Threats and Countermeasures of Cyber Security in Direct and Remote Vehicle Communication Systems

Traffic management, road safety, and environmental impact are important issues in the modern world. These challenges are addressed by the application of sensing, control and communication methods of intelligent transportation systems (ITS). A part of ITS is a vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) which means a wireless network of vehicles. However, communication among vehicles in a VANET exposes several security threats which need to be studied and addressed. In this review, firstly, the basic flow of VANET is illustrated focusing on its communication methods, architecture, characteristics, standards, and security facilities. Next, the attacks and threats for VANET are discussed. Moreover, the authentication systems are described by which vehicular networks can be protected from fake messages and malicious nodes. Security threats and counter measures are discussed for different remote vehicle communication methods namely, remote keyless entry system, dedicated short range communication, cellular scheme, Zigbee, Bluetooth, radio frequency identification, WiFi, WiMAX, and different direct vehicle communication methods namely on-board diagnosis and universal serial bus.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figure

PolymoRF: Polymorphic Wireless Receivers Through Physical-Layer Deep Learning

Today's wireless technologies are largely based on inflexible designs, which makes them inefficient and prone to a variety of wireless attacks. To address this key issue, wireless receivers will need to (i) infer on-the-fly the physical-layer parameters currently used by transmitters; and if needed, (ii) change their hardware and software structures to demodulate the incoming waveform. In this paper, we introduce PolymoRF, a deep learning-based polymorphic receiver able to reconfigure itself in real time based on the inferred waveform parameters. Our key technical innovations are (i) a novel embedded deep learning architecture, called RFNet, which enables the solution of key waveform inference problems; (ii) a generalized hardware/software architecture that integrates RFNet with radio components and signal processing. We prototype PolymoRF on a custom software-defined radio platform, and show through extensive over-the-air experiments that (i) RFNet achieves similar accuracy to that of state-of-the-art yet with 52x and 8x latency and hardware reduction; (ii) PolymoRF achieves throughput within 87% of a perfect-knowledge Oracle system, thus demonstrating for the first time that polymorphic receivers are feasible and effective.Comment: to appear in ACM MobiHoc 202

Signal Jamming Attacks Against Communication-Based Train Control: Attack Impact and Countermeasure

We study the impact of signal jamming attacks against the communication based train control (CBTC) systems and develop the countermeasures to limit the attacks' impact. CBTC supports the train operation automation and moving-block signaling, which improves the transport efficiency. We consider an attacker jamming the wireless communication between the trains or the train to wayside access point, which can disable CBTC and the corresponding benefits. In contrast to prior work studying jamming only at the physical or link layer, we study the real impact of such attacks on end users, namely train journey time and passenger congestion. Our analysis employs a detailed model of leaky medium-based communication system (leaky waveguide or leaky feeder/coaxial cable) popularly used in CBTC systems. To counteract the jamming attacks, we develop a mitigation approach based on frequency hopping spread spectrum taking into account domain-specific structure of the leaky-medium CBTC systems. Specifically, compared with existing implementations of FHSS, we apply FHSS not only between the transmitter-receiver pair but also at the track-side repeaters. To demonstrate the feasibility of implementing this technology in CBTC systems, we develop a FHSS repeater prototype using software-defined radios on both leaky-medium and open-air (free-wave) channels. We perform extensive simulations driven by realistic running profiles of trains and real-world passenger data to provide insights into the jamming attack's impact and the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure.Comment: Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec) - 201