12,614 research outputs found
Econymic Information Design
Information design is the defining of the requirements governing the selecting, rendering, and transmission of information for the purpose of knowledge transfer as well as the optimization of the information with respect to these requirements. In the case of econymic information, the knowledge transfer is determined by and linked to the respective markets.This paper examines its role in brand management and brand communication.branding; brand names; design; econymy
Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion
We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in
social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of
price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing
information about wait times to improve welfare. We consider a stylized model
with heterogeneous users who differ in their private outside options: low-need
users have an acceptable outside option to the social service, whereas
high-need users have no viable outside option. Upon arrival, a user decides to
wait for the service by joining an unobservable first-come-first-serve queue,
or leave and seek her outside option. To reduce congestion and improve social
outcomes, the service provider seeks to persuade more low-need users to avail
their outside option, and thus better serve high-need users. We characterize
the Pareto-optimal signaling mechanisms and compare their welfare outcomes
against several benchmarks. We show that if either type is the overwhelming
majority of the population, information design does not provide improvement
over sharing full information or no information. On the other hand, when the
population is a mixture of the two types, information design not only Pareto
dominates full-information and no-information mechanisms, in some regimes it
also achieves the same welfare as the "first-best", i.e., the Pareto-optimal
centralized admission policy with knowledge of users' types.Comment: Accepted for publication in the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (EC'20). 40 pages, 6 figure
Sequential Information Design
We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoffârelevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensiveâform refinements
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