Intent to Contract

There is a remarkable difference between black-letter contract laws of the United States and England. In England, the existence of a contract is supposedly conditioned on the parties\u27 intent to be legally bound, while section 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that [n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract. There are also differences within U.S. law on the issue. While section 21 describes courts\u27 approach to most contracts, the parties\u27 intent to contact can be a condition of validity of preliminary agreements, domestic agreements and social arrangements, reporters’ promises of confidentiality to sources, and gratuitous promises. This Article develops an analytic framework for evaluating these rules and examines their relationship to the broader principles that animate contract law. Rules that condition contractual liability on proof of contractual intent must include rules for interpreting that intent. Those interpretive rules will include both interpretive defaults and rules for what it takes to opt-out of the default. By adjusting these default and opt-out rules, the law can achieve different balances between the duty-imposing and power-conferring functions of contract law, or among the various reasons for enforcement. This is demonstrated by an analysis of the rules for gratuitous promises, preliminary agreements, spousal agreements and reporters\u27 confidentiality promises. The results of that analysis include a new argument for the Model Written Obligations Act; a critique of Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott\u27s proposal preliminary agreements and a recommended alternative to it; and recommended changes to the rules for agreements between spouses. Attention to intent to contract requirements also indicates an overlooked aspect of how the enforcement of contracts affects extralegal norms and relationships of trust. Interpretive rules that require parties who want, or who do not want, legal liability expressly to say so are particularly likely to interfere with or erode extralegal forms trust that otherwise create value in transactions

Spoken Language Intent Detection using Confusion2Vec

Decoding speaker's intent is a crucial part of spoken language understanding (SLU). The presence of noise or errors in the text transcriptions, in real life scenarios make the task more challenging. In this paper, we address the spoken language intent detection under noisy conditions imposed by automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems. We propose to employ confusion2vec word feature representation to compensate for the errors made by ASR and to increase the robustness of the SLU system. The confusion2vec, motivated from human speech production and perception, models acoustic relationships between words in addition to the semantic and syntactic relations of words in human language. We hypothesize that ASR often makes errors relating to acoustically similar words, and the confusion2vec with inherent model of acoustic relationships between words is able to compensate for the errors. We demonstrate through experiments on the ATIS benchmark dataset, the robustness of the proposed model to achieve state-of-the-art results under noisy ASR conditions. Our system reduces classification error rate (CER) by 20.84% and improves robustness by 37.48% (lower CER degradation) relative to the previous state-of-the-art going from clean to noisy transcripts. Improvements are also demonstrated when training the intent detection models on noisy transcripts

Oblique intent, foresight and authorisation

In R v Jogee, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC) abolished a contentious doctrine of criminal law which allowed accomplices to a crime A to be convicted of another’s crime B on the basis that they foresaw commission of the latter in the course of the former. The Court held that nothing short of an intention to assist or encourage crime B would suffice to fix the accomplice with criminal liability. At common law intention has traditionally been understood to entail acts and consequences that were either achieved with purpose (direct intent) or foreseen as virtually certain to follow one’s chosen course of conduct (oblique intent). This paper argues that Jogee constitutes a first step away from a conception that measures ‘guilty minds’ in degrees of foresight: by associating the accessory’s intent to assist or encourage the perpetrator’s crime with ‘authorisation’, Jogee seems to support the view that intention in the legal sense depends ultimately on whether the accused had endorsed the consequences of his and the perpetrator’s actions

Drawing the boundaries of mens rea in the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Even though more than a decade has passed since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the law of the most fundamental concept in international criminal law – mens rea - remains unsettled. Through its jurisprudence, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has made enormous efforts to assign different degrees of mens rea for different categories of crimes under its Statute. The present study is an attempt to clarify several issues with regard to the law of mens rea as developed in the case law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Among these issues are the following: what precisely is to be understood by the terms “specific intent”, “special intent”, “dolus specialis”, or “surplus intent”? Similarly, what are the precise meanings of the terms “deliberately”, “intention”, “intent”, “intentionally”, “wilful or wilfully”, “knowledge”, and “wanton” as provided for in the ICTY Statute or as employed by the Chambers within its judgments