2,858 research outputs found

    Distributed equilibrium seeking in aggregative games: linear convergence under singular perturbations lens

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    We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the aggregative variable, which is not available to the agents. We show that our method falls into the framework of singularly perturbed systems, as it involves the interconnection between a fast subsystem – the global information reconstruction dynamics – with a slow one concerning the optimization of the local strategies. This perspective plays a key role in analyzing the scheme with a constant stepsize, and in proving its linear convergence to the Nash equilibrium in strongly monotone games with local constraints. By exploiting the flexibility of our aggregative variable definition (not necessarily the arithmetic average of the agents’ strategy), we show the efficacy of our algorithm on a realistic voltage support case study for the smart grid

    A Douglas-Rachford splitting for semi-decentralized equilibrium seeking in generalized aggregative games

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    We address the generalized aggregative equilibrium seeking problem for noncooperative agents playing average aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. First, we use operator theory to characterize the generalized aggregative equilibria of the game as the zeros of a monotone set-valued operator. Then, we massage the Douglas-Rachford splitting to solve the monotone inclusion problem and derive a single layer, semi-decentralized algorithm whose global convergence is guaranteed under mild assumptions. The potential of the proposed Douglas-Rachford algorithm is shown on a simplified resource allocation game, where we observe faster convergence with respect to forward-backward algorithms.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1803.1044

    Continuous-time integral dynamics for Aggregative Game equilibrium seeking

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    In this paper, we consider continuous-time semi-decentralized dynamics for the equilibrium computation in a class of aggregative games. Specifically, we propose a scheme where decentralized projected-gradient dynamics are driven by an integral control law. To prove global exponential convergence of the proposed dynamics to an aggregative equilibrium, we adopt a quadratic Lyapunov function argument. We derive a sufficient condition for global convergence that we position within the recent literature on aggregative games, and in particular we show that it improves on established results

    Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard

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    One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time algorithms that compute exact (coarse) correlated equilibria. In light of these results, a natural question is how good are the (coarse) correlated equilibria that can arise from any efficient algorithm or dynamics. In this paper we address this question, and establish strong negative results. In particular, we show that in multiplayer games that have a succinct representation, it is NP-hard to compute any coarse correlated equilibrium (or approximate coarse correlated equilibrium) with welfare strictly better than the worst possible. The focus on succinct games ensures that the underlying complexity question is interesting; many multiplayer games of interest are in fact succinct. Our results imply that, while one can efficiently compute a coarse correlated equilibrium, one cannot provide any nontrivial welfare guarantee for the resulting equilibrium, unless P=NP. We show that analogous hardness results hold for correlated equilibria, and persist under the egalitarian objective or Pareto optimality. To complement the hardness results, we develop an algorithmic framework that identifies settings in which we can efficiently compute an approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare. We use this framework to develop an efficient algorithm for computing an approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare in aggregative games.Comment: 21 page
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