41 research outputs found
Indifferentiability of 3-Round Even-Mansour with Random Oracle Key Derivation
We revisit the Even-Mansour (EM) scheme with random oracle key derivation previously considered by Andreeva et al. (CRYPTO 2013). For this scheme, Andreeva et al. provided an indifferentiability (from an ideal -cipher) proof for 5 rounds while they exhibited an attack for 2 rounds. Left open is the (in)differentiability of 3 and 4 rounds.
We present a proof for the indifferentiability of 3 rounds and thus closing the aforementioned gap. This also separates EM ciphers with non-invertible key derivations from those with invertible ones in the full indifferentiability setting. Prior work only established such a separation in the weaker sequential-indifferentiability setting (ours, DCC, 2015). Our results also imply 3-round EM indifferentiable under multiple random known-keys, partially settling a problem left by Cogliati and Seurin (FSE 2016).
The key point for our indifferentiability simulator is to pre-emptively obtain some chains of ideal-cipher-queries to simulate the structures due to the related-key boomerang property in the 3-round case. The length of such chains have to be as large as the number of queries issued by the distinguisher. Thus the situation somehow resembles the context of hash-of-hash considered by Dodis et al. (CRYPTO 2012). Besides, a technical novelty of our proof is the absence of the so-called distinguisher that completes all chains
On the Provable Security of the Iterated Even-Mansour Cipher against Related-Key and Chosen-Key Attacks
The iterated Even-Mansour cipher is a construction of a block cipher from public permutations which abstracts in a generic way the structure of key-alternating ciphers. The indistinguishability of this construction from a truly random permutation by an adversary with oracle access to the inner permutations has been investigated in a series of recent papers. This construction has also been shown to be (fully) indifferentiable from an ideal cipher for a sufficient number of rounds (five or twelve depending on the assumptions on the key-schedule). In this paper, we extend this line of work by considering the resistance of the iterated Even-Mansour cipher to xor-induced related-key attacks (i.e., related-key attacks where the adversary is allowed to xor any constant of its choice to the secret key) and to chosen-key attacks. For xor-induced related-key attacks, we first provide a distinguishing attack for two rounds, assuming the key-schedule is linear. We then prove that for a linear key-schedule, three rounds yield a cipher which is secure against xor-induced related-key attacks up to queries of the adversary, whereas for a nonlinear key-schedule, one round is sufficient to obtain a similar security bound. We also show that the iterated Even-Mansour cipher with four rounds offers some form of provable resistance to chosen-key attacks, which is the minimal number of rounds to achieve this property. The main technical tool that we use to prove this result is \emph{sequential indifferentiability}, a weakened variant of (full) indifferentiability introduced by Mandal \emph{et al.} (TCC~2010)
How to Construct an Ideal Cipher from a Small Set of Public Permutations
We show how to construct an ideal cipher with -bit blocks and -bit keys (\emph{i.e.} a set of public -bit permutations) from a small constant number of -bit random public permutations. The construction that we consider is the \emph{single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher}, which encrypts a plaintext under a key by alternatively xoring the key and applying independent random public -bit permutations (this construction is also named a \emph{key-alternating cipher}). We analyze this construction in the plain indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein (TCC 2004), and show that twelve rounds are sufficient to achieve indifferentiability from an ideal cipher. We also show that four rounds are necessary by exhibiting attacks for three rounds or less
Minimizing Even-Mansour Ciphers for Sequential Indifferentiability (Without Key Schedules)
Iterated Even-Mansour (IEM) schemes consist of a small number of fixed permutations separated by round key additions. They enjoy provable security, assuming the permutations are public and random. In particular, regarding chosen-key security in the sense of sequential indifferentiability (seq-indifferentiability), Cogliati and Seurin (EUROCRYPT 2015) showed that without key schedule functions, the 4-round Even-Mansour with Independent Permutations and no key schedule is sequentially indifferentiable.
Minimizing IEM variants for classical strong (tweakable) pseudorandom security has stimulated an attractive line of research. In this paper, we seek for minimizing the construction while retaining seq-indifferentiability. We first consider , a natural variant of using a single round permutation. Unfortunately, we exhibit a slide attack against with any number of rounds. In light of this, we show that the 4-round using 2 independent random permutations is seq-indifferentiable. This provides the minimal seq-indifferentiable IEM without key schedule
Strengthening the Known-Key Security Notion for Block Ciphers
We reconsider the formalization of known-key attacks against ideal primitive-based block ciphers. This was previously tackled by Andreeva, Bogdanov, and Mennink (FSE 2013), who introduced the notion of known-key indifferentiability. Our starting point is the observation, previously made by Cogliati and Seurin (EUROCRYPT 2015), that this notion, which considers only a single known key available to the attacker, is too weak in some settings to fully capture what one might expect from a block cipher informally deemed resistant to known-key attacks. Hence, we introduce a stronger variant of known-key indifferentiability, where the adversary is given multiple known keys to ``play\u27\u27 with, the informal goal being that the block cipher construction must behave as an independent random permutation for each of these known keys. Our main result is that the 9-round iterated Even-Mansour construction (with the trivial key-schedule, i.e., the same round key xored between permutations) achieves our new ``multiple\u27\u27 known-keys indifferentiability notion, which contrasts with the previous result of Andreeva et al. that one single round is sufficient when only a single known key is considered. We also show that the 3-round iterated Even-Mansour construction achieves the weaker notion of multiple known-keys sequential indifferentiability, which implies in particular that it is correlation intractable with respect to relations involving any (polynomial) number of known keys
Optimally Secure Block Ciphers from Ideal Primitives
Recent advances in block-cipher theory deliver security analyses in
models where one or more underlying components (e.g., a function or
a permutation) are {\em ideal} (i.e., randomly chosen). This paper
addresses the question of finding {\em new} constructions achieving
the highest possible security level under minimal assumptions in
such ideal models.
We present a new block-cipher construction, derived from the
Swap-or-Not construction by Hoang et al. (CRYPTO \u2712). With -bit
block length, our construction is a secure pseudorandom permutation
(PRP) against attackers making block-cipher
queries, and queries to the underlying component
(which has itself domain size roughly ). This security level is
nearly optimal. So far, only key-alternating ciphers have been known
to achieve comparable security levels using independent
random permutations. In contrast, here we only assume that a {\em
single} {\em function} or {\em permutation} is available, while
achieving similar efficiency.
Our second contribution is a generic method to enhance a block
cipher, initially only secure as a PRP, to achieve related-key
security with comparable quantitative security
A Synthetic Indifferentiability Analysis of Interleaved Double-Key Even-Mansour Ciphers
Iterated Even-Mansour scheme (IEM) is a generalization of the basic 1-round proposal (ASIACRYPT \u2791). The scheme can use one key, two keys, or completely independent keys.
Most of the published security proofs for IEM against relate-key and chosen-key attacks focus on the case where all the round-keys are derived from a single master key. Whereas results beyond this barrier are relevant to the cryptographic problem whether a secure blockcipher with key-size twice the block-size can be built by mixing two \emph{relatively independent} keys into IEM and iterating sufficiently many rounds, and this strategy actually has been used in designing blockciphers for a long-time.
This work makes the first step towards breaking this barrier and considers IEM with Interleaved Double \emph{independent} round-keys:
where when is odd, and when is even. As results, this work proves that 15 rounds can achieve (full) indifferentiability from an ideal cipher with security bound. This work also proves that 7 rounds is sufficient and necessary to achieve sequential-indifferentiability (a notion introduced at TCC 2012) with security bound, so that is already correlation intractable and secure against any attack that exploits evasive relations between its input-output pairs
On Large Tweaks in Tweakable Even-Mansour with Linear Tweak and Key Mixing
In this paper, we provide the first analysis of the Iterated Tweakable Even-Mansour cipher with linear tweak and key (or tweakey) mixing, henceforth referred as TEML, for an arbitrary tweak(ey) size kn for all k ≥ 1, and arbitrary number of rounds r ≥ 2. Note that TEML captures the high-level design paradigm of most of the existing tweakable block ciphers (TBCs), including SKINNY, Deoxys, TweGIFT, TweAES etc. from a provable security point of view. At ASIACRYPT 2015, Cogliati and Seurin initiated the study of TEML by showing that 4-round TEML with a 2n-bit uniform at random key, and n-bit tweak is secure up to 22n/3 queries. In this work, we extend this line of research in two directions. First, we propose a necessary and sufficient class of linear tweakey schedules to absorb mn-bit tweak(ey) material in a minimal number of rounds, for all m ≥ 1. Second, we give a rigorous provable security treatment for r-round TEML, for all r ≥ 2. In particular, we first show that the 2r-round TEML with a (2r + 1)n-bit key, αn-bit tweak, and a special class of tweakey schedule is IND-CCA secure up to O(2r−α/r n) queries. Our proof crucially relies on the use of the coupling technique to upper-bound the statistical distance of the outputs of TEML cipher from the uniform distribution. Our main echnical contribution is a novel approach for computing the probability of failure in coupling, which could be of independent interest for deriving tighter bounds in coupling-based security proofs. Next, we shift our focus to the chosen-key setting, and show that (r + 3)-round TEML, with rn bits of tweakey material and a special class of tweakey schedule, offers some form of resistance to chosen-key attacks. We prove this by showing that r + 3 rounds of TEML are both necessary and sufficient for sequential indifferentiability. As a consequence of our results, we provide a sound provable security footing for the TWEAKEY framework, a high level design rationale of popular TBC
Impossibility of Indifferentiable Iterated Blockciphers from 3 or Less Primitive Calls
Virtually all modern blockciphers are iterated. In this paper, we ask: to construct a secure iterated blockcipher non-trivially , how many calls to random functions and permutations are necessary?
When security means indistinguishability from a random permutation, optimality is achieved by the Even-Mansour scheme using 1 call to a public permutation. We seek for the arguably strongest security indifferentiability from an ideal cipher, a notion introduced by Maurer et al. (TCC 2004) and popularized by Coron et al. (JoC, 2014).
We provide the first generic negative result/lower bounds: when the key is not too short, no iterated blockcipher making 3 calls is (statistically) indifferentiable. This proves optimality for a 4-call positive result of Guo et al. (Eprint 2016). Furthermore, using 1 or 2 calls, even indifferentiable iterated blockciphers with polynomial keyspace are impossible.
To prove this, we develop an abstraction of idealized iterated blockciphers and establish various basic properties, and apply Extremal Graph Theory results to prove the existence of certain (generalized) non-random properties such as the boomerang and yoyo