Games with recurring certainty

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players become uncertain about the current state of the game, and this uncertainty lasts forever. Here we consider games where the players attain certainty about the current state over and over again along any play. For finite-state games, we note that this kind of recurring certainty implies a stronger condition of periodic certainty, that is, the events of state certainty ultimately occur at uniform, regular intervals. We show that it is decidable whether a given game presents recurring certainty, and that, if so, the problem of synthesising coordination strategies under w-regular winning conditions is solvable.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041

Distributed Synthesis in Continuous Time

We introduce a formalism modelling communication of distributed agents strictly in continuous-time. Within this framework, we study the problem of synthesising local strategies for individual agents such that a specified set of goal states is reached, or reached with at least a given probability. The flow of time is modelled explicitly based on continuous-time randomness, with two natural implications: First, the non-determinism stemming from interleaving disappears. Second, when we restrict to a subclass of non-urgent models, the quantitative value problem for two players can be solved in EXPTIME. Indeed, the explicit continuous time enables players to communicate their states by delaying synchronisation (which is unrestricted for non-urgent models). In general, the problems are undecidable already for two players in the quantitative case and three players in the qualitative case. The qualitative undecidability is shown by a reduction to decentralized POMDPs for which we provide the strongest (and rather surprising) undecidability result so far

Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page

Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning strategies can be constructed effectively without restricting the direction of information flow. Instead, our condition requires that the players attain common knowledge about the actual state of the game over and over again along every play. We show that it is decidable whether a given game satisfies the condition, and prove tight complexity bounds for the strategy synthesis problem under $\omega$-regular winning conditions given by parity automata.Comment: 39 pages; 2nd revision; submitted to Information and Computatio

Alternating-time temporal logic with finite-memory strategies

Model-checking the alternating-time temporal logics ATL and ATL* with incomplete information is undecidable for perfect recall semantics. However, when restricting to memoryless strategies the model-checking problem becomes decidable. In this paper we consider two other types of semantics based on finite-memory strategies. One where the memory size allowed is bounded and one where the memory size is unbounded (but must be finite). This is motivated by the high complexity of model-checking with perfect recall semantics and the severe limitations of memoryless strategies. We show that both types of semantics introduced are different from perfect recall and memoryless semantics and next focus on the decidability and complexity of model-checking in both complete and incomplete information games for ATL/ATL*. In particular, we show that the complexity of model-checking with bounded-memory semantics is Delta_2p-complete for ATL and PSPACE-complete for ATL* in incomplete information games just as in the memoryless case. We also present a proof that ATL and ATL* model-checking is undecidable for n >= 3 players with finite-memory semantics in incomplete information games.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2013, arXiv:1307.416