Model-Free Non-Stationary RL: Near-Optimal Regret and Applications in Multi-Agent RL and Inventory Control

We consider model-free reinforcement learning (RL) in non-stationary Markov decision processes. Both the reward functions and the state transition functions are allowed to vary arbitrarily over time as long as their cumulative variations do not exceed certain variation budgets. We propose Restarted Q-Learning with Upper Confidence Bounds (RestartQ-UCB), the first model-free algorithm for non-stationary RL, and show that it outperforms existing solutions in terms of dynamic regret. Specifically, RestartQ-UCB with Freedman-type bonus terms achieves a dynamic regret bound of $\widetilde{O}(S^{\frac{1}{3}} A^{\frac{1}{3}} \Delta^{\frac{1}{3}} H T^{\frac{2}{3}})$, where $S$ and $A$ are the numbers of states and actions, respectively, $\Delta>0$ is the variation budget, $H$ is the number of time steps per episode, and $T$ is the total number of time steps. We further present a parameter-free algorithm named Double-Restart Q-UCB that does not require prior knowledge of the variation budget. We show that our algorithms are \emph{nearly optimal} by establishing an information-theoretical lower bound of $\Omega(S^{\frac{1}{3}} A^{\frac{1}{3}} \Delta^{\frac{1}{3}} H^{\frac{2}{3}} T^{\frac{2}{3}})$, the first lower bound in non-stationary RL. Numerical experiments validate the advantages of RestartQ-UCB in terms of both cumulative rewards and computational efficiency. We demonstrate the power of our results in examples of multi-agent RL and inventory control across related products.Comment: A preliminary version of this work has appeared in ICML 202

Independent Policy Gradient Methods for Competitive Reinforcement Learning

We obtain global, non-asymptotic convergence guarantees for independent learning algorithms in competitive reinforcement learning settings with two agents (i.e., zero-sum stochastic games). We consider an episodic setting where in each episode, each player independently selects a policy and observes only their own actions and rewards, along with the state. We show that if both players run policy gradient methods in tandem, their policies will converge to a min-max equilibrium of the game, as long as their learning rates follow a two-timescale rule (which is necessary). To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the first finite-sample convergence result for independent policy gradient methods in competitive RL; prior work has largely focused on centralized, coordinated procedures for equilibrium computation.Comment: Appeared at NeurIPS 202

Linear Last-iterate Convergence in Constrained Saddle-point Optimization

Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent (OGDA) and Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU) for saddle-point optimization have received growing attention due to their favorable last-iterate convergence. However, their behaviors for simple bilinear games over the probability simplex are still not fully understood - previous analysis lacks explicit convergence rates, only applies to an exponentially small learning rate, or requires additional assumptions such as the uniqueness of the optimal solution. In this work, we significantly expand the understanding of last-iterate convergence for OGDA and OMWU in the constrained setting. Specifically, for OMWU in bilinear games over the simplex, we show that when the equilibrium is unique, linear last-iterate convergence is achieved with a learning rate whose value is set to a universal constant, improving the result of (Daskalakis & Panageas, 2019b) under the same assumption. We then significantly extend the results to more general objectives and feasible sets for the projected OGDA algorithm, by introducing a sufficient condition under which OGDA exhibits concrete last-iterate convergence rates with a constant learning rate whose value only depends on the smoothness of the objective function. We show that bilinear games over any polytope satisfy this condition and OGDA converges exponentially fast even without the unique equilibrium assumption. Our condition also holds for strongly-convex-strongly-concave functions, recovering the result of (Hsieh et al., 2019). Finally, we provide experimental results to further support our theory

A Sharp Analysis of Model-based Reinforcement Learning with Self-Play

Model-based algorithms -- algorithms that explore the environment through building and utilizing an estimated model -- are widely used in reinforcement learning practice and theoretically shown to achieve optimal sample efficiency for single-agent reinforcement learning in Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). However, for multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, the current best known sample complexity for model-based algorithms is rather suboptimal and compares unfavorably against recent model-free approaches. In this paper, we present a sharp analysis of model-based self-play algorithms for multi-agent Markov games. We design an algorithm -- Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI) for two-player zero-sum Markov games that is able to output an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash policy in $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^3SAB/\epsilon^2)$ episodes of game playing, where $S$ is the number of states, $A,B$ are the number of actions for the two players respectively, and $H$ is the horizon length. This significantly improves over the best known model-based guarantee of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^4S^2AB/\epsilon^2)$, and is the first that matches the information-theoretic lower bound $\Omega(H^3S(A+B)/\epsilon^2)$ except for a $\min\{A,B\}$ factor. In addition, our guarantee compares favorably against the best known model-free algorithm if $\min \{A,B\}=o(H^3)$, and outputs a single Markov policy while existing sample-efficient model-free algorithms output a nested mixture of Markov policies that is in general non-Markov and rather inconvenient to store and execute. We further adapt our analysis to designing a provably efficient task-agnostic algorithm for zero-sum Markov games, and designing the first line of provably sample-efficient algorithms for multi-player general-sum Markov games