A new index of legislative oversight

The purpose of this paper is to present a new index of legislative oversight. Building on the work by Stapenhurst (2011), who argued that a proper index of legislative oversight capacity should reflect not only legislatures’ internal oversight capacity but also the impact of contextual factors, we devise and propose a modified version of the Stapenhurst. The results of the empirical analyses presented in the paper sustain the claim that when properly operationalized and measured, legislative oversight capacity is a good predictor of legislative oversight effectiveness and other policy relevant results

Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and Partner

Ultimately, all questions of administrative law, judicial review of agency action, and the degree of congressional oversight revolve around attempts to discover where the true congressional intent lies. All of our congressional oversight activities seek to advance an administrative agency outcome that most reflects congressional understanding of the dictates of law. In our system of government the non-legislative branches all pursue the same goal-determining and ultimately following congressional intent. The system affords each branch a great deal of leeway to pursue its own view of congressional intent, and naturally each branch seeks to assert its own perspective as much as possible. In the author\u27s opinion, from the vantage point of a congressional subcommittee chair, some views should be granted greater deference than others

Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU

‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ asked the Roman poet Juvenal – ‘who will watch the watchers, who will guard the guardians?’1 As legislative and regulatory processes around the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, (Verschuuren and van Gestel 2009, Hahn and Tetlock 2007), we ask: who oversees the regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and beneficial, it can also impose its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, regulatory oversight--frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation.We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional actors, the Regulatory Oversight Bodies (ROBs). These bodies tend to be located in the executive (or sometimes the legislative) branch of government. They review the flow of new regulations using impact assessment and benefit-cost analysis, and they sometimes also appraise existing regulations to measure and reduce regulatory burdens. Through these procedures of regulatory review, ROBs have become an integral aspect not only of regulatory reform programs in many countries, but also of their respective administrative systems. Although most academic attention focuses on the analytical tools used to improve the quality of legislation, such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) or benefit-cost analysis, this chapter instead identifies the key concepts and issues surrounding the establishment and operation of ROBs across governance systems. It does so by examining and comparing the oversight mechanisms that have been established in the United States and in the EU and by critically looking into their origins, rationales, mandates, institutional designs and scope of oversight.

Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies

I develop a formal model of bureaucratic policymaking to investigate why a legislature would choose to delegate authority to a bureaucratic agency whose actions can be controlled, ex post , by an executive with divergent policy preferences. Because the executive and legislature might find different policies to be salient to their constituencies, I demonstrate that executive review of agency rulemaking can benefit both branches of government, relative to legislative delegation without the possibility of such review. In trying to undermine the impacts of executive oversight, agencies propose policies that could benefit the legislature were the executive to choose not to intervene in agency policymaking. Likewise, if the executive does intervene, executive review allows him to implement a policy more desirable than absent such review. This joint-desirability of executive review is more likely when legislative and executive policy preferences are relatively aligned, and when legislative and agency policy preferences are relatively divergent. The broader social welfare consequences of executive review depend on the relative effectiveness of the executive's oversight of agency policymaking. These results provide insight for why mediating lawmaking institutions such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) continue to survive in a separation of powers system despite their potential to advantage one branch of government at the expense of the other.

Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options

[Excerpt] Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth, reform, and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. Congress conducts regular oversight of these programs, repeatedly revising and extending them. Two major issues face the 111th Congress: (1) the expiration of two preference programs by December 31, 2010; and (2) possible legislative action on broader reform of the preference programs based on comprehensive reviews in hearings held in both the House and the Senate earlier in this Congress. This report discusses the major U.S. trade preference programs, their possible economic effects, stakeholder interests, and legislative options

Congress, Treasury, and the Accountability of Exchange Rate Policy: How the 1988 Trade Act Should Be Reformed

The controversy within the United States over Chinese exchange rate policy has generated a series of legislative proposals to restrict the discretion of the Treasury Department in determining currency manipulation and to reform the department’s accountability to Congress. This paper reviews Treasury’s reports to Congress on exchange rate policy—introduced by the 1988 Trade Act—and Congress’s treatment of them. It finds that the accountability process has often not worked well in practice: The reports provide only a partial basis for effective congressional oversight. For its part, Congress held hearings on less than half of the reports and overlooked some important substantive issues. Several recommendations can improve guidance to the Treasury, standards for assessment, and congressional oversight. These include (1) refining the criteria used to determine currency manipulation and writing them into law, (2) explicitly harnessing US decisions on manipulation to the International Monetary Fund’s rules on exchange rates, (3) clarifying the general objectives of US exchange rate policy, (4) reaffirming the mandate to seek international macroeconomic and currency cooperation, (5) requiring Treasury to lead an executivewide policy review, and (6) institutionalizing multicommittee oversight of exchange rate policy by Congress. Legislators should strengthen reporting and oversight of broader exchange rate policy in addition to strengthening the provisions targeting manipulation.Exchange rate policy, currency manipulation, accountability, congressional oversight, China,Treasury, International Monetary Fund

Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity Act

A prooposed bill to establish an Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity in the legislative branch. This commission would be used to determine whether the President is mentally or physically unable to discharge the powers and duties of office.https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressionalmaterials_ppsl/1001/thumbnail.jp

Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3388</p

Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU

‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ asked the Roman poet Juvenal – ‘who will watch the watchers, who will guard the guardians?’ As legislative and regulatory processes around the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, we ask: who oversees the regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and beneficial, it can also impose its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, regulatory oversight--frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation. We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional actors, the Regulatory Oversight Bodies (ROBs). These bodies tend to be located in the executive (or sometimes the legislative) branch of government. They review the flow of new regulations using impact assessment and benefit-cost analysis, and they sometimes also appraise existing regulations to measure and reduce regulatory burdens. Through these procedures of regulatory review, ROBs have become an integral aspect not only of regulatory reform programs in many countries, but also of their respective administrative systems. Although most academic attention focuses on the analytical tools used to improve the quality of legislation, such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) or benefit-cost analysis, this chapter instead identifies the key concepts and issues surrounding the establishment and operation of ROBs across governance systems. It does so by examining and comparing the oversight mechanisms that have been established in the United States and in the EU and by critically looking into their origins, rationales, mandates, institutional designs and scope of oversight

A Hobbesian Bundle of Lockean Sticks: The Property Rights Legacy of Justice Scalia

No modern United States Supreme Court Justice has stimulated more thought and debate about the constitutional meaning of property than Antonin Scalia. This essay evaluates his efforts to change the prevailing interpretation of the Takings Clause. Scalia sought to ground it in clear rules embodying a reactionary defense of private owners’ prerogatives against environmental and land use regulation. Ultimately, Scalia aimed to authorize federal judicial oversight of state property law developments, whether through legislative or judicial innovation. In hindsight, he stands in a long tradition of conservative judges using property law as a constitutional baseline by which to restrain regulation