273,954 research outputs found
On the Disclosure of Promotion Value in Platforms with Learning Sellers
We consider a platform facilitating trade between sellers and buyers with the
objective of maximizing consumer surplus. Even though in many such marketplaces
prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers, platforms can influence prices
through (i) price-dependent promotion policies that can increase demand for a
product by featuring it in a prominent position on the webpage and (ii) the
information revealed to sellers about the value of being promoted. Identifying
effective joint information design and promotion policies is a challenging
dynamic problem as sellers can sequentially learn the promotion value from
sales observations and update prices accordingly. We introduce the notion of
confounding promotion policies, which are designed to prevent a Bayesian seller
from learning the promotion value (at the expense of the short-run loss of
diverting consumers from the best product offering). Leveraging these policies,
we characterize the maximum long-run average consumer surplus that is
achievable through joint information design and promotion policies when the
seller sets prices myopically. We then establish a Bayesian Nash equilibrium by
showing that the seller's best response to the platform's optimal policy is to
price myopically at every history. Moreover, the equilibrium we identify is
platform-optimal within the class of horizon-maximin equilibria, in which
strategies are not predicated on precise knowledge of the horizon length, and
are designed to maximize payoff over the worst-case horizon. Our analysis
allows one to identify practical long-run average optimal platform policies in
a broad range of demand models
A foundation for machine learning in design
This paper presents a formalism for considering the issues of learning in design. A foundation for machine learning in design (MLinD) is defined so as to provide answers to basic questions on learning in design, such as, "What types of knowledge can be learnt?", "How does learning occur?", and "When does learning occur?". Five main elements of MLinD are presented as the input knowledge, knowledge transformers, output knowledge, goals/reasons for learning, and learning triggers. Using this foundation, published systems in MLinD were reviewed. The systematic review presents a basis for validating the presented foundation. The paper concludes that there is considerable work to be carried out in order to fully formalize the foundation of MLinD
Deception in Optimal Control
In this paper, we consider an adversarial scenario where one agent seeks to
achieve an objective and its adversary seeks to learn the agent's intentions
and prevent the agent from achieving its objective. The agent has an incentive
to try to deceive the adversary about its intentions, while at the same time
working to achieve its objective. The primary contribution of this paper is to
introduce a mathematically rigorous framework for the notion of deception
within the context of optimal control. The central notion introduced in the
paper is that of a belief-induced reward: a reward dependent not only on the
agent's state and action, but also adversary's beliefs. Design of an optimal
deceptive strategy then becomes a question of optimal control design on the
product of the agent's state space and the adversary's belief space. The
proposed framework allows for deception to be defined in an arbitrary control
system endowed with a reward function, as well as with additional
specifications limiting the agent's control policy. In addition to defining
deception, we discuss design of optimally deceptive strategies under
uncertainties in agent's knowledge about the adversary's learning process. In
the latter part of the paper, we focus on a setting where the agent's behavior
is governed by a Markov decision process, and show that the design of optimally
deceptive strategies under lack of knowledge about the adversary naturally
reduces to previously discussed problems in control design on partially
observable or uncertain Markov decision processes. Finally, we present two
examples of deceptive strategies: a "cops and robbers" scenario and an example
where an agent may use camouflage while moving. We show that optimally
deceptive strategies in such examples follow the intuitive idea of how to
deceive an adversary in the above settings
Intelligent systems in manufacturing: current developments and future prospects
Global competition and rapidly changing customer requirements are demanding increasing changes in manufacturing environments. Enterprises are required to constantly redesign their products and continuously reconfigure their manufacturing systems. Traditional approaches to manufacturing systems do not fully satisfy this new situation. Many authors have proposed that artificial intelligence will bring the flexibility and efficiency needed by manufacturing systems. This paper is a review of artificial intelligence techniques used in manufacturing systems. The paper first defines the components of a simplified intelligent manufacturing systems (IMS), the different Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to be considered and then shows how these AI techniques are used for the components of IMS
Composable and Efficient Mechanisms
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good
properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms
simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms,
related to smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought of as
mechanisms that generate approximately market clearing prices. We show that
smooth mechanisms result in high quality outcome in equilibrium both in the
full information setting and in the Bayesian setting with uncertainty about
participants, as well as in learning outcomes. Our main result is to show that
such mechanisms compose well: smoothness locally at each mechanism implies
efficiency globally.
For mechanisms where good performance requires that bidders do not bid above
their value, we identify the notion of a weakly smooth mechanism. Weakly smooth
mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction, are approximately efficient under the
no-overbidding assumption. Similar to smooth mechanisms, weakly smooth
mechanisms behave well in composition, and have high quality outcome in
equilibrium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information setting and
in the Bayesian setting, as well as in learning outcomes.
In most of the paper we assume participants have quasi-linear valuations. We
also extend some of our results to settings where participants have budget
constraints
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