Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players

A Note on institutional hierarchy and volatility in financial markets

From a statistical point of view, the prevalence of non-Gaussian distributions in nancial returns and their volatilities shows that the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) often does not apply in nancial markets. In this paper we take the position that the independence assumption of the CLT is violated by herding tendencies among market participants, and investigate whether a generic probabilistic herding model can reproduce non-Gaussian statistics in systems with a large number of agents. It is well-known that the presence of a herding mechanism in the model is not sucient for non-Gaussian properties, which crucially depend on the details of the communication network among agents. The main contribution of this paper is to show that certain hierarchical networks, which portray the institutional structure of fund investment, warrant non-Gaussian properties for any system size and even lead to an increase in system-wide volatility. Viewed from this perspective, the mere existence of nancial institutions with socially interacting managers contributes considerably to nancial volatility.Herding; financial volatility; networks; core-perifery

The role of social interaction in farmers' climate adaptation choice

Adaptation to climate change might not always occur, with potentially\ud catastrophic results. Success depends on coordinated actions at both\ud governmental and individual levels (public and private adaptation). Even for a “wet” country like the Netherlands, climate change projections show that the frequency and severity of droughts are likely to increase. Freshwater is an important factor for agricultural production. A deficit causes damage to crop production and consequently to a loss of income. Adaptation is the key to decrease farmers’ vulnerability at the micro level and the sector’s vulnerability at the macro level. Individual adaptation decision-making is determined by the behavior of economic agents and social interaction among them. This can be best studied with agentbased modelling. Given the uncertainty about future weather conditions and the costs and effectiveness of adaptation strategies, a farmer in the model uses a cognitive process (or heuristic) to make adaptation decisions. In this process, he can rely on his experiences and on information from interactions within his social network. Interaction leads to the spread of information and knowledge that causes learning. Learning changes the conditions for individual adaptation decisionmaking. All these interactions cause emergent phenomena: the diffusion of adaptation strategies and a change of drought vulnerability of the agricultural sector. In this paper, we present a conceptual model and the first implementation of an agent-based model. The aim is to study the role of interaction in a farmer’s social network on adaptation decisions and on the diffusion of adaptation strategies\ud and vulnerability of the agricultural sector. Micro-level survey data will be used to parameterize agents’ behavioral and interaction rules at a later stage. This knowledge is necessary for the successful design of public adaptation strategies, since governmental adaptation actions need to be fine-tuned to private adaptation behavior

Performance pay, group selection and group performance

Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered by the principal. The rational solution of the game implies that contract design may not induce agents to select GT and provide positive effort in GT. Furthermore it predicts equal behavior of agents with different productivities. In contrast, considerations of trust, reciprocity and cooperation – the social-emotional model of behavior – suggest that contract design can influence the agents’ willingness to join groups and provide effort. We analyze the data by applying a two-step regression model (multinomial logit and tobit) and find that counter to the rational solution, contract design does influence both, task selection and effort choice. The principal can increase participation in work groups and can positively influence group performance. Larger payment increases the share of socially motivated agents in work groups. The selection effect is larger than the motivation effect

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.ownership rights, double moral hazard, fairness, reciprocity, incomplete contracts