12,781 research outputs found
Intervention in Power Control Games With Selfish Users
We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish
users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their
maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this
paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention to induce
selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. An intervention scheme can
be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power
levels of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users. We
mainly consider first-order intervention rules based on individual transmit
powers. We derive conditions on design parameters and the intervention
capability to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium and
propose a dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users
and the intervention device to the desired outcome. The effect of using
intervention rules based on aggregate receive power is also analyzed. Our
results show that with perfect monitoring intervention schemes can be designed
to achieve any positive power profile while using interference from the
intervention device only as a threat. We also analyze the case of imperfect
monitoring and show that a performance loss can occur. Lastly, simulation
results are presented to illustrate the performance improvement from using
intervention rules and compare the performances of different intervention
rules.Comment: 33 pages, 6 figure
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems
Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare. Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users. The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources. Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field
Near-Optimal Deviation-Proof Medium Access Control Designs in Wireless Networks
Distributed medium access control (MAC) protocols are essential for the
proliferation of low cost, decentralized wireless local area networks (WLANs).
Most MAC protocols are designed with the presumption that nodes comply with
prescribed rules. However, selfish nodes have natural motives to manipulate
protocols in order to improve their own performance. This often degrades the
performance of other nodes as well as that of the overall system. In this work,
we propose a class of protocols that limit the performance gain which nodes can
obtain through selfish manipulation while incurring only a small efficiency
loss. The proposed protocols are based on the idea of a review strategy, with
which nodes collect signals about the actions of other nodes over a period of
time, use a statistical test to infer whether or not other nodes are following
the prescribed protocol, and trigger a punishment if a departure from the
protocol is perceived. We consider the cases of private and public signals and
provide analytical and numerical results to demonstrate the properties of the
proposed protocols.Comment: 14 double-column pages, submitted to ACM/IEEE Trans Networkin
A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks
User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P
networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate
fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game
theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an
incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the
basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated
interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper
show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative
peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme
allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a
cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing
an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention;
and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In
addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss
enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming
to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes
for P2P networks.Comment: 31 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl
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