problem of moral luck arises because many moral judgements appear to contradict the Control Principle. My aims in this work are two-fold. First, I disambiguate concepts of luck and moral luck by conceptualising both in light of a Hybrid Account of Luck (HAL). In order to understand moral luck, the concept of luck itself needs to be understood. I begin by distinguishing luck from similar concepts and go on to defend a particular version of HAL that can be adapted to identify genuine cases of moral luck.Second, I propose a possible solution to the problem of moral luck based primarily on a critique of some of Nagel’s basic presuppositions regarding the issue in conjunction with a defence of Terence Irwin’s interpretation of Aristotle’s complex theory of moral responsibility. By giving a number of examples, I hope to establish that there is circumstantial moral luck and resultant moral luck, and that Aristotle’s conditions for moral responsibility can provide an adequate justification for praise and blame in these cases