Ontological Pluralism and Notational Variance

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are

A Language for Ontological Nihilism

According to ontological nihilism there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural languages and standard predicate logic, however, appear to be committed to a picture of the world as containing individual objects. This leads to what I call the \emph{expressibility challenge} for ontological nihilism: what language can the ontological nihilist use to express her account of how matters fundamentally stand? One promising suggestion is for the nihilist to use a form of \emph{predicate functorese}, a language developed by Quine. This proposal faces a difficult objection, according to which any theory in predicate functorese will be a notational variant of the corresponding theory stated in standard predicate logic. Jason Turner (2011) has provided the most detailed and convincing version of this objection. In the present paper, I argue that Turner's case for the notational variance thesis relies on a faulty metasemantic principle and, consequently, that an objection long thought devastating is in fact misguided

Is Generative AI Ready to Join the Conversation That We Are?

In this article, I use the dialogical ideas of Hans-Georg Gadamer to evaluate whether generative AI is ready to join the ontological conversation that he considers humanity to be. Despite the technical advances of generative AI, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics reveals that it cannot function as a proxy human dialogue partner in pursuit of understanding. Even when free from anthropomorphic projections and reimagined as the “other”, generative AI is found to have a weak epistemology, lack of moral awareness, and no emotions. Even so, it evokes a response in some users that places it on the threshold of being. The most promising dialogical role identified for generative AI is as a digital form of Gadamerian “text” currently constrained by copyright and technical design. Generative AI’s shortcomings risk inhibiting hermeneutical understanding through greater access to summarised knowledge. Nonetheless, the new technology is on the brink of joining the ontological conversation of humanity

Quantifier Variance without Collapse

The thesis of quantifier variance is consistent and cannot be refuted via a collapse argument

Ways of being have no way of being useful

I critically discuss two kinds of argument in favour of ontological pluralism and argue that they fail to show that ways of being are explanatorily fruitful

Collapse and the Varieties of Quantifier Variance

The aim of the paper is to bring clarity regarding the doctrine of quantifier variance (due to Eli Hirsch), and two prominent arguments against this doctrine, the collapse argument and the Eklund-Hawthorne argument. Different versions of the doctrine of quantifier variance are distinguished, and it is shown that the effectiveness of the arguments against it depends on what version of the doctrine is at issue. The metaontological significance of the different versions of the doctrine are also assessed. Roughly, quantifier variance concerns there being different possible existential quantifier meanings, and often the doctrine involves a claim to the effect there is no unique “best” quantifier meaning. Much of the discussion in the paper concerns what it is to be an existential quantifier meaning in the sense at issue

Putnam's Meaning-Based Version of Ontological Pluralism

In the discussion of ontological pluralism, little attention has been paid to Putnam. However, he can be considered one of the leaders of this approach.The following article pursues Putnam's view on ontological pluralism,that is, pursuing the procedure that Putnam gradually moved away from metaphysical realism and eventually became an ontological pluralist.The discussion begins with Quine's ontological ideas and it is discussed how these ideas can be viewed, at least in Putnam's interpretation, as a monistic approach to ontology. Hence, ontological pluralism is, in a way, a rejection of such ideas. Then, I have dealt with Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism, and of course its inherent monism. I have shown how his arguments presented in this article in opposition to metaphysical realism can be grouped into a single doctrine called semanticism. So this doctrine, and its relation to Putnam's pluralistic approach, is also discussed. To better understand Putnam's version of ontological pluralism, which I have called the Meaning-Based version, two other versions have been introduced: the Sorting Version, attributed to Aristotle, and the Language-Based Version, attributed to Carnap. Then, I listed one by one the differences between Putnam's version and the other two versions, especially Carnap's version. Finally, the basic components of the Meaning-Based version of ontological pluralism are discussed

The logical problem of the incarnation: a new solution

This article aims to provide a new solution to the Logical Problem of the Incarnation by proposing a novel metaphysical reconstrual of the method of reduplicative predication. This reconstrual will be grounded upon the metaphysical thesis of ‘Ontological Pluralism, proposed by Kris McDaniel and Jason Turner, and the notion of an ‘aspect’ proposed by Donald L. M. Baxter. Utilising this thesis and notion will enable the method of reduplicative predication to be further clarified, and the central objection that is often raised against this approach can be successfully answered