Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

Modeling of Optimal Concession Contract between Port Authority and Terminal Operators using Channel Coordination Model

세계 해운 시장의 급격한 변화는 항만 산업에 큰 영향을 미친다. PA (항만공사)와 TOC (터미널 운영 회사)는 경쟁 우위를 확보하기 위하여 지금까지 항만 시설과 장비에 많은 투자를 해왔다. TOC는 경쟁사 및 해운 회사로부터의 요구 사항에 따라 수익성을 제고하기 위해 노력한다. 같은 상황에서 PA도 경쟁력을 찾고 있다. 시장의 불확실성과 기술적 변화는 PA와 TOC가 협력하여 더 나은 재정 상태를 요구하고 있다. PA와 TOC간에는계약을 통해 여러 방식으로 운영된다. 세계의 60-70%가 운영중인 임대 기능 모델에 따르면, PA는 항만의 토지 및 인프라를 소유∙관리하며, TOC는 터미널 운영을 담당한다. PA와 TOC는 계약을 통해 고정 요금제 내지 단가 요금제 등의 여부를 결정한다. 세계 항만 임대 시스템을 비교해 볼 때, 절대적인 고정된 계약 방식이 없다고 한다. 아시아의 대부분 지역에서는 고정 요금제를 이용하고, 유럽 지역에서는 고정 요금제와 단가 요금제가 혼합된 계약을 이용한다. 그동안 세계 항만 임대 시스템에 간한 연구는 많지 않았다. 특히 구체적 수치를 제공하지 않거나 비실용적 연구가 많았다. 한편, 이전 연구에서는TOC보다 PA 관점에서의 이익 극대화를 도모하는 데 중점을 두었다. 만약 PA가 처리량을 늘림으로써 이익을 극대화하고자 할 때, 고정 임대 계약이 더 유리한 선택이다. 이 연구는 공공기관과 민간 단체 상호간의 이익 극대화의 방식으로 연결하는 방법에 중점을 두고 있다. PA가 TOC에게 제안하는 4 가지 유형의 계약 방식은 비조정, 조정, Cournot 및 Collusion 모델로 비교하고, 동시에 각 계약 방식에 대해 모듈 수행과 수치 분석을 통해 모델을 비교한다. 연구 결과는 향후 항만 임대 계약을 수립하는 데 중요한 영향을 미칠 것이다. 비교 수치 분석을 관찰하면 다음과 같은 주요 결과를 얻을 수 있다. 결과에 따르면, 고정 계약과 단가 계약을 합친 조건이 각각의 고정 및 단가 계약제 보다 더 높다는 것을 알 수 있다. PA가 TOC의 이익과 위험을 다루는 만큼 TOC가 처리량을 증가시킬 수 있으며, 이것은 PA와 TOC 간의 총이익을 극대화 할 수 있다. 따라서PA가 조정 없는 계약을 제공하는 것보다 조정된 계약을 제공 할 때 더 많은 이익을 낼 수 있다. 그리고 PA와 TOC의 통합 이익은 각각의 이익보다 더 높다. PA와TOC의 통합 이익을 통해서 PA는 TOC에게 적절한 계약 방식을 제공하고 상호간의 이익 극대화를 도모할 수 있다. PA가 이익을 늘리려고 시도 할 때마다 수익과 수요 위험을 공유함으로써 TOC와의 관계를 유지해야한다. PA는TOC와의 협조로 어떤 계약방식을 선택하더라도 이익을 창출할 수 있다.|Rapid changes in the global maritime market have a major impact on the port industry. PA (Port Authority) and TOC (Terminal Operating Company) have invested heavily in port facilities and equipment so far to secure competitive advantage. TOC strives to improve profitability in accordance with requirements from competitors and shipping companies. In the same situation, PA is also looking for its own profitability. Market uncertainty and technological changes require PA and TOC to achieve better financial conditions in cooperation. The ports are operated in different contracts. According to the landlord function model which is operated by 60-70% of the world, the PA owns and manages the land and infrastructure of the port, and the TOC is responsible for terminal operations. The PA and TOC will decide whether to use a fixed fee or a unit fee through the contract. There is no absolute contract method in the port leasing system. Most regions in Asia prefer to use the fixed fee, while European countries prefer to use a mix of fixed fee and unit fee. There have been few studies on the port leasing system. In particular, most of them did not provide specific calculations or were impractical. On the other hand, previous studies have focused on maximizing profits from the perspective of PA rather than TOC. This research focuses on how to connect to the method of maximizing profit between public and private entities. The four types of contracts proposed by the PA to the TOC are compared with the uncoordination, coordination, Cournot and Collusion models, and at the same time, model comparisons and numerical analysis are performed for each contract method. The results of the study will have a significant impact on establishing future port lease contracts. Observing the comparative numerical analysis, the following main results are obtained. According to the results, it can be seen that the two-part tariff is higher than the each of fixed and unit contracts. As the PA shares with the profits and risks in cooperation with the TOC, the TOC can increase throughput, which can maximize the total benefit between PA and TOC. Thus, the PA can make more profits when it comes to providing a contract that is coordination contract provide more than uncoordination contract. And the joint profit of PA and TOC is higher than the respective total profits. Through the joint profit of PA and TOC, the PA can provide the TOC with the appropriate contractual condition and maximize their joint profits. The PA, in cooperation with the TOC, is able to generate profits no matter what contract type it chooses.Table of Contents LIST OF TABLES III LIST OF FIGURES III ABSTRACT IV 초록 VI CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1. BACKGROUND 1 2. AIM AND OBJECTIVES 6 3. SIGNIFICANCE 9 4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 10 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 11 1. PORT ECONOMICS 11 1. PORT GOVERNANCE 11 2. CONTRACTS: LEASEHOLD AND CONCESSION 16 3. PRICING MECHANISM 18 2. CONCESSION CONTRACT SCHEMES 21 1. FIXED-FEE CONTRACT 21 2. UNIT-FEE CONTRACT 22 3. TWO-PART TARIFF CONTRACT 22 4. FOREIGN AND KOREAN PORT CONTRACT SCHEMES 22 3. RISK SHARING CHARACTERISTICS 26 1. RISKS TYPES IN CONCESSION CONTRACTS 27 2. RISK ALLOCATION BETWEEN PA AND TOC 28 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 30 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 30 1. BERTRAND MODEL 31 2. COURNOT MODEL 32 3. STACKELBERG MODEL 33 4. COLLUSION MODEL 34 2. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 38 1. TERMINAL OPERATORS’ OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS UNDER THREE SCHEMES 41 2. PORT AUTHORITY’S OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS UNDER FOUR SCHEMES 45 3. COURNOT COORDINATION 55 4. COLLUSION COORDINATION 59 5. COMPARING THE ASSUMPTION MODELS 64 3. COORDINATION THROUGH SHARING THE RISK AND REVENUE 72 1. ASSUMPTION 72 2. SHARING THE JOINT PROFIT 73 3. SHARING THE MARKET UNCERTAINTY 73 4. SHARING THE MARKET RISK 74 CHAPTER 4. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 75 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 81 1. SUMMARY 81 2. IMPLICATIONS 83 3. LIMITATION 84 4. FURTHER STUDIES 85 REFERENCE 86Docto

Coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chains considering retailer innovation inputs

In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers' innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer's product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains

Stronger Partnerships for Safer Food: An Agenda for Strengthening State and Local Roles in the Nation's Food Safety System

Examines federal, state, and local agencies' responsibilities, strengths, and weaknesses in ensuring food safety. Recommends systemwide reforms to enhance state and local roles and improve surveillance, outbreak response, and regulation and inspection

Strategic Capacity Planning Problems in Revenue‐Sharing Joint Ventures

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154244/1/poms13128_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154244/2/poms13128.pd

Organizational models for implementing microgrids and district energy systems in urban commercial districts

Thesis (M.C.P.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-61).There is a growing trend in cities toward establishing localized, shared energy infrastructure. As existing energy infrastructure ages and demand increases, cities face rising energy costs and security risks combined with mandates to decrease carbon emissions. Local energy infrastructure provides cities and neighborhoods with greater control over their energy production and consumption, including the ability to lower the cost of energy, move to low-carbon energy technologies, and improve energy reliability and security. This thesis seeks to understand how stakeholders in urban commercial districts are creating organizations to implement two types of shared local energy infrastructure: district energy and microgrids. Building district energy and microgrids is a complex undertaking, which is one reason that they proliferate in urban environments where that complexity is reduced, such as universities, hospitals, and military bases. These areas may have single property owners, single land-owners or preexisting energy infrastructure that simplifies regulatory, legal, and development complexities of building new energy systems. Commercial businesses districts are significantly more complicated; they have multiple properties that abut public right of ways and that are owned by multiple, unaffiliated customers of legacy energy utilities. Establishing such a system in a commercial district requires addressing local utility rights, public right-of-way and franchise issues, as well as creating a new organizational structure that allows for the involvement of multiple parties in developing the system. This thesis assesses the feasibility of two organizational models for implementing local energy infrastructure in commercial districts: a joint cooperative model and an independent provider model. In a joint cooperative, all properties in a district become customers of a jointly owned, operated, and managed energy system. With an independent provider, all district properties become customers of an independently owned and operated system. These models are evaluated through two cases in which they are currently being tested: a proposed district energy system in Portland, Oregon and a proposed microgrid in Stamford, Connecticut. Therein, barriers to implementation such as perception of risk and lack of familiarity with shared energy systems are also examined.by Genevieve Rose Sherman.M.C.P

Analysis of Resource-Sharing Decisions in Dyadic Collaborative Knowledge Creation: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Knowledge is an asset that can give an organization competitive edge. However, knowledge creation is an expensive activity. One of the reasons organizations form knowledge creation collaborations is to share resources that are needed to create knowledge. This dissertation models the dyadic collaborations as games between the partners and arrives at resource-sharing schemes for them. Specifically, the collaborations are modeled as two games- Stackelberg Leader-Follower game and Partnership game. The types of collaborations are distinguished based on the nature of the marginal return functions with respect to knowledge creation investments for each of the collaborating organizations. Three essays are presented and discussed. In Essay 1, collaborations between organizations characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to investments are modeled as a partnership game. In Essay 2, collaborations between organizations characterized by increasing marginal returns with respect to investments are modeled as a Stackelberg Leader-Follower game. In Essay 3, collaborations where the leader organization is characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to investment and the follower organization is characterized by increasing marginal returns with respect to investments are studied. The solutions for the game in terms of the participation rate, knowledge creation investments, and the system gain are presented for each essay. The results are analyzed and the observations are stated as propositions. The propositions provide guidelines for collaborating organizations to arrive at a resource-sharing scheme. Additionally, the results suggest conditions under which the potential partners collaborate specifically with respect to the participation rate and the system gain. The results of Essays 2 and 3 provide conditions for participation rate. The results of Essay 3 provide the conditions of expected system gain under which the follower organization will collaborate with a potential leader organization. The results have implications for several stages of the alliance management process such as partner selection, gauging the behavior of potential and current partners, and renegotiation of alliance terms

Investment Options and Bargaining Power the Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas

We use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipeline network determines the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. If the assessment is narrowly focused on the abilities to obstruct flows in the existing system, the main transit countries, Belarus and Ukraine, appear to be strong. If investment options are accounted for, however, Russia achieves clear dominance. We show that options to bypass one of the transit countries are of little strategic importance compared to Russia's direct access to its customers through the Baltic Sea. Comparing the results of our calibrated model with empirical evidence obtained from transit and import agreements we find that the Shapley value explains the power of major transit countries better than the core and the nucleolus.Bargaining Power, Supply Chain, Shapley Value, Gas Transport

Trading reliability targets within a supply chain using Shapley's value

The development of complex systems involves a multi-tier supply chain, with each organisation allocated a reliability target for their sub-system or component part apportioned from system requirements. Agreements about targets are made early in the system lifecycle when considerable uncertainty exists about the design detail and potential failure modes. Hence resources required to achieve reliability are unpredictable. Some types of contracts provide incentives for organisations to negotiate targets so that system reliability requirements are met, but at minimum cost to the supply chain. This paper proposes a mechanism for deriving a fair price for trading reliability targets between suppliers using information gained about potential failure modes through development and the costs of activities required to generate such information. The approach is based upon Shapley's value and is illustrated through examples for a particular reliability growth model, and associated empirical cost model, developed for problems motivated by the aerospace industry. The paper aims to demonstrate the feasibility of the method and discuss how it could be extended to other reliability allocation models