AoA-aware Probabilistic Indoor Location Fingerprinting using Channel State Information

With expeditious development of wireless communications, location fingerprinting (LF) has nurtured considerable indoor location based services (ILBSs) in the field of Internet of Things (IoT). For most pattern-matching based LF solutions, previous works either appeal to the simple received signal strength (RSS), which suffers from dramatic performance degradation due to sophisticated environmental dynamics, or rely on the fine-grained physical layer channel state information (CSI), whose intricate structure leads to an increased computational complexity. Meanwhile, the harsh indoor environment can also breed similar radio signatures among certain predefined reference points (RPs), which may be randomly distributed in the area of interest, thus mightily tampering the location mapping accuracy. To work out these dilemmas, during the offline site survey, we first adopt autoregressive (AR) modeling entropy of CSI amplitude as location fingerprint, which shares the structural simplicity of RSS while reserving the most location-specific statistical channel information. Moreover, an additional angle of arrival (AoA) fingerprint can be accurately retrieved from CSI phase through an enhanced subspace based algorithm, which serves to further eliminate the error-prone RP candidates. In the online phase, by exploiting both CSI amplitude and phase information, a novel bivariate kernel regression scheme is proposed to precisely infer the target's location. Results from extensive indoor experiments validate the superior localization performance of our proposed system over previous approaches

Stay Connected, Leave no Trace: Enhancing Security and Privacy in WiFi via Obfuscating Radiometric Fingerprints

The intrinsic hardware imperfection of WiFi chipsets manifests itself in the transmitted signal, leading to a unique radiometric fingerprint. This fingerprint can be used as an additional means of authentication to enhance security. In fact, recent works propose practical fingerprinting solutions that can be readily implemented in commercial-off-the-shelf devices. In this paper, we prove analytically and experimentally that these solutions are highly vulnerable to impersonation attacks. We also demonstrate that such a unique device-based signature can be abused to violate privacy by tracking the user device, and, as of today, users do not have any means to prevent such privacy attacks other than turning off the device. We propose RF-Veil, a radiometric fingerprinting solution that not only is robust against impersonation attacks but also protects user privacy by obfuscating the radiometric fingerprint of the transmitter for non-legitimate receivers. Specifically, we introduce a randomized pattern of phase errors to the transmitted signal such that only the intended receiver can extract the original fingerprint of the transmitter. In a series of experiments and analyses, we expose the vulnerability of adopting naive randomization to statistical attacks and introduce countermeasures. Finally, we show the efficacy of RF-Veil experimentally in protecting user privacy and enhancing security. More importantly, our proposed solution allows communicating with other devices, which do not employ RF-Veil.Comment: ACM Sigmetrics 2021 / In Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., Vol. 4, 3, Article 44 (December 2020