The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance

Significant controversy surrounds the issuance of legal opinions in structured finance transactions, particularly where accountants separately use these opinions, beyond their traditional primary use, for determining whether to characterize the transactions as debt. Reflecting at its core the unresolved boundaries between public and private in financial transactions, this controversy raises important issues of first impression: To what extent, for example, should lawyers be able to issue legal opinions that create negative externalities? Furthermore, what should differentiate the roles of lawyers and accountants in disclosing information to investors? Resolution of these issues not only helps to demystify the mystique, and untangle the morass, of legal-opinion giving but also affects the very viability of the securitization industry, which dominates American, and increasingly global, financing

Securitize Me: Stimulating Renewable Energy Financing by Embracing the Capital Markets

The current system of financing renewable energy projects is broken and inadequate, especially when compared to the framework for participating in oil and gas ventures. The solution lies in borrowing accepted energy business practices and adapting them to solar and wind energy projects. This Article focuses on the current issues facing renewable energy project financing in the United States, analyzes failed attempts to stimulate growth, and presents the securitization of renewable energy assets as a solution. Drawing on current legal structure and debates from the corporate sphere, this Article also discusses specific securitization techniques that can help to democratize and grow investment in renewable energy projects

The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance

Significant controversy surrounds the issuance of legal opinions in structured finance transactions, particularly where accountants separately use these opinions, beyond their traditional primary use, for determining whether to characterize the transactions as debt. Reflecting at its core the unresolved boundaries between public and private in financial transactions, this controversy raises important issues of first impression: To what extent, for example, should lawyers be able to issue legal opinions that create negative externalities? Furthermore, what should differentiate the roles of lawyers and accountants in disclosing information to investors? Resolution of these issues not only helps to demystify the mystique, and untangle the morass, of legal-opinion giving but also affects the very viability of the securitization industry, which dominates American, and increasingly global, financing

Asset securitization in Europe

Until the late 1980s, asset securitisation was an US-American finance technique. Meanwhile this technique has been used also in some European countries, although to a much lesser extent. While some of them have adopted or developed their legal and regulatory framework, others remain on earlier stages. That may be because of the lack of economic incentives, but also because of remaining regulatory or legal impediments. The following overview deals with the legal and regulatory environment in five selected European countries. It is structured as follows: First, this finance technique will be described in outline to the benefit of the reader who might not be familiar with it. A further part will report the recent development and the underlying economic reasons that drive this development. The main part will then deal with international aspects and give an overview of some legal and regulatory issues in five European legislations. Tax and accounting questions are, however, excluded. Concluding remarks follow

What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?

In Re: Defining Securitization, Professor Jonathan Lipson attempts to define a “true” securitization transaction, ultimately characterizing it as “a purchase of primary payment rights by a special purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) estate of the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights so purchased.” There is much to admire in Lipson’s attempt but also much to question. Let me start with the admiration. Lipson’s article is by far the most systematic and thoughtful analysis of what securitization should mean. Importantly, he describes what he sees as the “essential elements of a securitization, its inputs (payment rights), structure (bankruptcy-proof legal isolation), and outputs (securities).” Dividing securitization into inputs, structure, and outputs is rhetorically, if not also conceptually, sensible. Indeed, in teaching courses about securitization I often have referred to the left-hand side of the structure--which Lipson more felicitously calls the inputs--and the right-hand side of the structure--which Lipson (again more felicitously) calls the outputs. To the extent such terminology is intuitively descriptive, it advances understanding. In future courses, I intend to refer to inputs and outputs. I would, however, make one change to Lipson’s use of the term “structure” to describe the portion of a securitization transaction between the inputs and the outputs. Because “structure” intuitively means an entire structure--which, in the case of securitization, would also include the inputs and outputs--I suggest using the term “intermediate structure” instead. Thus, I will refer to a securitization transaction’s inputs, intermediate structure, and outputs. Even with that change, I still have several concerns with Professor Lipson’s definition of securitization. This Article will next discuss those concerns, showing that the definition is overly restrictive and potentially inaccurat

What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?

In Re: Defining Securitization, Professor Jonathan Lipson attempts to define a “true” securitization transaction, ultimately characterizing it as “a purchase of primary payment rights by a special purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) estate of the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights so purchased.” There is much to admire in Lipson’s attempt but also much to question. Let me start with the admiration. Lipson’s article is by far the most systematic and thoughtful analysis of what securitization should mean. Importantly, he describes what he sees as the “essential elements of a securitization, its inputs (payment rights), structure (bankruptcy-proof legal isolation), and outputs (securities).” Dividing securitization into inputs, structure, and outputs is rhetorically, if not also conceptually, sensible. Indeed, in teaching courses about securitization I often have referred to the left-hand side of the structure--which Lipson more felicitously calls the inputs--and the right-hand side of the structure--which Lipson (again more felicitously) calls the outputs. To the extent such terminology is intuitively descriptive, it advances understanding. In future courses, I intend to refer to inputs and outputs. I would, however, make one change to Lipson’s use of the term “structure” to describe the portion of a securitization transaction between the inputs and the outputs. Because “structure” intuitively means an entire structure--which, in the case of securitization, would also include the inputs and outputs--I suggest using the term “intermediate structure” instead. Thus, I will refer to a securitization transaction’s inputs, intermediate structure, and outputs. Even with that change, I still have several concerns with Professor Lipson’s definition of securitization. This Article will next discuss those concerns, showing that the definition is overly restrictive and potentially inaccurat

In-House Counsel’s Role in the Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities

The authors introduce the financial crisis and the role played by mortgage-backed securities. Then describe the controversy at issue: whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, the authors analyze (i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to mitigate the controversy. Finally, the authors examine how the foregoing analysis can help to inform the broader issue of how in-house counsel should address complex legal transactions

The Universal Language of International Securitization

This article introduces the reader to international securitization, first by explaining the concepts of securitization and then by examining securitization in a cross-border context

Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Fin. Serv. Comm., 111th Cong., Nov. 18, 2010 (Statement of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center)

The US is now in its forth year of a mortgage crisis in which over 3 million families have lost their homes and another 2.5 million are currently scheduled to lose theirs. Repeated government loan modification or refinancing initiatives have failed miserably. To this sad state of affairs, there now come a variety of additional problems: faulty foreclosures due to irregularities ranging from procedural defects (including, but not limited to robosigning) to outright counterfeiting of documents; predatory servicing practices that precipitate borrower defaults and then overcharge for foreclosure services that are ultimately paid for by investors; and questions about the validity of transfers in private-label mortgage securitizations. While the extent of these problems is unknown at present, the evidence is mounting that they are not limited to one-off cases, but that there may be pervasive defects throughout the mortgage servicing and securitization processes