6 research outputs found
Maximizing Social Welfare and Agreement via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games
We consider linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games in which players have
quadratic payoffs that depend on the players' actions and an unknown
payoff-relevant state, and signals on the state that follow a Gaussian
distribution conditional on the state realization. An information designer
decides the fidelity of information revealed to the players in order to
maximize the social welfare of the players or reduce the disagreement among
players' actions. Leveraging the semi-definiteness of the information design
problem, we derive analytical solutions for these objectives under specific LQG
games. We show that full information disclosure maximizes social welfare when
there is a common payoff-relevant state, when there is strategic
substitutability in the actions of players, or when the signals are public.
Numerical results show that as strategic substitution increases, the value of
the information disclosure increases. When the objective is to induce
conformity among players' actions, hiding information is optimal. Lastly, we
consider the information design objective that is a weighted combination of
social welfare and cohesiveness of players' actions. We obtain an interval for
the weights where full information disclosure is optimal under public signals
for games with strategic substitutability. Numerical solutions show that the
actual interval where full information disclosure is optimal gets close to the
analytical interval obtained as substitution increases
Information Design in Large Anonymous Games
We consider anonymous Bayesian cost games with a large number of players,
i.e., games where each player aims at minimizing a cost function that depends
on the action chosen by the player, the distribution of the other players'
actions and an unknown parameter. We study the nonatomic limit versions of
these games. In particular, we introduce the concepts of correlated and Bayes
correlated Wardrop equilibria, which extend the concepts of correlated and
Bayes correlated equilibria to nonatomic games. We prove that (Bayes)
correlated Wardrop equilibria are indeed limits of action flow distributions
induced by (Bayes) correlated equilibria of the game with a large finite set of
small players. For nonatomic games with complete information admitting a convex
potential, we show that the set of correlated Wardrop equilibria is the set of
probability distributions over Wardrop equilibria. Then, we study how to
implement optimal Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibria and show that in games
with a convex potential, every Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibrium can be
fully implemented.Comment: 53 page
Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder
We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions. The decoding process is not supervised, it returns the output sequence that minimizes the decoder's distortion function. The encoding process is designed beforehand and takes into account the decoder's distortion mismatch. When the communication channel is perfect and no side information is available at the decoder, this problem is referred to as the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow in the Economics literature. We formulate the strategic communication scenario as a joint source-channel coding problem with side information at the decoder. The informational content of the source influences the design of the encoding since it impacts differently the two distinct distortion functions. The side information complexifies the analysis since the encoder is uncertain about the decoder's belief on the source statistics