Laws of Little in an open queueing network

The object of this research in the queueing theory is theorems about the functional strong laws of large numbers (FSLLN) under the conditions of heavy traffic in an open queueing network (OQN). The FSLLN is known as a fluid limit or fluid approximation. In this paper, FSLLN are proved for the values of important probabilistic characteristics of the OQN investigated as well as the virtual waiting time of a customer and the queue length of customers. As applications of the proved theorems laws of Little in OQN are presented

Real-time and fault tolerance in distributed control software

Closed loop control systems typically contain multitude of spatially distributed sensors and actuators operated simultaneously. So those systems are parallel and distributed in their essence. But mapping this parallelism onto the given distributed hardware architecture, brings in some additional requirements: safe multithreading, optimal process allocation, real-time scheduling of bus and network resources. Nowadays, fault tolerance methods and fast even online reconfiguration are becoming increasingly important. All those often conflicting requirements, make design and implementation of real-time distributed control systems an extremely difficult task, that requires substantial knowledge in several areas of control and computer science. Although many design methods have been proposed so far, none of them had succeeded to cover all important aspects of the problem at hand. [1] Continuous increase of production in embedded market, makes a simple and natural design methodology for real-time systems needed more then ever

Rights and Queues: On Distributive Contests in the Modern State

Two legal concepts have become fundamental to questions of resource allocation in the modern state: rights and queues. As rights are increasingly recognized in areas such as housing, health care, or immigration law, so too are queues used to administer access to the goods, services, or opportunities that realize such rights, especially in conditions of scarcity. This Article is the first to analyze the concept of queues (or temporal waiting lines or lists) and their ambivalent, interdependent relation with rights. After showing the conceptual tension between rights and queues, the Article argues that queues and “queue talk” present a unique challenge to rights and “rights talk.” In exploring the currency of rights and queues in both political and legal terms, the Article illustrates how participants discuss and contest the right to housing in South Africa, the right to health care in Canada, and the right to asylum in Australia. It argues that, despite its appearance in very different ideological and institutional settings, the political discourse of “queues” and especially “queue jumping” commonly invokes misleading distinctions between corruption and order, markets and bureaucracies, and governments and courts. Moreover, queue talk obscures the first-order questions on which resource allocations in housing, health care, or immigration contexts must rely. By bringing much-needed complexity to the concept of “queues,” the Article explores ways in which general principles of allocative fairness may be both open to contestation and yet supportive of basic claims of rights

Essays on optimal allocation of resources by governments

The focus of this thesis is on how the government can optimally allocate the resources available in an economy. Chapter 2 studies how the efficiency of government activities depends on the allocation of labor resources by the government among different agencies. In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this chapter we study the effect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single window clearance system, on the efficiency of the entire process. Government intervention in education, typically in the form of education subsidies, is ubiquitous. In Chapter 3, the rationale behind such an intervention in education is studied in the presence of consumption externalities. The standard rationale for such intervention is a human capital externality. This chapter argues for government intervention in education even when no human capital externalities are present. Finally, Chapter 4 investigates how an economy with production shock behaves in the long run under the presence of government subsidy in education which is made available through a generational transfer mechanism where tax is collected from the working class and passed on to the new generation. The final good production is subject to a period wise shock. In this stochastic framework we define a balanced growth path in which the ratio of physical to human capital stocks converges. The conditions under which this invariant measure exists and is unique are completely specified. This steady state has been compared with a steady state of an economy where a perfect capital market exists to provide funds for education