University Innovation and the Professor’s Privilige

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Mid-term evaluation of the support to strengthened bilateral relations under the EEA and Norway Grants

Through the EEA Grants and Norway Grants, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein aim to reduce economic and social disparities and strengthen cooperation with 16 countries in Central and Southern Europe. A mid-term evaluation of the current EEA and Norway Grants 2009-14 was conducted by COWI during the second half of 2015 and early 2016 at the request of the Financial Mechanism Office, EEA and Norway Grants. The aim of the mid-term evaluation is to assess to what extent and in which way the EEA and Norway Grants contribute towards strengthening bilateral relations between donor and beneficiary states. The evaluation covers four out of the ten priority sectors of the EEA and Norway Grants and five of the 16 beneficiary countries (Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), representing 19.4% of the allocated total of EUR 1.8 billion

Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005-2010

Politicians often implement popular changes in public policies prior to elections, with the aim of improving their Election Day outcome. This research note evaluates whether such electioneering carries over also into politicians' extra-parliamentary activities. Evidence from the UK House of Commons over the period 2005-2010 suggests adjustments do occur in MPs' outside activities over the election cycle. The safety of the politicians' seat and his/her decision to stand for re-election play an important mediating role. --Outside interests,election cycles,House of Commons

Performance-Based Financing: Report on Feasibility and Implementation Options Final September 2007

This study examines the feasibility of introducing a performance-related bonus scheme in the health sector. After describing the Tanzania health context, we define “Performance-Based Financing”, examine its rationale and review the evidence on its effectiveness. The following sections systematically assess the potential for applying the scheme in Tanzania. On the basis of risks and concerns identified, detailed design options and recommendations are set out. The report concludes with a (preliminary) indication of the costs of such a scheme and recommends a way forward for implementation. We prefer the name “Payment for Performance” or “P4P”. This is because what is envisaged is a bonus payment that is earned by meeting performance targets1. The dominant financing for health care delivery would remain grant-based as at present. There is a strong case for introducing P4P. Its main purpose will be to motivate front-line health workers to improve service delivery performance. In recent years, funding for council health services has increased dramatically, without a commensurate increase in health service output. The need to tighten focus on results is widely acknowledged. So too is the need to hold health providers more accountable for performance at all levels, form the local to the national. P4P is expected to encourage CHMTs and health facilities to “manage by results”; to identify and address local constraints, and to find innovative ways to raise productivity and reach under-served groups. As well as leveraging more effective use of all resources, P4P will provide a powerful incentive at all levels to make sure that HMIS information is complete, accurate and timely. It is expected to enhance accountability between health facilities and their managers / governing committees as well as between the Council Health Department and the Local Government Authority. Better performance-monitoring will enable the national level to track aggregate progress against goals and will assist in identifying under-performers requiring remedial action. We recommend a P4P scheme that provides a monetary team bonus, dependent on a whole facility reaching facility-specific service delivery targets. The bonus would be paid quarterly and shared equally among health staff. It should target all government health facilities at the council level, and should also reward the CHMT for “whole council” performance. All participating facilities/councils are therefore rewarded for improvement rather than absolute levels of performance. Performance indicators should not number more than 10, should represent a “balanced score card” of basic health service delivery, should present no risk of “perverse incentive” and should be readily measurable. The same set of indicators should be used by all. CHMTs would assist facilities in setting targets and monitoring performance. RHMTs would play a similar role with respect to CHMTs. The Council Health Administration would provide a “check and balance” to avoid target manipulation and verify bonus payments due. The major constraint on feasibility is the poor state of health information. Our study confirmed the findings of previous ones, observing substantial omission and error in reports from facilities to CHMTs. We endorse the conclusion of previous reviewers that the main problem lies not with HMIS design, but with its functioning. We advocate a particular focus on empowering and enabling the use of information for management by facilities and CHMTs. We anticipate that P4P, combined with a major effort in HMIS capacity building – at the facility and council level – will deliver dramatic improvements in data quality and completeness. We recommend that the first wave of participating councils are selected on the basis that they can first demonstrate robust and accurate data. We anticipate that P4P for facilities will not deliver the desired benefits unless they have a greater degree of control to solve their own problems. We therefore propose - as a prior and essential condition – the introduction of petty cash imprests for all health facilities. We believe that such a measure would bring major benefits even to facilities that have not yet started P4P. It should also empower Health Facility Committees to play a more meaningful role in health service governance at the local level. We recommend to Government that P4P bonuses, as described here, are implemented across Mainland Tanzania on a phased basis. The main constraint on the pace of roll-out is the time required to bring information systems up to standard. Councils that are not yet ready to institute P4P should get an equivalent amount of money – to be used as general revenue to finance their comprehensive council health plans. We also recommend that up-to-date reporting on performance against service delivery indicators is made a mandatory requirement for all councils and is also agreed as a standard requirement for the Joint Annual Health Sector Review. P4P can also be applied on the “demand-side” – for example to encourage women to present in case of obstetric emergencies. There is a strong empirical evidence base from other countries to demonstrate that such incentives can work. We recommend a separate policy decision on whether or not to introduce demand-side incentives. In our view, they are sufficiently promising to be tried out on an experimental basis. When taken to national scale (all councils, excepting higher level hospitals), the scheme would require annual budgetary provision of about 6 billion shillings for bonus payments. This is equivalent to 1% of the national health budget, or about 3% of budgetary resources for health at the council level. We anticipate that design and implementation costs would amount to about 5 billion shillings over 5 years – the majority of this being devoted to HMIS strengthening at the facility level across the whole country

A Guide to Evaluating Marine Spatial Plans

Marine spatial plans are being developed in over 40 countries around the world, to distribute human activities in marine areas more sustainably and achieve ecological, social, and economic objectives. Monitoring and evaluation are often considered only after a plan has been developed. This guide will help marine planners and managers, monitor and evaluate the success of marine plans in achieving real results and outcomes. This report emphasizes the importance of early integration of monitoring and evaluation in the planning process, the importance of measurable and specific objectives, clear management actions, relevant indicators and targets, and involvement of stakeholders throughout the planning process.

Valuation of International Oil Companies –The RoACE Era

High oil prices are normally expected to stimulate exploration and the development of new oil and gas fields. But over the last few years, financial analysts have focused strongly on short-term accounting return (RoACE) for benchmarking and valuation, and this has led to high capital discipline among oil and gas companies. We analyse how high oil prices can be explained in terms of an implicit capacity game between the oil companies, and explore the stability of the current equilibrium. Our approach is an investigation of a key assumption among financial analysts, namely the presumed positive relation between RoACE and stock market valuation. Based on panel data for 11 international oil and gas companies, we seek to establish econometric relations between market valuation on one hand, and simple financial and operational indicators on the other. Our findings do not support the perceived positive relation between reported RoACE and market-based multiples. Recent evidence also suggests that the stock market is increasingly concerned about reserve replacement and sustained profitable growth. The current high-price equilibrium is therefore hardly stable.

Introducing activity-based financing: a review of experience in Australia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden

We review and evaluate the international literature on activity-based funding of health services, focussing especially on experience in Australia (Victoria), Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In evaluating this literature we summarise the differences and pros and cons of three different funding arrangements, namely cost-based reimbursement, global budgeting and activity-based financing. The institutional structures of the four jurisdictions that are the main focus of the review are described, and an outline is provided about how activity-based funding has been introduced in each. We then turn to the mechanics of activity-based funding and discuss in detail how patients are classified, how prices are set and how other services are funded. Although concentrating on the four jurisdictions, we draw on wider international experience to inform this discussion. We review evidence of the impact of activity-based funding in the four jurisdictions on efficiency, activity rates, waiting times, quality and overall expenditure. Finally we conclude with a brief commentary of some of the challenges that would have to be faced if implementing activity-based funding.

Patient safety in Europe: medication errors and hospital-acquired infections

The Report was commissioned by the European Federation of Nurses Associations (EFN) in November 2007 in order to support its policy statements on Patient Safety (June 2004). In that statement the EFN declares its belief that European Union health services should operate within a culture of safety that is based on working towards an open culture and the immediate reporting of mistakes; exchanging best practice and research; and lobbying for the systematic collection of information and dissemination of research findings. This Report adressess specifically the culture of highly reliable organisations using the work of James Reason (2000). Medication errors and hospital-acquired infections are examined in line with the Reprt´s parameters and a range of European studies are used as evidence. An extensive reference list is provided that allows EFN to explore work in greater detail as required

Outputs of innovation systems: a European perspective

This paper focuses upon the performance of innovation systems from an output perspective. On it, we try to characterize some European countries according to seven innovation output indicators in the manufacturing and service sectors. The data are gathered from the Community Innovation Surveys between 1996 and 2006. Innovation performance measurement is considered as increasingly interesting by several scholars during last years. It is also important as basis for the design and implementation of innovation policies as the comparison among countries allows policy failures to be detected. The approach followed in this paper could also provide insights when applied to developing countries, which are already concerned with the collection of science and technology indicatorsinnovation systems; output indicators; community innovation survey; manufacturing sector; service sector