Impact of Institutional Quality on Human Rights Abuses in Transition Economies

This purpose of this paper is to examine the direct effects of institutional quality on human rights abuses in transition economies. We make use of an alternative empirical approach for evaluation of institutional systemís development in transition economies developed by Chousa et al. (2005). To assess this relationship, along with institutional quality index, which is an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to observe institutional reforms-economic growth interdependence, we also construct cost of decline in institutional quality and transition from communist to reforms years variables. We also evaluate the effect of institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by the level of transition from communist to reforms years. The empirical work reveals that an improvement in institutional quality increases government respect for human rights. While, any decline in institutional quality leads to human rights abuses. The results also show that government respect for human rights are strongly associated with transition towards reforms years.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64424/1/wp928.pd

Economic Crisis and Fiscal Reforms in Latin America

The recent financial crisis has initiated pressures for not only policy reform but also fundamental institutional fiscal reforms. This paper explores the connection between economic crises and fiscal institutional reforms in a region that has experienced plenty of both in recent years, namely Latin America. For that purpose it reviews the literature and provides five hypotheses about why, and under what circumstances, crises would promote reforms. The empirical evidence shows that debt crises make reforms more likely but banking crises on their own, if anything, reduce the pressure for fiscal institutional reforms. Political institutions are also important. If the electoral system encourages the personal vote, the country is more likely to reform. This evidence may become useful for predicting the likelihood of reforms in the developed world.Information and communications technology, Education, Experimental design, Ecuador

IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES

This purpose of this paper is to examine the direct effects of institutional quality on human rights abuses in transition economies. We make use of an alternative empirical approach for evaluation of institutional system’s development in transition economies developed by Chousa et al. (2005). To assess this relationship, along with institutional quality index, which is an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to observe institutional reforms-economic growth interdependence, we also construct cost of decline in institutional quality and transition from communist to reforms years variables. We also evaluate the effect of institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by the level of transition from communist to reforms years. The empirical work reveals that an improvement in institutional quality increases government respect for human rights. While, any decline in institutional quality leads to human rights abuses. The results also show that government respect for human rights are strongly associated with transition towards reforms years.Institutional Quality; Human Rights; Transition economies

IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES

This purpose of this paper is to examine the direct effects of institutional quality on human rights abuses in transition economies. We make use of an alternative empirical approach for evaluation of institutional system’s development in transition economies developed by Chousa et al. (2005). To assess this relationship, along with institutional quality index, which is an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to observe institutional reforms-economic growth interdependence, we also construct cost of decline in institutional quality and transition from communist to reforms years variables. We also evaluate the effect of institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by the level of transition from communist to reforms years. The empirical work reveals that an improvement in institutional quality increases government respect for human rights. While, any decline in institutional quality leads to human rights abuses. The results also show that government respect for human rights are strongly associated with transition towards reforms years.Institutional Quality; Human Rights; Transition economies.

The Impact of Trust on Reforms

In a constantly changing economic environment a country's ability to undertake institutional reforms is crucial to maintain economic growth and to promote the welfare of its citizens. A wide range of determinants for institutional reforms have been identified. However, the impact of trust on reforms has so far never been addressed. We provide theoretical arguments why trust should influence institutional changes and test the relationship empirically. We find a significant positive relation between trust and reforms with regard to government size, the legal system, and deregulation of private businesses and the labor market. The results in other policy fields are ambiguous. --Trust,Economic Freedom,Policy Reforms

Market-Based Instruments for Water Allocation in India: Issues and the Way Forward

Institutions do matter in managing water scarcity. Institutional reforms in water sector in recent years have tried to replace the existing 'command-and-control approach' with more innovative and comprehensive marketbased approach. Based on a comprehensive literature review, this paper highlights various issues involved in marketbased institutional reforms in the water sector in various countries. This paper finds that even though there are some problems, the market-based institutional reforms are capable of generating relatively higher benefits through efficient, equitable and sustainable water allocation mechanisms. This paper also provides policy suggestions on introducing market-based instruments formally in the water sector in the Indian context

Structural reforms in Europe and the (in)coherence of institutions

The aim of this article is to analyse the consequences of some structural reforms on the institutional coherence of OECD countries, particularly Continental Europe, and on their economic performance, particularly employment. Because institutions in developed political economies are interrelated through a complex network of complementarities, institutional change has consequences beyond the area concerned by a reform. This also implies that there are complementarity effects in reforms themselves. A challenge of reform programs is therefore to achieve a new type of complementarities between reformed institutions. The paper presents empirical evidence questioning the compatibility of the ongoing structural reforms in product and labour markets with the existing institutional structures in some OECD countries. The coherence of the flexicurity strategy, i.e. a combination of labour market flexibility and generous welfare state, is also questioned, both from economic efficiency and political economy points of view.Structural reforms;, models of capitalism; flexicurity

Trade, instititutions and export specialization.

This paper studies whether trade integration between the EU15 and Central Europe has led to more export specialization in Central Europe. Moreover, we analyze the impact of institutional reforms in Central Europe on export specialization. The empirical analysis is set up for thirteen Central European countries over the period 1989-2000. Our results indicate that a reduction in tariffs between EU15 and Central Europe led to increased export specialization in Central Europe. In addition to trade integration, we show that institutional reforms and in particular enterprise reforms contributed to export specialization.trade integration; tariffs; Herfindahl index; exports; institutions;

Entrepreneurship, Reforms, and Development: Empirical Evidence

We examine how entrepreneurship and institutional and policy reforms affect development (proxied by the rate of growth in per–capita income). We do so by performing Arellano-Bond GMM estimations on annual data for a large group of developing and developed countries, and covering the period 1990-2002. We focus in particular on the interplay of trade and institutional reforms and entrepreneurship. The empirical results indicate that the interplay of entrepreneurship and institutions, and the interplay of entrepreneurship and policy reforms, influence the growth effects of entrepreneurship. However, the effects are strikingly different. The impact of institutional reform is positive when the level of entrepreneurship is low and negative when it is high. On the other hand, the effect of policy reform is negative when entrepreneurial activity is weak and positive when it is strong. These results are robust to the inclusion of other control variables.development, growth, entrepreneurship, institutions, policy reform

Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms

We compare the economic consequences and political feasibility of reforms aimed at reducing barriers to entry (deregulation) and improving contractual enforcement (legal reform). Deregulation fosters entry, thereby increasing the number of firms (entrepreneurship) and the average quality of management (meritocracy). Legal reform also reduces financial constraints on entry, but in addition it facilitates transfers of control of incumbent firms, from untalented to talented managers. Since when incumbent firms are better run entry by new firms is less profitable, in general equilibrium legal reform may improve meritocracy at the expense of entrepreneurship. As a result, legal reform encounters less political opposition than deregulation, as it preserves incumbents' rents, while at the same time allowing the less efficient among them to transfer control and capture (part of) the resulting efficiency gains. Using this insight, we show that there may be dynamic complementarities in the reform path, whereby reformers can skillfully use legal reform in the short run to create a constituency supporting future deregulations. Generally speaking, our model suggests that "Coasian" reforms improving the scope of private contracting are likely to mobilize greater political support because — rather than undermining the rents of incumbents — they allow for an endogenous compensation of losers. Some preliminary empirical evidence supports the view that the market for control of incumbent firms plays an important role in an industry's response to legal reform.financial economics, deregulation, meritocracy