Latvia's democratic resistance: a forgotten episode from the Second World War

In summer 1943 politicians representing the four main political parties of Latvia's democratic years came together to establish a movement which would both resist the German occupation and prevent the return of the Red Army. They considered the key to re-establishing Latvia as an independent democratic state was to make contact with Britain, and they hoped to do this by a combination of military and diplomatic activity. Once contact with Sweden had been established this Latvian Central Council planned to combine a diplomatic offensive abroad with an insurrection within Latvia. The diplomatic offensive was partly obstructed by the Foreign Office, but that did not prevent the Latvian Central Council working closely with the British Secret Service as it first brought out of Latvia potential members of a Government in Exile, and then began to prepare for an insurrection. Planned to coincide with the arrival of the Red Army and the withdrawal of the Germans, the military wing of the Latvian Central Council intended to seize part of the Courland coast and hold it until British or Swedish forces intervened to prevent them being crushed by the Red Army, thus forcing the Soviets to negotiate about the future status of Latvia. The plans of the Latvian Central Council relied heavily on stories circulating in Sweden that the British were indeed about to intervene in the Baltic, and it is argued here that there was more to this than mere loose talk. The dilemma of whether or not to stage an insurrection was resolved by the Germans, who arrested General Kurelis, the leader of the insurrection and the man designated the interim leader of independent Latvia. The surviving forces of the Latvian Central Council established themselves as an underground army and waited for news from Britain that the time had come to rise. When no such message had come by summer 1945, many underground groups started moves towards a national uprising; to prevent this the Latvian Central Council used its surviving organization to instruct its underground fighters not to take up arms against the Soviets but to wait on diplomacy

Second Things First: What Free Speech Can and Can’t Say About Guns

Professor Blocher responds to Gregory Magarian’s article on the implications of the First Amendment for the Second

Youth bulges, insurrections, and politico-economic institutions: Theory and empirical evidence

We develop a model of insurrection markets and integrate the youth bulge as measured by the relative youth cohort size. As youth-specific characteristics we define the young person's attitude toward revolutionary groups and the government, the degree of risk aversion and the relative productivity of young people on the insurrection market as compared to the official labor market. We find that, apart from certain spontaneous outbreaks of violence or riots, youth bulges alone are not a good predictor for political violence. Nevertheless, deliberate insurrection activities that aim at changing political and economic power positions are indeed affected by youth bulges, but indirectly so, and their intensity is driven by the characteristics of the respective underlying set of politico-economic institutions. We test our implications in an empirical model based on cross-country panel data and find that the effect of the relative youth cohort size on insurrection outbreaks is moderated by changes in the underlying istitutional setting, and more precisely changes in the labor-market conditions as approximaed by unemployment rates

Legal Corruption

We challenge the conventional definition of corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain, making a distinction between legal and illegal forms of corruption, and paying more attention to corporate patterns of corruption (which also affect public corruption). We undertake to identify general determinants of the pattern of legal and illegal corruption worldwide, and present a model where both corruption (modeled explicitly in the context of allocations) and the political equilibrium are endogenous. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified as a function of basic parameters, namely initial conditions (assets/productivity), equality, and fundamental political accountability. These equilibria are: i) an illegal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite does not face binding incentives; ii) a legal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite is obliged to incur on a cost to deceive the population; and iii) a no-corruption equilibrium, where the population cannot be deceived. An integral empirical test of the model is performed, using a broad range of variables and sources. Its core variables, namely regarding legal corruption (and other manifestations of corporate corruption) come from an original survey developed with the World Economic Forum (in the Executive Opinion Survey 2004 of the Global Competitiveness Report). The empirical results generally validate the model and explanations. Some salient implications emerge.

Poland in the Period of Partitions 1795–1914

The present book “Poland – History, Culture and Society. Selected Readings” is the third edition of a collection of academic texts written with the intention to accompany the module by providing incoming students with teaching materials that will assist them in their studies of the course module and encourage further search for relevant information and data. The papers collected in the book have been authored by academic teachers from the University of Łódź, specialists in such fields as history, geography, literature, sociology, ethnology, cultural studies, and political science. Each author presents one chapter related to a topic included in the module or extending its contents. The book contains the extensive bibliograph

Revolution

This chapter compares the revolutions of 1789, 1848 and 1989 to examine the usefulness of the concepts of 'risk', and 'threat' in the development of revolutionary situations

The Paarl Insurrection

African Studies Seminar series. Paper presented October 1979At half past two, early in the morning of Thursday, November 22nd, 1962, 250 men carrying axes, pangas and various self-made weapons left the Mbekweni location and marched on Paarl. On the outskirts of the city the marchers formed two groups, one destined for the prison where the intention was to release prisoners, the other to make an attack on the police station. Before the marchers reached Paarl’s boundaries, the police had already been warned of their approach by a bus driver. Police patrols were sent out and one of these encountered the marchers in Paarl’s Main Street. Having lost the advantage of surprise, the marchers in Main Street began to throw stones at cars, shop windows and any police vans which they came across on their way to the police station. The police at the station were armed with sten guns and rifles in anticipation of the attack. At ten minutes past four between 75 and a hundred men advanced on the station throwing stones. When the attackers came within twenty-five yards of the station they were fired upon and two of them were immediately killed. The marchers then broke up into smaller groups and several were arrested or shot during their retreat. Some of the men who had taken part in the assault on Paarl police station met up in Loop Street with the group that was marching on the prison. These men regrouped and embarked on an attack on the inhabitants of Loop Street. Three houses and two people in the street were attacked: a seventeen year old girl and a young man were killed and four other people were wounded. According to police evidence, five insurgents were killed and fourteen were wounded. By five o clock, the Paarl uprising was over; police reinforcements had arrived from Cape Town and the men from Mbekweni were in full retreat. This paper has two purposes. One is to provide an analysis of the causes of the Paarl disturbance. In the literature on black South African opposition movements, the events in Paarl are scarcely mentioned. This is at least partly because the participants were not politically very sophisticated or articulate; they are consequently difficult to write about. But the neglect of the events in Paarl is also attributable to a bias in much of the relevant scholarship: the emphasis of historical studies has been on black ideological response and has tended to focus on the most fluent articulants of black aspirations. There is a tendancy for the history of black South African opposition to be intellectual history and to concern itself with the thoughts, responses and actions of an elite group

Youth bulges, insurrections, and politico-economic institutions

We develop a simple model of an insurrection market based on a kleptocratic politico-economic institutional setting, within which a certain government elite holds both all central government position and all productive assets. The kleptocratic setting provokes the appearance of insurrection entrepreneurs that are called the revolutionary elite and that aim at redistributing wealth away from the government elite. To that end, the revolutionary elite hires insurrection activists and compensates them in cash or in kind. We integrate the youth bulge measured by the relative youth cohort size into the insurrection market by defining certain youth-specific characteristics that influence relative productivities on the insurrection market as compared to an official labor market. We find that, apart from certain spontaneous outbreaks of violence or riots, youth bulges alone are not a good predictor for political violence. Moreover, deliberate insurrection activities that aim at changing political and economic power positions are affected by youth bulges only when related to certain politico-economic institutional settings, from which kleptocracies may be the most vulnerable

The Poqo insurrection

African Studies Seminar series. Paper presented February 1986This paper is about one of the least successful of South Africa's revolutionary movements. Several thousand Poqo insurrectionists were arrested during the course of the 1960s. The vast majority of these were detained and convicted before they had had a chance to strike a single blow. Fewer than thirty deaths can be attributed to the activities of Poqo adherents of whom nearly the same number were sentenced to death in South African courts. The history of the Poqo uprisings is a history without a climax. Its final act takes place in the courtrooms not the barricades. Perhaps for this reason the Poqo story has lacked a chronicler. This paper is an attempt to compensate for the perfunctory treatment Poqo has received from historians. It provides a narrative of Poqo's development and a description of its social following. It then attempts to assess Poqo's historical significance