Divided They Dally? The Arab World and a Nuclear Iran

Explores how the Arab states -- Gulf States, non-Gulf States, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria -- might react to a nuclear Iran. Considers possible changes to inter-Arab relations and the United States' role in working with Arab states to contain Iran

For a ‘More Active’ EU in the Middle East: Transatlantic Relations and the Strategic Implications of Europe’s Engagement with Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine. Egmont Paper, no. 13, March 2007

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), calls for the EU to be ‘more active’ in pursuing its strategic objectives. The two probably most salient examples of a ‘more active’ EU are to be found in the Middle East. (2) The ‘EU3’ (France, Germany and the UK) are leading nuclear negotiations with Iran. The EU has taken the lead in reinforcing the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, UNIFIL, as authorized by UNSC Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006. Over 70% of the enlarged force or 7,600 troops out of 10,800 are provided by the EU27. This engagement clearly fits in with the EU’s interests as defined in the ESS, notably the need ‘to promote a ring of well governed countries […] on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’, and to avoid ‘a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East’. The cases of Iran and Lebanon can be seen as positive examples of an EU that is more united and hence ‘more active’. Yet, they also provoke fundamental strategic questions on the ambitions and potential of EU policy towards the region, and of the EU as a global strategic actor. These are questions which the EU inevitably will be confronted with if it continues its ‘more active’ role in the Middle East

International Interventionism 1970-1989: A Count Data Approach

Due to progress in statistical methods and improved data processing capabilities, count data modelling has become increasingly popular in the social sciences. In empirical international relations and international conflict research, however, the use of event count models has been largely restricted to the application of the simple Poisson approach so far. This article outlines the methodological weaknesses of the model and presents some improvements which are applied to the problem of international interventionism. The cross-sectional data set used covers the behaviour of states during the period from 1970 to 1989, and thus avoids some theoretical problems of the standard long-term dyadic approach. The main result of the analysis is the empirical irrelevance of idealist conceptions claiming pacifying effects of democratization or fostering of economic prosperity

European Neighbourhood Policy in the Mashreq Countries: Enhancing Prospects for Reform. CEPS Working Documents No. 229, 1 September 2005

This report assesses ways in which the Action Plan process that has been launched under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could become a more effective driver of political and economic change in the Mashreq region (covering Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories), compared with the modest results from the Barcelona process to date. The development of the ENP has already provided a valuable systemic/institutional advance in Euro-Med relations and has been an important confidence-building measure in an increasingly uncertain political environment. But it has yet to provide momentum for economic, political and social advance in the partner states. Key elements in making the Action Plan process more effective would be the following: · The Commission needs to deepen the policy content of the ENP with sketches of different degrees of desirable EU acquis compliance as a function of different economic structures and capabilities of the partner states. · The task of policy-shaping in different sectors of the Action Plans with the partner states needs to be shared by the Commission with other international organisations, most importantly the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). · The policy-shaping recommendations in support of the economic parts of the Action Plans should be explicitly linked to financial or market-access incentives (or both) on offer from the EU and international financial institutions. The promotion of political reform in the partner states is a more delicate affair. Yet there is still some room for ‘positive conditionality’ if the Commission were to define more substantively the package of incentives that are offered to partner states

EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean - Cooperation against All Odds?

Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far the EU has been able to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion policy. The paper traces the evolution of the EU’s provisions for democracy promotion and compares the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting power in international relations. A systematic comparison across countries and over time explores the explanatory power of interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining country variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation in target countries is the most important scope condition for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EU’s differential ‘normative power’ in international relations.closer cooperation; closer cooperation; democracy; Mediterranean; Europeanization; Europeanization

The Euro-Mediterranean Trade relations

In fact The EU is the most important trading partner for the Mediterranean countries accounting for about 45% of both MED exports (€40 billion) and imports (€42 billion) in 2004. This corresponds to approximately 5% of both the EU’s imports and exports, where The most important EU exports to the Mediterranean countries are in machinery and mechanical appliances (15%), electrical machinery (11%)and vehicles (8%),while EU imports from Med countries are dominated by fuels and oil (40%) and to a lesser extent by textiles (10%).foreign trade, EU, EU-Mediteraneean countries agreements

Do institutions matter for FDI? A comparative analysis for the MENA countries

The paper analyses the underpinning factors of foreign direct investments towards the MENA countries. Our main interpretative hypothesis is based on the significant role of the quality of institutions to attract FDI. In MENA experience the growth of FDI flows proved to be notably inferior to that recorded in the EU or in Asian economies, such as China and India. Our research, firstly, stresses three major factors for such a poor performance: i) the small size of local markets and the lack of real economic integration; ii) the changes in the scenario of international competition; iii) economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and mostly insufficient. Using the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) governance indicators, we examine the role of “institutional quality” on FDI trough a regression analysis. Our analysis show as institutions play an important role in the relative performances of countries in attracting FDI. At last, data on institutional quality and business climate show the relative disvantages of MENA. Our paper suggests as MENA countries require deep institutional reforms in order to improve the attractiveness in terms of FDI.FDI; Institutions; MENA Countries