Informational Cronyism

If Maher Kara, the Citigroup analyst at the center of the Salman case now before the Supreme Court, was forbidden under SEC Rule 10b-5 from trading securities for his own account while in possession of the valuable secrets to which his job gave him access, should he instead be able to give that information to family members simply in order to enrich them? I suspect that to anyone unfamiliar with the fine line drawing of federal insider trading law, the answer is clearly no. There is probably no more common form of corruption than generously shoveling the fruits of power and privilege to family and close friends. Cultures lacking a strong rule of law make it an art form

Informational Warfare

Recent empirical and theoretical work suggests that reputation was an important mediator of access to resources in ancestral human environments. Reputations were built and maintained by the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about the actions and capabilities of group members-that is, by gossiping. Strategic gossiping would have been an excellent strategy for manipulating reputations and thereby competing effectively for resources and for cooperative relationships with group members who could best provide such resources. Coalitions (cliques) may have increased members' abilities to manipulate reputations by gossiping. Because, over evolutionary time, women may have experienced more within-group competition than men, and because female reputations may have been more vulnerable than male reputations to gossip, gossiping may have been a more important strategy for women than men. Consequently, women may have evolved specializations for gossiping alone and in coalitions. We develop and partially test this theory

Informational precaution

In environmental ethics, the precautionary principle states that parties should refrain from actions in the face of scientific uncertainties about serious or irreversible harm to public health or the environment. A similar principle is lacking when judging effects of information technology. Such a principle would be helpful in guiding discussions, and that is why we try to develop a precautionary principle for information technology in this paper.\ud \ud As the effects of information technology are primarily social, social sustainability would be a key concept in developing the principle, where environmental sustainability fulfils this role in the traditional one. However, present definitions of social sustainability often consider it as an additional condition for environmental sustainability, rather than as an end in itself. Social sustainability, as meant in this paper, is the property of a development that it safeguards the continuity and stability of a social system. This may include maintaining trust and power relations in society. Based on this definition of social sustainability, we establish a precautionary principle with respect to the social sustainability of information technology.\ud \ud The principle of informational precaution, as we call it, aims at protecting the social environment of technology by providing information security, just as the traditional precautionary principle aims at protecting the natural environment of technology by providing physical, chemical and biological safety. By providing causal insulation in the infosphere, i.e. separation of pieces of information, information technology may be able to protect the social environment. The principle of informational precaution then states that people should refrain from changing causal insulations in the infosphere, if there is uncertainty about possible serious or irreversible harm to society.\u

Informational Substitutes

We propose definitions of substitutes and complements for pieces of information ("signals") in the context of a decision or optimization problem, with game-theoretic and algorithmic applications. In a game-theoretic context, substitutes capture diminishing marginal value of information to a rational decision maker. We use the definitions to address the question of how and when information is aggregated in prediction markets. Substitutes characterize "best-possible" equilibria with immediate information aggregation, while complements characterize "worst-possible", delayed aggregation. Game-theoretic applications also include settings such as crowdsourcing contests and Q\&A forums. In an algorithmic context, where substitutes capture diminishing marginal improvement of information to an optimization problem, substitutes imply efficient approximation algorithms for a very general class of (adaptive) information acquisition problems. In tandem with these broad applications, we examine the structure and design of informational substitutes and complements. They have equivalent, intuitive definitions from disparate perspectives: submodularity, geometry, and information theory. We also consider the design of scoring rules or optimization problems so as to encourage substitutability or complementarity, with positive and negative results. Taken as a whole, the results give some evidence that, in parallel with substitutable items, informational substitutes play a natural conceptual and formal role in game theory and algorithms.Comment: Full version of FOCS 2016 paper. Single-column, 61 pages (48 main text, 13 references and appendix

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BUSM News and Notes

Monthly newsletter providing updates of interest to the Boston University School of Medicine community

BUSM News and Notes

Monthly newsletter providing updates of interest to the Boston University School of Medicine community

BUSM News and Notes

Monthly newsletter providing updates of interest to the Boston University School of Medicine community

BUSM News and Notes

Monthly newsletter providing updates of interest to the Boston University School of Medicine community

BUSM News and Notes

Monthly newsletter providing updates of interest to the Boston University School of Medicine community