A Theory of Humanity: Part 2—Conditions for True Universalism

The currently used humanity model is chaotic, devoid of logic or coherence. In Part 1 of this two-part paper, we examined human traits of a scientific model in absence of ‘born sinner’ starting point. We demonstrated that the so-called ‘viceroy model’ that is characterized as scientifically sustainable can replace the existing models that are based on fear and scarcity. Part Two of the paper deals with adequate definition of moral campus that conforms to the viceroy model. In this paper, it is shown that the talk of morality or a moral compass is aphenomenal in absence of strict necessary and sufficient conditions. It also follows that natural justice can only be followed after defining the term ‘natural’ with the same scientific rigor as that of the viceroy model. Once these terms are consistently defined, one is well poised to talk about inalienable rights, moral compass, environmental sustainability, and humanity. The immediate consequence of this model is the demonstration that currently used governance models, such as democracy, is inherently implosive and must be replaced with a new model that is in conformance with the scientific definition of ‘natural’. This emerging model is free from inconsistencies and will remain effective as a governance tool that optimizes individual rights and balances with the right of the state as well as a Creator. It is concluded that this model offers the only hope of maximizing individual liberty without compromising universal peace and natural justice. At this point, morality and legality become equivalent to each. The implications of this paper are overwhelming, making all current judicial actions immoral, in essence repudiating the entire Establishment as little more than a mafia entity, bringing back ‘might is right’ mantra, packaged as ‘social progress’. The paper finally shows how a standard that is necessarily and sufficiently universal can become impetus for a true knowledge

Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic

In §12 of his 1837 magnum opus, the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano remarks that “In the new logic textbooks one reads almost constantly that ‘in logic one must consider not the material of thought but the mere form of thought, for which reason logic deserves the title of a purely formal science’” (WL §12, 46).1 The sentence Bolzano quotes is his own summary of others’ philosophical views; he goes on to cite Jakob, Hoffbauer, Metz, and Krug as examples of thinkers who held that logic abstracts from the matter of thought and considers only its form. Although Bolzano does not mention Kant by name here, Kant does of course hold that “pure general logic”, what Bolzano would consider logic in the traditional sense (the theory of propositions, representations, inferences, etc.), is formal. As Kant remarks in the Introduction to the 2nd edition of Kritik der reinen Vernunft , (pure general) logic is “justified in abstracting – is indeed obliged to abstract – from all objects of cognition and all of their differences; and in logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its own form” (KrV, Bix).

A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Object, Truth, and Actuality

Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant's notion of actual object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgment with an actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant's notions of truth, object, and actuality. I argue that Kant's notion of actual object does not presuppose the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a judgment with an actual object

Speculations on a privileged state of cognitive dissonance

This paper examines two commonly held and conflicting cognitions in the modern world, each based on a belief vital to the individual's sense of self, both maintained in what is here considered as a chronic state of dissonance. This psychological inconsistency consists of an inherent practical belief in the goodness of empirical knowledge and a culturally-developed transcendent belief denying, or at least mitigating, empirical evidence about the finite nature of individual life and affirming a counter-empirical belief in supernatural: supra-cause-and-effect forces that influence life. I argue that since both beliefs are highly resistant to change, they lead to an impasse that individuals in diverse cultures have borne and been motivated to maintain. They have borne it, as I hope to show, because the consonant “cure” has proved to be more discomforting than the dissonant condition. \ud \u

Cultural Cognition and the Thoughtful Judge

That judges follow what the law is, and not what they wish it was, is a requirement of the rule of law. At the same time, scholars, lawyers, and judges often say that judges’ values influence their decisions. Connecting these two ideas has generated a conversation about the relationship between law, ideology, and politics. Recently, part of this conversation has focused on a theory called cultural cognition. The theory offers an account of how people’s values shape how they interpret things without their noticing. People whose values tend toward hierarchy sometimes perceive facts differently than people whose values tend toward egalitarianism, and communitarians sometimes perceive facts differently than individualists. But cultural cognition is underappreciated in legal interpretation. In law, cultural cognition theory is sometimes associated with legal realism, and people who are not legal realists might discount it for that reason. Recent empirical work has also concluded that judges have some skill at avoiding cultural cognition’s influence when interpreting the law. In this Article, I argue that cultural cognition is a more powerful concern for legal judgment than recognized. If cultural cognition exists, then it can influence legal judgment according to many theories of law, not just legal realism. Legal judgment is also susceptible to influences that are hard to track empirically. Figuring out the content of disputed laws is amenable to the values-driven influences—and errors— that cultural cognition theory contemplates. Cultural cognition poses a problem for the thoughtful judge. Avoiding its power requires cultivating a reflective and curious attitude toward legal questions, which may be expressed in judicial virtues like wisdom, temperance, and humility. Cultural cognition theory also gives reason for concern if the judiciary separates into values-based groups

The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative

Kant on Perception, Experience and Judgements Thereof

It is commonly thought that the distinction between subjectively valid judgements of perception and objectively valid judgements of experience in the Prolegomena is not consistent with the account of judgement Kant offers in the B Deduction, according to which a judgement is ‘nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception’. Contrary to this view, I argue that the Prolegomena distinction maps closely onto that drawn between the mathematical and dynamical principles in the System of Principles: Kant’s account of the Prolegomena distinction strongly suggests that it is the Analogies of Experience that make it possible for judgements of perception to give rise to judgements of experience. This means that judgements of perception are objectively valid with regard to the quantity and quality of objects, and subjectively valid with regard to the relation they posit between objects. If that is the case, then the notion of a judgement of perception is consistent with the B Deduction account of judgement

On Modern Science, Human Cognition, and Cultural Diversity

The development of modern science has depended strongly on specific features of the cultures involved; however, its results are widely and trans-culturally accepted and applied. The science and technology of electricity provides a particularly interesting example. It emerged as a specific product of post-Renaissance Europe, rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition that encourages explanations of nature in theoretical terms. It did not evolve in China presumably because such encouragement was missing. The trans-cultural acceptance of modern science and technology is postulated to be due, in part, to the common biological dispositions underlying human cognition, with generalizable capabilities of abstract, symbolic and strategic thought. These faculties of the human mind are main prerequisites for dynamic cultural development and differentiation. They appear to have evolved up to a stage of hunters and gatherers perhaps some 100 000 years ago. However, the extent of the correspondence between some constructions of the human mind and the order of nature, as revealed by science, is a late insight of the last centuries. Quantum physics and relativity are particularly impressive examples