1 research outputs found
Incentivizing Collaboration in Heterogeneous Teams via Common-Pool Resource Games
We consider a team of heterogeneous agents that is collectively responsible
for servicing, and subsequently reviewing, a stream of homogeneous tasks. Each
agent has an associated mean service time and a mean review time for servicing
and reviewing the tasks, respectively. Agents receive a reward based on their
service and review admission rates. The team objective is to collaboratively
maximize the number of "serviced and reviewed" tasks. We formulate a
Common-Pool Resource (CPR) game and design utility functions to incentivize
collaboration among heterogeneous agents in a decentralized manner. We show the
existence of a unique Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE), and establish convergence of
best response dynamics to this unique PNE. Finally, we establish an analytic
upper bound on three measures of inefficiency of the PNE, namely the price of
anarchy, the ratio of the total review admission rate, and the ratio of
latency, along with an empirical study