Space Efficiency of Propositional Knowledge Representation Formalisms

We investigate the space efficiency of a Propositional Knowledge Representation (PKR) formalism. Intuitively, the space efficiency of a formalism F in representing a certain piece of knowledge A, is the size of the shortest formula of F that represents A. In this paper we assume that knowledge is either a set of propositional interpretations (models) or a set of propositional formulae (theorems). We provide a formal way of talking about the relative ability of PKR formalisms to compactly represent a set of models or a set of theorems. We introduce two new compactness measures, the corresponding classes, and show that the relative space efficiency of a PKR formalism in representing models/theorems is directly related to such classes. In particular, we consider formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning, such as circumscription and default logic, as well as belief revision operators and the stable model semantics for logic programs with negation. One interesting result is that formalisms with the same time complexity do not necessarily belong to the same space efficiency class

Is Intractability of Non-Monotonic Reasoning a Real Drawback?

Several studies about computational complexity of non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) showed that non-monotonic inference is significantly harder than classical, monotonic inference. This contrasts with the general idea that NMR can be used to make knowledge representation and reasoning simpler, not harder. In this paper we show that, to some extent, NMR fulfills the representation goal. In particular, we prove that non-monotonic formalisms such as circumscription and default logic allow for a much more compact and natural representation of propositional knowledge than propositional calculus. Proofs are based on a suitable definition of compilable inference problem, and on non-uniform complexity classes. Some results about intractability of circumscription and default logic can therefore be interpreted as the price one has to pay for having such an extra-compact representation. On the other hand, intractability of inference and compactness of representation are not equivalent notions: we ex..