Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Annual Report, FY 2009

The Iowa Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) was created by an act of the Iowa legislature in 1967 with its purpose being to upgrade law enforcement to professional status. The specific goals were to maximize training opportunities for law enforcement officers, to coordinate training and to set standards for the law enforcement services. The Academy establishes minimum standards for Iowa law enforcement and grants officer certification. The Academy has the responsibility to de-certify or to suspend officer‟s certification when necessary

Why Is Law Enforcement Decentralized?

Law enforcement is decentralized. It is so despite documented interjurisdictional externalities which would justify its centralization. To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take externalities into account. However, the majority rule applies for decisions made by the central legislature and this implies that the allocation of enforcement resources may be skewed in favour of those who belong to the required majority. We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities.Crime, Law enforcement, Decentralization, Externalities

LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER INCOMPLETE LAW: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the socialwelfare loss that results from the regime's inability to deter harmful actions. As a potential remedy a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. Proactive law enforcement may be superior in preventing harm. However, it incurs high costs and may err in stopping potentially beneficial activities. We study optimal regime selection between a court and a regulatory regime and present evidence from the history of financial market regulationIncomplete law, law enforcement, financial market, regulation

Law Enforcement and Transition

We present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies. Law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidnce and a fiscal externality. We analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem. A first mechanism is what we call "dualism", follows the scenario of Chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non state sector follows market rules. The second mechanism we put forward is accession to the European Union. We show that accession to the European Union, even without external borrowing, provides a mechanism to eliminate the "bad" equilibrium, provided the "accesing" country is small enough relative to the European Union. Interestingly, we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39647/3/wp262.pd

Antitrust Private Enforcement – Case of Poland

This article presents the main difficulties surrounding private enforcement of antitrust law in Poland, currently the key implementation problem in the field of antitrust law. Whereas the basic standards concerning the public pillar of antitrust enforcement have already been established, either in the European Community (EC) or in its Member States, the private pillar of antitrust enforcement has not yet been fully developed. The fact that private enforcement of antitrust law is possible, and in fact equal, to public enforcement is not yet commonly recognized. In response to the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, private enforcement of antirust law is presently under intense discussion in EC Member States. This article should be considered as one of the contributions to this debate. It presents the main legal framework of private enforcement of antitrust law in Poland. In order to do so, it directly refers to the Polish Act on competition and consumer protection, the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code. This article also discusses Polish case law in this area. It aims to assess whether existing Polish legal provisions are, in fact, sufficient to ensure effective private enforcement of Polish as well as EC antitrust law. The article refers to the main proposals of the European Commission’s White Paper. It is concluded that private enforcement of antitrust law is indeed possible in Poland on the basis of currently applicable procedural rules, even if there are no special instruments designed to facilitate it. However, it cannot be expect that in the current legal climate, private parties will eagerly and frequently apply for damages in cases of a breach of Polish antitrust law. Antitrust cases are special in many aspects and, thus, they require specific solutions in procedural terms. This article aims to pinpoint those areas, where the Polish law needs to be changed in order to develop and promote private enforcement of antitrust law in Poland.private and public enforcement, private parties, antitrust damages, court proceedings, collective redress, damage actions

Internet Sex Crimes Against Minors: The Response of Law Enforcement.

The Internet1 and computers have come to play a growing role in sex crimes that are committed against children and youth.2 Since the mid-1990s these developing technologies have posed challenges for law enforcement requiring them to confront situations not anticipated in criminal statutes, master technical advances, develop new investigative techniques, and handle criminal cases that often span multiple jurisdictions. To assist, legislators have acted on a number of fronts creating new statutes that encompass Internet offenses, stiffening penalties, and creating a national clearinghouse for reports of Internet-related crimes against children and the CyberTipline® operated by the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children. In addition the federal government has increased funding in this area creating Internet Crimes Against Children Task Forces to support state and local law enforcement and specialized Internet, child-exploitation units in federal, law-enforcement agencies. Unfortunately the results of these initiatives are difficult to track. Criminaljustice authorities do not collect information specifically about Internet-related crimes. The National Juvenile Online Victimization (N-JOV) Study was undertaken to get a sense of the scope and types of law-enforcement activity in this area and serve as a baseline for monitoring the growth of Internet sex crimes against minors and related law-enforcement activities

Extraterritorial Intellectual Property Enforcement in the European Union

This paper was prepared for the 2011 ABILA International Law Weekend – West volume of the Southwestern Journal of International Law. It addresses extraterritorial enforcement of intellectual property rights in the European Union. The maximum length of the paper was set by the Journal. The problems associated with extraterritorial enforcement of intellectual property rights in the European Union (the “EU”) may be divided into three categories: enforcement of unitary EU-wide rights, enforcement of multiple national rights, and enforcement of rights based on one national law with extraterritorial effects on activities in other countries. Although these are three distinct categories of problems, they are interconnected; problems in one category may exacerbate problems in another category, and solutions developed in one category may contribute to the resolution of problems in another category. This article briefly reviews the three categories of problems and demonstrates the interrelatedness of solutions that have been developed or will have to be developed to address the problems

How Strongly Should We Protect and Enforce International Law?, University of Chicago Law School Workshop, March 2006

Observers of international law are obsessed with trying to explain and predict why and when states comply with international law. Doing so, they have consistently overlooked a logically preceding, but no less important, question: To what extent should states perform their international commitments? Put differently, how strongly should we protect and enforce international law? Worrying as much about over-enforcement of international law as under-enforcement of international law, this article offers a theory of relative normativity. This theory is driven by efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy concerns rather than a hierarchy of values. It makes distinctions between how international law allocates entitlements, how it protects entitlements and how it reacts when rules of protection are broken (back-up enforcement). My central claim is that, much like domestic law, international law is best protected on a sliding scale between strict inalienability and simple liability. From that perspective, both what I call European \u27absolutism\u27 and American \u27voluntarism\u27 must be avoided as extreme and homogeneous normative frameworks

Opportunistic competition law enforcement

We analyse the interplay between investigation policies, deterrence and desistance in a model where a competition authority monitors multiple sectors and faces a budget constraint that prevents it from deterring cartels in all sectors simultaneously. Most studies of competition law enforcement treat competition authorities as all-knowing, unwavering and benevolent. They do not behave opportunistically, do not face asymmetric information and choose their actions to optimize social welfare. In this paper, we drop one of these assumptions, and study a competition authority that can not commit to a particular investigation strategy. As a consequence, a competition authority’s decisions to investigate will be driven by the (ex-post) desistance effect instead of the (ex ante) deterrence effect of an investigation policy. The resulting opportunistic behaviour may lead to a suboptimal investigation strategy. We find that, in the absence of commitment, developing a sector specific reward scheme based on the number of captured cartels can improve welfare.