On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining

In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the analyst.Subgame Perfection Rubinstein Game

One-relator Kaehler groups

We prove that a one-relator group $G$ is K\"ahler if and only if either $G$ is finite cyclic or $G$ is isomorphic to the fundamental group of a compact orbifold Riemann surface of genus $g > 0$ with at most one cone point of order $n$: $$< a_1\, b_1\, \,...\, a_g\, b_g\, \mid\, (\prod_{i=1}^g [a_i\, b_i])^n>\, .$$Comment: v2: 9pgs. no figs. Final version, to appear in "Geometry and Topology