Identifying options for regulating the coordination of network investments with investments in distributed electricity generation

This paper analyses two effects of the current Dutch regulation on the system operators of the electricity network and on teh decentralised generators of electricity, and suggests a number of improvements in the tariff regulation. The increase in the distributed generation of electricity, with wind turbines and solar panels, necessitates investments in the distribution network. The current tariff regulation in the Dutch electricity industry, with its ex post evaluation of the efficiency of investments and the frontier shift in the x-factor, delays these investments. In the unbundled electricity industry, the investments in the network need to be coordinated with those in the distributed generation of electricity to enable the DSOs to build enough network capacity. The current Dutch regulations do not provide for a sufficient information exchange between the generators and the system operators to coordinate the investments. This paper analyses these two effects of the Dutch regulation, and suggests improvements to the regulation of the network connection and transportation tariffs to allow for sufficient network capacity and coordination between the investments in the network and in the generation of electricity. These improvements include locally differentiated tariffs that increase with an increasing concentration of distributed generators.

Thinking about others and the future: neural correlates of perspective taking relate to preferences for delayed rewards

We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting

Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics

Neuroeconomics uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic analysis, and roots economics in biology. It opens up the "black box" of the brain, much as organizational economics adds detail to the theory of the firm. Neuroscientists use many tools— including brain imaging, behavior of patients with localized brain lesions, animal behavior, and recording single neuron activity. The key insight for economics is that the brain is composed of multiple systems which interact. Controlled systems ("executive function") interrupt automatic ones. Emotions and cognition both guide decisions. Just as prices and allocations emerge from the interaction of two processes—supply and demand— individual decisions can be modeled as the result of two (or more) processes interacting. Indeed, "dual-process" models of this sort are better rooted in neuroscientific fact, and more empirically accurate, than single-process models (such as utility-maximization). We discuss how brain evidence complicates standard assumptions about basic preference, to include homeostasis and other kinds of state-dependence. We also discuss applications to intertemporal choice, risk and decision making, and game theory. Intertemporal choice appears to be domain-specific and heavily influenced by emotion. The simplified ß-d of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is supported by activation in distinct regions of limbic and cortical systems. In risky decision, imaging data tentatively support the idea that gains and losses are coded separately, and that ambiguity is distinct from risk, because it activates fear and discomfort regions. (Ironically, lesion patients who do not receive fear signals in prefrontal cortex are "rationally" neutral toward ambiguity.) Game theory studies show the effect of brain regions implicated in "theory of mind", correlates of strategic skill, and effects of hormones and other biological variables. Finally, economics can contribute to neuroscience because simple rational-choice models are useful for understanding highly-evolved behavior like motor actions that earn rewards, and Bayesian integration of sensorimotor information

Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future

Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations. This book consists of representative recent articles in behavioral economics. This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the approach and methods of behavioral economics, and to some of its major findings, applications, and promising new directions. It also seeks to fill some unavoidable gaps in the chapters’ coverage of topics

Research Frontiers in the Economics of Climate Change

Academic and policy debates over climate change risks and policies have stimulated economic research in a variety of fields. In this article I briefly discuss eight overlapping areas of current research in which further effort particularly is warranted. These areas include decision criteria for policy; risk assessment and adaptation; uncertainty and learning; abatement cost and the innovation and diffusion of technology; and the credibility of policies and international agreements. Further analysis in these areas not only will advance academic understanding but also will provide insights of considerable importance to policymakers.

The Economics of Infrastructure Investment: Beyond Simple Cost Benefit Analysis

This non-technical ‘think-piece’ examines aspects of infrastructure project evaluation, concentrating on circumstances that may render a standard cost benefit analysis (CBA) inappropriate. It is designed to make infrastructure investors and planners think deeply about their assumptions and to broaden the range of issues that are taken into account. Issues considered include: the role of CBA; network effects (increasing returns to scale) and the endogeneity of resources within an economy; the valuation of productive versus consumptive benefits; the value of traded versus non-traded sector production; the role and choice of the discount rate; and the importance of considering option values when making infrastructure investment and disinvestment decisions.Infrastructure, Cost Benefit Analysis, Evaluation

Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach

In this article, we analyse the optimal investment decision in a new health care technology of a representative hospital that maximises its surplus in an uncertain environment. The new technology allows the hospital to increase the quality level of the care provided, but the investment is irreversible. The article uses the framework of the real option literature to show how the purchasing rules might influence the level of investment. We show that the investment in new technology is best incentivate within a long term contract where the number of treatments reimbursed depends on the level of investment made in the period when the technology is new. In this way, asymmetry of information does not affect the outcome of the contract. In our model in fact the purchaser can verify the level of the investment only at the end of each period but the purchasing rule has an anticipating effect on the decision to invest.Health care technologies, Medical quality, Irreversible investments, Real options

Dynamic Adverse Selection and the Size of the Informed Side of the Market

In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller’s private information. We show that in equilibrium all goods can be traded if a simple piece of information is made publicly available: the size of the informed side of the market. Moreover, we show that if exchanges can take place frequently enough, then agents roughly enjoy the entire potential surplus from exchanges. We illustrate these findings with a dynamic model of trade where buyers and sellers repeatedly interact over time. More precisely we prove that, if the size of the informed side of the market is a public information at each trading stage, then there exists a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium where all goods are sold in finite time and where the price and quality of traded goods are increasing over time. Moreover, we show that as the time between exchanges becomes arbitrarily small, full trade still obtains in finite time – i.e., all goods are actually traded in equilibrium while total surplus from exchanges converges to the entire potential. These results suggest two policy interventions in markets suffering from dynamic adverse selection: first, the public disclosure of the size of the informed side of the market in each trading stage and, second, the increase of the frequency of trading stagesdynamic adverse selection; full trade; size of the informed side; frequency of exchanges; asymmetric information

Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Assessment

This paper deals with an assessment of the economic costs of environmental policies in the Netherlands, using a dynamic Applied General Equilibrium model with bottom-up information on abatement techniques. Empirical abatement cost curves are used to determine substitution possibilities between pollution and abatement and the characteristics of abatement goods. The results show that an absolute decoupling of economy and environment is possible. Smog formation is the most costly environmental theme, due to the absence of technical abatement options. For all environmental themes, the least-cost way to reduce emissions is via a combination of technical abatement measures and substantial economic restructuring.Applied general equilibrium, Pollution abatement, Dynamics, Environmental policy, Netherlands

Information and communications technologies,coordination and control, and the distribution of income

We consider the links between information and communications technologies (ICTs) and the distribution of income, as mediated by problems of coordination and control within organizations. In the large corporations of the mid-twentieth century, a highly developed division of labor was coordinated and controlled with the aid of relatively underdeveloped ICTs. This created a situation in which the options of top manage- ment were constrained while the individual and collective power of lower paid workers was enhanced. Only in the late twentieth century, when the microprocessor and re- lated technologies transformed the information systems of organizations, did improve- ments in the tools of coordination and control race ahead of the growing demands of coordination and control. These technological changes have reduced the power of lower-paid employees, increased that for higher-paid employees, and led to an increase in income inequality. Thus, the more important aspects of new technology relate to the "power-bias", rather than the "skill-bias", of technological change. JEL Categories: J31, O33communications technology, power-biased technical change, inequality, work intensity, efficiency wage.