The Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amendment General Public Use Standard for Emerging Technologies but Fails to Define It

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)

Is It Hot in Here - The Eighth Circuit\u27s Reduction of Fourth Amendment Protections in the Home

Several years ago, the United States military developed thermal imaging technology for targeting and reconnaissance purposes which law enforcement agencies subsequently adopted as a means of conducting surveillance in support of counter-narcotics efforts. Police use thermal imaging devices in counter-narcotics operations by scanning buildings and homes in order to determine higher heat emissions from buildings. These higher than normal thermal readings of homes act as indicators of possible marijuana grow operations due to the high output of heat from the indoor lamps commonly used for such activities. Even though a majority of jurisdictions have held that a thermal imaging scan of a home does not qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment, and thus require a warrant, in 2001, the United States Supreme Court held in Kyllo v. United States that the use of thermal imaging devices by police in their investigatory capacities required the issuance of a warrant. The Eighth Circuit, in their recent decision of United States v. Kattaria, misconstrued the Supreme Court\u27s holding in United States v. Kyllo. In Kattaria, the Eighth Circuit found that although a warrant is required prior to police using a thermal imaging device on a home, the traditional probable cause standard need not be met prior to a court or magistrate issuing such a warrant. Thus, the Eighth Circuit has created a hybrid Terry stop / search warrant

These Walls Can Talk! Securing Digital Privacy in the Smart Home Under the Fourth Amendment

Privacy law in the United States has not kept pace with the realities of technological development, nor the growing reliance on the Internet of Things (IoT). As of now, the law has not adequately secured the “smart” home from intrusion by the state, and the Supreme Court further eroded digital privacy by conflating the common law concepts of trespass and exclusion in United States v. Jones. This article argues that the Court must correct this misstep by explicitly recognizing the method by which the Founding Fathers sought to “secure” houses and effects under the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the Court must reject its overly narrow trespass approach in lieu of the more appropriate right to exclude. This will better account for twenty-first century surveillance capabilities and properly constrain the state. Moreover, an exclusion framework will bolster the reasonable expectation of digital privacy by presuming an objective unreasonableness in any warrantless penetration by the state into the smart home

Drones and the Fourth Amendment: Redefining Expectations of Privacy

Drones have gained notoriety as a weapon against foreign terrorist targets; yet, they have also recently made headlines as an instrument for domestic surveillance. With their sophisticated capabilities and continuously decreasing costs, it is not surprising that drones have attracted numerous consumers—most notably, law enforcement. Courts will likely soon have to decipher the limits on the government’s use of drones under the Fourth Amendment. But it is unclear where, or even whether, drones would fall under the current jurisprudence. Because of their diverse and sophisticated designs and capabilities, drones might be able to maneuver through the Fourth Amendment’s doctrinal loopholes. This Note advocates analyzing drones under an adapted approach to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Katz v. United States. Courts should focus more on the test’s oft-neglected first prong—whether a person exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy—and analyze what information falls within the scope of that expectation, excluding information knowingly exposed to the plain view of the public. This analysis also considers instances when, although a subjective expectation exists, it may be impossible or implausible to reasonably exhibit that expectation, a dilemma especially relevant to an analysis of drones. Courts that adopt the recommended analysis would have a coherent and comprehensible approach to factually dynamic cases challenging the constitutionality of drone surveillance. Until then, the constitutional uncertainties of these cases will likely linger

Everybody’s Going Surfing: The Third Circuit Approves the Warrantless Use of Internet Tracking Devices in \u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Stanley\u3c/em\u3e

On June 11, 2014, in United States v. Stanley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the warrantless use of a tracking device to detect the location of a wireless signal was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that because the defendant was using his neighbor’s open wireless network, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court’s reasoning was based on a belief that the use of an open wireless network, which is not password protected, is “likely illegal.” This comment argues that the Third Circuit erred in refusing to recognize the applicability of the test for “sense-enhancing devices” derived from the 2001 U.S. Supreme Court decision Kyllo v. United States. Further, the Third Circuit’s holding imperils an activity that many law-abiding citizens engage in daily

Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr\u27s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference

This essay critiques Professor Orin Kerr\u27s provocative article, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801 (2004). Increasingly, Fourth Amendment protection is receding from a litany of law enforcement activities, and it is being replaced by federal statutes. Kerr notes these developments and argues that courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies. Kerr\u27s key contentions are that (1) legislatures create rules that are more comprehensive, balanced, clear, and flexible; (2) legislatures are better able to keep up with technological change; and (3) legislatures are more adept at understanding complex new technologies. I take issue with each of these arguments. Regarding Kerr\u27s first contention, I argue that Congress has created an uneven fabric of protections that is riddled with holes and weak safeguards. Kerr\u27s second contention - that legislatures are better able to update rules quickly as technology shifts - is belied by the historical record, which suggests Congress is actually far worse than the courts in reacting to new technologies. As for Kerr\u27s third contention, shifting to a statutory regime will not eliminate Kerr\u27s concern with judges misunderstanding technology. In fact, many judicial misunderstandings stem from courts trying to fit new technologies into an old statutory regime that is built around old technologies. Therefore, while Kerr is right that our attention must focus more on the statutes, he is wrong in urging for a deferential judicial approach to the Fourth Amendment