Impact of Institutional Quality on Human Rights Abuses in Transition Economies

This purpose of this paper is to examine the direct effects of institutional quality on human rights abuses in transition economies. We make use of an alternative empirical approach for evaluation of institutional systemís development in transition economies developed by Chousa et al. (2005). To assess this relationship, along with institutional quality index, which is an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to observe institutional reforms-economic growth interdependence, we also construct cost of decline in institutional quality and transition from communist to reforms years variables. We also evaluate the effect of institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by the level of transition from communist to reforms years. The empirical work reveals that an improvement in institutional quality increases government respect for human rights. While, any decline in institutional quality leads to human rights abuses. The results also show that government respect for human rights are strongly associated with transition towards reforms years.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64424/1/wp928.pd

Institutional dynamics of regulatory actors in the recruitment of migrant workers : the case of Indonesia

This paper examines how institutional dynamics among regulatory institutions affect the governance of the recruitment of Indonesian low-skilled migrant workers. Two institutional reforms have been made to create better governance for Indonesian migrant workers in the post-authoritarian era. One was the establishment of the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) while the other was the granting of greater responsibility to sub-national governments to supervise migrant worker recruitment. In spite of these institutional reforms, little progress has been made in the protection of Indonesian migrant workers. The paper reveals that the restrictive regulatory framework for the recruitment of migrant workers, which curbs private recruitment agencies, does not create better migrant worker governance. This regulatory framework does not take into consideration the horizontal relationship between the old and new institutions, and the vertical relationship between the central and sub-national governments. Horizontally, the institutional design of the proposed new regulatory framework has created institutional rivalry between the newly established regulatory actor and the old one. Vertically, the reluctance of central government to decentralise authority to sub-national governments has curtailed the ability of sub-national governments to perform a supervisory role in the recruitment process. These two inter-related factors have hindered the efforts to create a better recruitment process for Indonesian migrant workers

Trust-based trade

Weak enforcement of international contracts can substantially reduce international trade. We develop a model where agents build reputations to overcome the difficulties that this institutional failure causes in a context of incomplete information. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. We find that the conditional probability that a firm will stop exporting decreases and its foreign sales increase as the firm acquires greater export experience. The reason is that the informational costs that an exporter faces fall as the exporter becomes more confident about the reliability of its distributor. An improvement in the institutional quality of a country affects its imports through several distinct channels, as it changes the incentives of both current and potential exporters. Trade liberalization induces current exporters to increase their sales. It could induce entry as well, but this will happen only when the initial tariff is high and/or the institutional quality of the country is low

Ireland's EU Referendum Experience

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it surveys Ireland’s European Union referendum experience, tracing the key actors, issues and political dynamics of seven European referendums from 1973 to 2008. It unpicks the institutional rules of the referendum game in Ireland stemming from the McKenna and Coughlan judgements, the operation of the Referendum Commission and the effect of this institutional environment on referendum campaigns and outcomes. Second, building on a framework originally developed by Darcy and Laver (1990), this article investigates the emergence of a dynamic in Irish referendums on EU treaties with two key elements: elite withdrawal and populist capture

IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES

This purpose of this paper is to examine the direct effects of institutional quality on human rights abuses in transition economies. We make use of an alternative empirical approach for evaluation of institutional system’s development in transition economies developed by Chousa et al. (2005). To assess this relationship, along with institutional quality index, which is an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to observe institutional reforms-economic growth interdependence, we also construct cost of decline in institutional quality and transition from communist to reforms years variables. We also evaluate the effect of institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by the level of transition from communist to reforms years. The empirical work reveals that an improvement in institutional quality increases government respect for human rights. While, any decline in institutional quality leads to human rights abuses. The results also show that government respect for human rights are strongly associated with transition towards reforms years.Institutional Quality; Human Rights; Transition economies

IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES

This purpose of this paper is to examine the direct effects of institutional quality on human rights abuses in transition economies. We make use of an alternative empirical approach for evaluation of institutional system’s development in transition economies developed by Chousa et al. (2005). To assess this relationship, along with institutional quality index, which is an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to observe institutional reforms-economic growth interdependence, we also construct cost of decline in institutional quality and transition from communist to reforms years variables. We also evaluate the effect of institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by the level of transition from communist to reforms years. The empirical work reveals that an improvement in institutional quality increases government respect for human rights. While, any decline in institutional quality leads to human rights abuses. The results also show that government respect for human rights are strongly associated with transition towards reforms years.Institutional Quality; Human Rights; Transition economies.

"Assessing Institutional Efficiency, Growth and Integration"

This paper presents a new empirical methodology for evaluation of the institutional system's development in transition economies and the impact it has on economic performance. We have developed and used a methodology of estimation of an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to observe the "institutional reforms-economic growth" interdependence in transition economies. The empirical work reveals a certain dependence between institutional development and growth. An application of the approach to the problems of international economic integration of transition economies in the context of EU accession allows us to assess the role of democratization and the rule of law in particular.

Trust-Based Trade

There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efficacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufficiently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade flows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents, but that trade liberalization can mitigate these negative effects.International trade, Export dynamics, Contract enforcement, Reputation

A Dynamic Approach to the Relationship between Inequality, Social Capital and Institutions

One of the main objectives of this paper is to show the dynamics that relates inequality, social capital and institutions. The most important result is that these dynamics could generate multiple equilibria. Thus, we can identify two types of equilibria: one with a low level of social capital and high level of inequality, supported by institutions created endogenously by the community; and on the other hand, an equilibrium with a high level of social capital, low inequality and institutions that favor social equality. The analysis made in this paper can be seen as a contribution to the literature on why a society may attain high levels of institutional development and social integration.Inequality, Social Capital, Institutional Arrangement