Truck, Barter, and Exchange: An Empirical Investigation of Reciprocity in Online P2P Barter Markets

This study provides the first attempt to study the emerging online peer-to-peer (P2P) barter markets, in which individuals trade goods or services without the use of money. Using detailed transaction data from a leading P2P barter marketplace for books, we examine how the norm of reciprocity affects transaction outcomes. We find that although the barter marketplace is designed under the norm of indirect reciprocity, market participants also exhibit a strong preference towards direct reciprocity. We further find that both indirect reciprocity and direct reciprocity affect transactions, but in different ways. While both forms of reciprocity help improve the probability of success of a transaction, only direct reciprocity helps facilitate the fulfillment speed of a transaction. We also provide evidence that direct reciprocity is favored for exchanging rare goods. We discuss the implication of our findings for the design of P2P barter marketplaces

Empathy: A clue for prosocialty and driver of indirect reciprocity.

Indirect reciprocity has been proposed to explain prosocial behavior among strangers, whereby the prosocial act is returned by a third party. However, what happens if the prosocial act cannot be observed by the third party? Here, we examine whether empathy serves as a clue for prosociality and whether people are more generous toward more empathetic people. In a laboratory study, we measured prosocial behavior as the amount sent in the dictator game and empathy based on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). By using an incentivized task, we find that people believe that more empathetic participants send more money in the dictator game. Thus, people see empathy as a clue for prosocial behavior. Furthermore, in a second dictator game, participants indirectly reciprocate by sending more money to more empathetic recipients. Therefore, we suggest that empathy can replace a reputation derived from observable prosocial behavior in triggering indirect reciprocity

Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game

This paper explores how information about paired subject's previous action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The first experiment puts dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: one where the recipient is a stranger and the other where the dictator has information on the recipient's reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictator's behavior toward a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior toward an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. In the second experiment the dictators' choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.Experimental economics; dictator game; indirect reciprocity; reputation; generosity

Religious and Non-religious Giving in Thailand: An Economic Perspective

Understanding religious and non-religious giving in Thailand will help us to comprehend the role of Buddhism on social reciprocity which is a necessary condition for policy recommendation to enhance the participatory development of Thai citizens. The study found that attending religious services on a regular basis does make people become more generous to both religious and non-religious contributions indicating the influence of Buddhism on socioeconomic development of Thailand. Highest educational achievement plays a major role on both money and time contributions. Education thus is a means not only to human capital formation but also to implanting the social reciprocal value to young generations. In addition, while government spending on religious boosts up the religious contributions, it in turn lessens the non-religious giving. But the level of an individual social capital significantly increases individual’s time volunteers to both religious and non-religious organizations. Government hence may consider diverting some of their religious spending towards community-based social capital accumulation by financing community activities that could enhance the civic participations. Furthermore, policy makers should encourage people to follow news on a daily basis to make people become aware of social needs. The accuracy and reliability of social media thus have an indirect influence on social reciprocity. Keywords: Money and time contribution, Religious and Nonreligious giving, Social Capital, Participatory developmen

The nature of human altruism

Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution.altruism, selfishness, human altruism, evolution

Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictatorultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less otherregarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.

Measuring Indirect Reciprocity: Whose Back Do We Scratch?

This paper presents an experimental investigation of strong indirect reciprocity. We examine both generalized indirect reciprocity (if A helps B then B helps C) and social indirect reciprocity (if A helps B then C helps A), in a setting where reciprocal behavior cannot be explained by strategic motivations. We also consider a treatment for direct reciprocity, as a benchmark, and use a variant of the strategy method to control for di®erences in ¯rst movers' actions across treatments. We ¯nd evidence of strong reciprocity within each treatment, both for strategies and decisions. Generalized indirect reciprocity is found to be signi¯cantly stronger than social indirect reciprocity and, interestingly, direct reciprocity. This ¯nd- ing is interpreted as re°ecting the relevance of ¯rst movers' motivation for second movers' reciprocal behavior.Reciprocity, Experimental Economics.

To reciprocate or not to reciprocate: Exploring temporal qualities in reciprocal exchanges in networks

In this article, we sought to draw theoretical explanations of reciprocal exchanges in networks and how reciprocity is seen as the building block of network sustainability through employing a temporal perspective. The article’s main contribution was to provide fresh insights into how temporality, drawn upon Bergson’s philosophy, advanced the way we look at reciprocity and consequently provided three perspectives of time, namely; emergent networks, discursive practices, and possible times. The practical implications of such perspectives inform organisation on how to select networks and predict their benefits. The research method included 28 interviews and casual observation of network sessions