Investigating the electromagnetic side channel leakage from a raspberry pi

This research investigates the Electromagnetic (EM) side channel leakage of a Raspberry Pi 2 B+. An evaluation is performed on the EM leakage as the device executes the AES-128 cryptographic algorithm contained in the Crypto++ library in a threaded environment. Four multi-threaded implementations are evaluated. These implementations are Portable Operating System Interface Threads, C++11 threads, Threading Building Blocks, and OpenMP threads. It is demonstrated that the various thread techniques have distinct variations in frequency and shape as EM emanations is leaked from the Raspberry Pi. Additionally, noise is introduced while the cryptographic algorithm executes. The results indicates that tt is still possible to visibly see the execution of the cryptographic algorithm. However, out of 50 occasions the cryptographic execution was not detected 32 times. It was further identified when calculating prime numbers, the cryptographic algorithm becomes hidden. Furthermore, the analysis pointed in the direction that when high prime numbers are calculated there is a window where the cryptographic algorithm can not be seen visibly in the EM spectrum