Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Collaboration Enforcement In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) have attracted great research interest in recent years. Among many issues, lack of motivation for participating nodes to collaborate forms a major obstacle to the adoption of MANETs. Many contemporary collaboration enforcement techniques employ reputation mechanisms for nodes to avoid and penalize malicious participants. Reputation information is propagated among participants and updated based on complicated trust relationships to thwart false accusation of benign nodes. The aforementioned strategy suffers from low scalability and is likely to be exploited by adversaries. To address these problems, we first propose a finite state model. With this technique, no reputation information is propagated in the network and malicious nodes cannot cause false penalty to benign hosts. Misbehaving node detection is performed on-demand; and malicious node punishment and avoidance are accomplished by only maintaining reputation information within neighboring nodes. This scheme, however, requires that each node equip with a tamper-proof hardware. In the second technique, no such restriction applies. Participating nodes classify their one-hop neighbors through direct observation and misbehaving nodes are penalized within their localities. Data packets are dynamically rerouted to circumvent selfish nodes. In both schemes, overall network performance is greatly enhanced. Our approach significantly simplifies the collaboration enforcement process, incurs low overhead, and is robust against various malicious behaviors. Simulation results based on different system configurations indicate that the proposed technique can significantly improve network performance with very low communication cost

Dealing With Misbehavior In Distributed Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Most distributed systems comprise autonomous entities interacting with each other to achieve their objectives. These entities behave selfishly when making decisions. This behavior may result in strategical manipulation of the protocols thus jeopardizing the system wide goals. Micro-economics and game theory provides suitable tools to model such interactions. We use game theory to model and study three specific problems in distributed systems. We study the problem of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions and develop mechanisms to prevent cheating in such settings. We study the problem of antisocial behavior in a scheduling mechanism based on the second price sealed bid auction. We also build models using extensive form games to analyze the interactions of the attackers and the defender in a security game involving honeypots. Multicast cost sharing is an important problem and very few distributed strategyproof mechanisms exist to calculate the costs shares of the users. These mechanisms are susceptible to manipulation by rational nodes. We propose a faithful mechanism which uses digital signatures and auditing to catch and punish the cheating nodes. Such mechanism will incur some overhead. We deployed the proposed and existing mechanisms on planet-lab to experimentally analyze the overhead and other relevant economic properties of the proposed and existing mechanisms. In a second price sealed bid auction, even though the bids are sealed, an agent can infer the private values of the winning bidders, if the auction is repeated for related items. We study this problem from the perspective of a scheduling mechanism and develop an antisocial strategy which can be used by an agent to inflict losses on the other agents. In a security system attackers and defender(s) interact with each other. Examples of such systems are the honeynets which are used to map the activities of the attackers to gain valuable insight about their behavior. The attackers want to evade the honeypots while the defenders want them to attack the honeypots. These interesting interactions form the basis of our research where we develop a model used to analyze the interactions of an attacker and a honeynet system

Exponential Reliability Coefficient based Reputation Mechanism for isolating selfish nodes in MANETs

AbstractIn mobile ad hoc networks, cooperation among active mobile nodes is considered to play a vital role in reliable transmission of data. But, the selfish mobile nodes present in an ad hoc environment refuse to forward neighbouring nodes’ packet for conserving its own energy. This intentional selfish behaviour drastically reduces the degree of cooperation maintained between the mobile nodes. Hence, a need arises for devising an effective mechanism which incorporates both energy efficiency and reputation into account for mitigating selfish behaviour in MANETs. In this paper, we propose an Exponential Reliability Coefficient based reputation Mechanism (ERCRM) which isolates the selfish nodes from the routing path based on Exponential Reliability Coefficient (ExRC). This reliability coefficient manipulated through exponential failure rate based on moving average method highlights the most recent past behaviour of the mobile nodes for quantifying its genuineness. From the simulation results, it is evident that, the proposed ERCRM approach outperforms the existing Packet Conservation Monitoring Algorithm (PCMA) and Spilt Half Reliability Coefficient based Mathematical Model (SHRCM) in terms of performance evaluation metrics such as packet delivery ratio, throughput, total overhead and control overhead. Further, this ERCRM mechanism has a successful rate of 28% in isolating the selfish nodes from the routing path. Furthermore, it also aids in framing the exponential threshold point of detection as 0.4, where a maximum number of selfish nodes are identified when compared to the existing models available in the literature

Truthful resource management in wireless ad hoc networks

In wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), cooperation cannot be an im- plicit assumption anymore. Each profit-oriented network node has the intention to be selfish due to limited resource possession. In this dissertation, we investigate the truthful resource management that induces network nodes to reveal true information and stimulate cooperation. We propose the Transmission Power Recursive Auction Mechanism routing pro- tocol (TEAM) and the Truthful Topology Control mechanism (TRUECON) to cope with the selfish intention and achieve resource effciency in a non-cooperative envi- ronment. We prove both are strategy-proof and have some theoretic bounds on the performance. Compared with the existing routing protocols and topology control al- gorithms, TEAM and TRUECON are more effcient when dealing with the selfishness in MANETs. We conduct a study on anonymity enhancement in MANETs by reducing trans- mission power of network nodes. A routing protocol - Whisper is presented. Simu- lation results show that it has desirable properties in terms of anonymity and power effciency

Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial Part 1- Key concepts and classical results

Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a social planner faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective decision when the agents exhibit strategic behaviour. The objective of this paper is to provide a tutorial introduction to the foundations and key results in mechanism design theory. The paper is in two parts. Part 1 focuses on basic concepts and classical results which form the foundation of mechanism design theory. Part 2 presents key advanced concepts and deeper results in mechanism design

Systems-compatible Incentives

Originally, the Internet was a technological playground, a collaborative endeavor among researchers who shared the common goal of achieving communication. Self-interest used not to be a concern, but the motivations of the Internet's participants have broadened. Today, the Internet consists of millions of commercial entities and nearly 2 billion users, who often have conflicting goals. For example, while Facebook gives users the illusion of access control, users do not have the ability to control how the personal data they upload is shared or sold by Facebook. Even in BitTorrent, where all users seemingly have the same motivation of downloading a file as quickly as possible, users can subvert the protocol to download more quickly without giving their fair share. These examples demonstrate that protocols that are merely technologically proficient are not enough. Successful networked systems must account for potentially competing interests. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how to build systems that give users incentives to follow the systems' protocols. To achieve incentive-compatible systems, I apply mechanisms from game theory and auction theory to protocol design. This approach has been considered in prior literature, but unfortunately has resulted in few real, deployed systems with incentives to cooperate. I identify the primary challenge in applying mechanism design and game theory to large-scale systems: the goals and assumptions of economic mechanisms often do not match those of networked systems. For example, while auction theory may assume a centralized clearing house, there is no analog in a decentralized system seeking to avoid single points of failure or centralized policies. Similarly, game theory often assumes that each player is able to observe everyone else's actions, or at the very least know how many other players there are, but maintaining perfect system-wide information is impossible in most systems. In other words, not all incentive mechanisms are systems-compatible. The main contribution of this dissertation is the design, implementation, and evaluation of various systems-compatible incentive mechanisms and their application to a wide range of deployable systems. These systems include BitTorrent, which is used to distribute a large file to a large number of downloaders, PeerWise, which leverages user cooperation to achieve lower latencies in Internet routing, and Hoodnets, a new system I present that allows users to share their cellular data access to obtain greater bandwidth on their mobile devices. Each of these systems represents a different point in the design space of systems-compatible incentives. Taken together, along with their implementations and evaluations, these systems demonstrate that systems-compatibility is crucial in achieving practical incentives in real systems. I present design principles outlining how to achieve systems-compatible incentives, which may serve an even broader range of systems than considered herein. I conclude this dissertation with what I consider to be the most important open problems in aligning the competing interests of the Internet's participants