Emotional inferences by pragmatics

It has for long been taken for granted that, along the course of reading a text, world knowledge is often required in order to establish coherent links between sentences (McKoon & Ratcliff 1992, Iza & Ezquerro 2000). The content grasped from a text turns out to be strongly dependent upon the reader’s additional knowledge that allows a coherent interpretation of the text as a whole. The world knowledge directing the inference may be of distinctive nature. Gygax et al. (2007) showed that mental models related to human action may be of a perceptual nature and may include behavioral as well as emotional elements. Gygax (2010), however, showed the unspecific nature of emotional inferences and the prevalence of behavioral elements in readers' mental models of emotions. Inferences are made in both directions; emotional inferences based on behavior and vice versa. Harris & de Rosnay (2002) and Pons et al. (2003) proved that different linguistic skills –in particular lexicon, syntax and semantics are closely related to emotion understanding. Iza & Konstenius (2010) showed that additional knowledge about social norms affects the participants’ prediction about would be inferred as the behavioral or emotional outcome of a given social situation. Syntactic and lexical abilities are the best predictors of emotion understanding, but making inferences is the only significant predictor of the most complex components (reflective dimension) of emotion comprehension in normal children. Recently, Farina et al. (2011) showed in a study that the relation between pragmatics and emotional inferences may not be so straight forward. Children with High Functioning Autism (HFA) and Asperger Syndrome (AS) present similar diagnostic profiles, characterized by satisfactory cognitive development, good phonological, syntactic and semantic competences, but poor pragmatic skills and socio-emotional competencies. After training in pragmatics a descriptive analyses showed the whole group to display a deficit in emotion comprehension, but high levels of pragmatic competences. This indicates a further need to study the relationship between emotion and inference in normal subjects too. We also suggest that while behavioral elements may indeed be of perceptual nature and the inference between emotion and behavior less culturally dependent especially when concerned with basic emotions -the inference concerned with social norms may be more complex and require elaborative inference. We suggest that in further studies a distinction between basic emotions and non basic emotions, social settings and non-social settings should be made. The cognitive models concerned with social action may be of more complex nature, but with recognizable features on lexical and syntactic levels.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

Semantics for Probabilistic Inference

A number of writers(Joseph Halpern and Fahiem Bacchus among them) have offered semantics for formal languages in which inferences concerning probabilities can be made. Our concern is different. This paper provides a formalization of nonmonotonic inferences in which the conclusion is supported only to a certain degree. Such inferences are clearly 'invalid' since they must allow the falsity of a conclusion even when the premises are true. Nevertheless, such inferences can be characterized both syntactically and semantically. The 'premises' of probabilistic arguments are sets of statements (as in a database or knowledge base), the conclusions categorical statements in the language. We provide standards for both this form of inference, for which high probability is required, and for an inference in which the conclusion is qualified by an intermediate interval of support.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1992

More Than Memories? Schema Transference from Media Characters to Real People

This study focused on whether personality traits and evaluations of television personalities are used to make inferences about new Social interaction partners. It tested the hypothesis that priming schemas of television personalities will bias inferences made about a stranger. The results were mixed. Participants in the experimental condition made more biased inferences about a stranger than did participants in the control condition. This transference was not influenced by participants\u27 parasociability, and methodological limitations prevented conclusive study of the influence of affective evaluations in this effect. Future studies should attempt to increase methodological control and introduce a diverse set of measures to test for possible mediating and moderating variables

Enhancing Transparency and Control when Drawing Data-Driven Inferences about Individuals

Recent studies have shown that information disclosed on social network sites (such as Facebook) can be used to predict personal characteristics with surprisingly high accuracy. In this paper we examine a method to give online users transparency into why certain inferences are made about them by statistical models, and control to inhibit those inferences by hiding ("cloaking") certain personal information from inference. We use this method to examine whether such transparency and control would be a reasonable goal by assessing how difficult it would be for users to actually inhibit inferences. Applying the method to data from a large collection of real users on Facebook, we show that a user must cloak only a small portion of her Facebook Likes in order to inhibit inferences about their personal characteristics. However, we also show that in response a firm could change its modeling of users to make cloaking more difficult.Comment: presented at 2016 ICML Workshop on Human Interpretability in Machine Learning (WHI 2016), New York, N

A Cut-Free Sequent Calculus for Defeasible Erotetic Inferences

In recent years, the effort to formalize erotetic inferences (i.e., inferences to and from questions) has become a central concern for those working in erotetic logic. However, few have sought to formulate a proof theory for these inferences. To fill this lacuna, we construct a calculus for (classes of) sequents that are sound and complete for two species of erotetic inferences studied by Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL): erotetic evocation and regular erotetic implication. While an attempt has been made to axiomatize the former in a sequent system, there is currently no proof theory for the latter. Moreover, the extant axiomatization of erotetic evocation fails to capture its defeasible character and provides no rules for introducing or eliminating question-forming operators. In contrast, our calculus encodes defeasibility conditions on sequents and provides rules governing the introduction and elimination of erotetic formulas. We demonstrate that an elimination theorem holds for a version of the cut rule that applies to both declarative and erotetic formulas and that the rules for the axiomatic account of question evocation in IEL are admissible in our system

Inferences on Criminality Based on Appearance

In our research study, we tested whether people can tell if someone is a criminal or not based on a photograph of their face. The importance of the subject lies in the fact that many people are unfairly judged as criminals based on stereotypes such as race. In this study, we wished to eliminate race and see if any purely facial characteristics are stereotypically defined as criminal or if a person’s initial judgment is an accurate predictor of someone’s character. Extensive research has been dedicated to finding if people have facial features that portray some characteristic about them and this study will focus on criminality. Through the use of a face modulating program, neutral faced photographs were shown to participants with a question that asked if the person in the photograph is a criminal or not. The data gathered will be beneficial in either identifying facial features that are associated with criminals or that show the interesting phenomena of gut instinct

Psychosemantic analyticity

It is widely agreed that the content of a logical concept such as and is constituted by the inferences it enters into. I argue that it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between logical and non-logical concepts, and hence that the content of non-logical concepts can also be constituted by certain of their inferential relations. The traditional problem with such a view has been that, given Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction, there does not seem to be any way to distinguish between those inferences that are content constitutive and those that are not. I propose that such a distinction can be drawn by appealing to a notion of ‘psychosemantic analyticity’. This approach is immune to Quine’s arguments, since ‘psychosemantic analyticity’ is a psychological property, and it is thus an empirical question which inferences have this property

Discussion of "Impact of Frequentist and Bayesian Methods on Survey Sampling Practice: A Selective Appraisal" by J. N. K. Rao

This comment emphasizes the importance of model checking and model fitting when making inferences about finite population quantities. It also suggests the value of using unit level models when making inferences for small subpopulations, that is, "small area" analyses [arXiv:1108.2356].Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/11-STS346B the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org