Cryptanalysis of two mutual authentication protocols for low-cost RFID

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is appearing as a favorite technology for automated identification, which can be widely applied to many applications such as e-passport, supply chain management and ticketing. However, researchers have found many security and privacy problems along RFID technology. In recent years, many researchers are interested in RFID authentication protocols and their security flaws. In this paper, we analyze two of the newest RFID authentication protocols which proposed by Fu et al. and Li et al. from several security viewpoints. We present different attacks such as desynchronization attack and privacy analysis over these protocols.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, 1 table, International Journal of Distributed and Parallel system

On the Improper Use of CRC for Cryptographic Purposes in RFID Mutual Authentication Protocols

Mutual authentication is essential to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an RFID system. One area of interest is the design of lightweight mutual authentication protocols that meet the limited computational and energy resources of the tags. These protocols use simple operations such as permutation and cyclic redundancy code for cryptographic purposes. However, these functions are cryptographically weak and are easily broken. In this work, we present a case against the use of these functions for cryptographic purposes, due to their simplicity and linear properties, by analyzing the LPCP protocol. We evaluate the claims of the LPCP resistance to de-synchronization and full disclosure attacks and show that the protocol is weak and can be easily broken by eavesdropping on a few mutual authentication sessions. This  weakness stems from the functions themselves as well as the improper use of inputs to these functions. We further offer suggestions that would help in designing more secure protocols

Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio

Criptografía ligera en dispositivos de identificación por radiofrecuencia- RFID

Esta tesis se centra en el estudio de la tecnología de identificación por radiofrecuencia (RFID), la cual puede ser considerada como una de las tecnologías más prometedoras dentro del área de la computación ubicua. La tecnología RFID podría ser el sustituto de los códigos de barras. Aunque la tecnología RFID ofrece numerosas ventajas frente a otros sistemas de identificación, su uso lleva asociados riesgos de seguridad, los cuales no son fáciles de resolver. Los sistemas RFID pueden ser clasificados, atendiendo al coste de las etiquetas, distinguiendo principalmente entre etiquetas de alto coste y de bajo coste. Nuestra investigación se centra fundamentalmente en estas últimas. El estudio y análisis del estado del arte nos ha permitido identificar la necesidad de desarrollar soluciones criptográficas ligeras adecuadas para estos dispositivos limitados. El uso de soluciones criptográficas estándar supone una aproximación correcta desde un punto de vista puramente teórico. Sin embargo, primitivas criptográficas estándar (funciones resumen, código de autenticación de mensajes, cifradores de bloque/flujo, etc.) exceden las capacidades de las etiquetas de bajo coste. Por tanto, es necesario el uso de criptografía ligera._______________________________________This thesis examines the security issues of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, one of the most promising technologies in the field of ubiquitous computing. Indeed, RFID technology may well replace barcode technology. Although it offers many advantages over other identification systems, there are also associated security risks that are not easy to address. RFID systems can be classified according to tag price, with distinction between high-cost and low-cost tags. Our research work focuses mainly on low-cost RFID tags. An initial study and analysis of the state of the art identifies the need for lightweight cryptographic solutions suitable for these very constrained devices. From a purely theoretical point of view, standard cryptographic solutions may be a correct approach. However, standard cryptographic primitives (hash functions, message authentication codes, block/stream ciphers, etc.) are quite demanding in terms of circuit size, power consumption and memory size, so they make costly solutions for low-cost RFID tags. Lightweight cryptography is therefore a pressing need. First, we analyze the security of the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard, which is considered the universal standard for low-cost RFID tags. Secondly, we cryptanalyze two new proposals, showing their unsuccessful attempt to increase the security level of the specification without much further hardware demands. Thirdly, we propose a new protocol resistant to passive attacks and conforming to low-cost RFID tag requirements. In this protocol, costly computations are only performed by the reader, and security related computations in the tag are restricted to very simple operations. The protocol is inspired in the family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Protocols (UMAP: M2AP, EMAP, LMAP) and the recently proposed SASI protocol. The thesis also includes the first published cryptanalysis of xi SASI under the weakest attacker model, that is, a passive attacker. Fourthly, we propose a new protocol resistant to both passive and active attacks and suitable for moderate-cost RFID tags. We adapt Shieh et.’s protocol for smart cards, taking into account the unique features of RFID systems. Finally, because this protocol is based on the use of cryptographic primitives and standard cryptographic primitives are not supported, we address the design of lightweight cryptographic primitives. Specifically, we propose a lightweight hash function (Tav-128) and a lightweight Pseudo-Random Number Generator (LAMED and LAMED-EPC).We analyze their security level and performance, as well as their hardware requirements and show that both could be realistically implemented, even in low-cost RFID tags

An Elliptic Curve-based Signcryption Scheme with Forward Secrecy

An elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme is introduced in this paper that effectively combines the functionalities of digital signature and encryption, and decreases the computational costs and communication overheads in comparison with the traditional signature-then-encryption schemes. It simultaneously provides the attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public verifiability, and forward secrecy of message confidentiality. Since it is based on elliptic curves and can use any fast and secure symmetric algorithm for encrypting messages, it has great advantages to be used for security establishments in store-and-forward applications and when dealing with resource-constrained devices.Comment: 13 Pages, 5 Figures, 2 Table