Libya after the civil war: regime change and democratisation

This article examines changes in Libya’s internal security, politics, economy and international relations since the start of the revolution in February 2011. Our main argument is that in order to transition from authoritarianism to democracy significant change in each of these four, mutually reinforcing, areas is needed. Drawing on data collected through media analysis and field work, we offer a discussion of the nature of change in Libya and how far the country has democratised. We claim that significant changes in Libya’s political system and foreign relations have taken place since 2011 that reinforce the process of democratisation. Within the political system these changes include the conduct of free and fair elections, the formation of new political parties, the reinforcement of civil rights and liberties, governmental accountability and the emergence of a participant political culture. Within foreign relations they include deeper cooperation with regional and international actors, reintegration into the Arab League, and rapprochement with Western states. However, we also observe that structural economic changes, in particular raising personal incomes and lowering poverty, and the normalisation of security provision are moving forward more slowly. We conclude that democratisation in Libya is taking place and there is a solid possibility that embedded democracy will emerge in Libya in the medium to long-term

معاملة السجين في الشريعة الإسلامية والقانون الليبي (لسنة1373,1988.1997)(دراسة نظرية وواقعية( Mu’aamalat assajin Fi assyari’at Al_Islamiyah Wa Al-Qonun al-Liby Dirosat nadzotiyah Wa Waqi’iyah

This Letter Is an Inductive Analytic Research The Idea Was Born Because Of The Need In The Libyan Society To Know And Clarify How To Treat With The Prisoner In The Libyan Law And The Compatibility/Conflict With Islamic Law In Deal With The Prisoner. Research Focused On The Prisoner Issue Between The Libyan Law And Islamic Law And How They Are Agreed or Disagree With Each Other. The research focuses on The Compatibility and Opposes between Libyan Law Abuses Occurring in Libyan Prisons which not acceptable In Islamic Law. After Research, Study And Analysis In The Words Of Scientists And Scholars The Former And Contemporaries, As Well As The Study And Analysis Of Law Materials in Libya, The Researcher Found That The Treatment Of The Prisoner In reality Inside The Libyan Prisons Does Not Apply With The Treatment Of The Prisoner In Islamic Law. As Well as Some of the Material had direct Disagreement with the Provisions of Islamic Sharia Law. And That Some Of The Material Which Has The Kind Of Compassion in Sharia Has Provided Courtesy, As International Protocols To Libya Be A State Of Justice And Truth

Rebels, Negligent Support, and State Accountability: Holding States Accountable for the Human Rights Violations of Non-State Actors

This Note discusses a crucial problem in the law of state accountability for human rights abuses. Specifically, it analyzes the difficulty of attaching liability when a state negligently supports a group that it should reasonably expect to commit human rights abuses. This note shows that the current legal framework governing attribution stems from a myopic focus on non-state actors acting like arms of the state. Indeed, the current tests require that the state have an extraordinarily high level of control over the non-state actors before liability can attach. This requirement not only creates perverse incentives for states to acquire less control over the nonstate groups they fund, but it also makes the goal of state responsibility illusory

Where’s the Consultation? The War Powers Resolution and Libya

[Excerpt] “President Barack Obama triggered a War Powers Resolution (WPR) controversy with his military response to the anti-government rebellion and civil war in Libya in 2011. Members of Congress seized upon the WPR, questioning whether the Obama administration had complied with the WPR’s requirements when the United States launched the initial Libyan Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) and subsequently participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Many legislators charged that President Obama had violated the WPR. Concerns centered on such issues as presidential reliance on the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council—rather than Congress—for authorization to act, the WPR’s relevance to what some perceived to be humanitarian missions, our nation’s role in a larger NATO operation, the Obama administration’s definition of “hostilities” under the WPR, and the expiration of the WPR’s sixty-day clock (requiring the termination of military involvement). As debate raged about these and other matters, the WPR’s consultation provisions failed to attract serious congressional scrutiny. Consultation, however, is at the WPR’s core and the prerequisite for the law’s stated goal that military ventures be based on the “collective judgment” of both Congress and the President. Thus, this Article concentrates on the subject of consultation and its glaring absence from the congressional conversation during the Libya crisis. After providing background on the WPR generally, the consultation requirement more specifically, and the U.S. response to the violence in Libya during the Libyan Revolution, I examine President Obama’s disregard for the consultation mandate’s letter and spirit. I then explore Congress’s muted response to the administration’s consultation violations, analyzing why the administration’s non-compliance did not spark greater congressional outrage. The congressional reaction to President Obama’s initial failure to consult on U.S. policy in Syria in August 2013, I also show, conforms to the analysis here. Finally, I consider what this study suggests for the future of the WPR’s consultation obligation. This Article hence highlights a specific WPR topic—consultation—that heretofore has received neither dedicated nor significant scholarly attention.

The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought

he recent Tuareg uprising in Mali under the banner of the MNLA has raised concerns over stability and safety in the region, with much attention focussed on the Libya and AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) ‘connections’. The framing of the conflict in terms of international security and political (in)stability elsewhere obscures the causes, considerations and implications on a local level. Here we will try to discuss the conflict from a Tuareg perspective, estimating the impact of local, international and national concerns on the chances for peace or lasting conflict