Incentive Effects of Pensions

Many different types of pension plans exist in American firms. The stipulations of plans vary dramatically, even among large firms, with respect to vesting, relationship of the pension to final salary, maximum and minimum years of service constraints, and maximum and minimum benefit levels. These provisions are examined to determine their effects on worker behavior.Specifically, the paper analyes which plans encourage or discourage appropriate worker responses in hours worked, turnover, human capital investment and effort. An attempt is made to explain the provisions in light of the findings.

Providing health checks as incentives to retain blood donors — evidence from two field experiments

The collection of blood given by donors has proven to be a substantial societal and a managerial challenge. Consequently, blood donation services seek for incentive mechanisms to retain donors. However, economic or material rewards might entail negative side effects such as motivational crowding out or even attracting “bad blood”. In an effort to increase the retention of established blood donors, we conducted two randomized field trials (N1 = 53,257, N2 = 31,522) in cooperation with the German Red Cross Blood Donation Service and tested the effectiveness of an incentive strategy that is directly related to the blood donation itself: offering a comprehensive blood health check. Contrary to previous related research, we found substantial positive effects of a comprehensive blood health check incentive on donation behavior. In addition, unlike previous studies, we examine effects of repeated exposure to this incentive and do not find any wearout effects. Considering the positive effect of this incentive on donor retention and the relative low cost for providing this service to donors, our findings suggest that offering comprehensive blood health check incentives is a viable and cost-efficient marketing strategy to increase the retention among previous donors even if offered over the longer run.Accepted manuscrip

Incentive Effects of Social Security Under an Uncertain Disability Option

Incentive effects of pension systems are usually estimated under the assumption that the institutional environment provides a single optimal 'pathway' for retirement. However, many countries provide competing pathways which may include several early retirement options in addition to normal retirement. Moreover, early retirement options often comprise special provisions for disabled and unemployed workers that can be strategically manipulated by the employer and the employee while ultimate eligibility for such provisions is uncertain in advance. This paper shows that ignoring the endogeneity and/or uncertainty in the relevant institutional setting can severely bias the estimates of incentive effects. Ignoring the endogeneity leads to overestimated incentive effects that unduly exaggerate the 'pull' view of early retirement. In turn, when the uncertain option set is specified too generously, incentive effects are underestimated. The paper proposes several estimates to bound the true incentive effects of social security on early retirement, and applies them to the German public pension system.

Work Disability, Health, and Incentive Effects

Disability insurance – the insurance against the loss of the ability to work – is a substantial part of social security expenditures in many countries. The enrolment rates in disability insurance vary strikingly across European countries and the US. This paper investigates the extent of, and the causes for, this variation, using data from SHARE, ELSA and HRS. We show that even after controlling for differences in the demographic structure and health status these differences remain. In turn, indicators of disability insurance generosity explain 75% of the cross-national variation. We conclude that country-specific disability insurance rules are a prime candidate to explain the observed cross-country variation in disability insurance enrolment.

Work Disability, Health, and Incentive Effects

Disability insurance – the insurance against the loss of the ability to work – is a substantial part of social security expenditures in many countries. The enrolment rates in disability insurance vary strik-ingly across European countries and the US. This paper investigates the extent of, and the causes for, this variation, using data from SHARE, ELSA and HRS. We show that even after controlling for differences in the demographic structure and health status these differences remain. In turn, indicators of disability insurance generosity explain 75% of the cross-national variation. We conclude that country-specific disability insurance rules are a prime can-didate to explain the observed cross-country variation in disability insurance enrolment.

Contingent Valuation of Community Forestry Programs in Ethiopia: Observing Preference Anomalies in Double-Bounded CVM

This study examines the potential for anomalous response behaviour effects within the context of double-bounded contingent valuation methods applied to community forestry programs in rural Ethiopia. Anomalous responses considered include shift effects, framing effects and anchoring effects, and these effects are considered within a double-bounded contingent valuation study. The results confirmed the presence of incentive incompatibility and framing effects. However, anchoring effects are not uncovered. After controlling for these biases, the community forestry program considered is shown to offer a welfare gain ranging from Ethiopian Birr (ETB) 20.14 to 22.80. In addition to these welfare benefits, the results raise questions with respect to the validity of previous welfare estimates associated with double-bounded CVM studies in developing countries, suggesting that future studies should control for incentive incompatibility and framing effects bias.Double-bounded CVM, incentive incompatibility bias, anchoring bias

Biasing actions by incentive valence in an approach/avoidance task

The present study investigates interactions between incentive valence and action, which mirror wellknown valence-action biases in the emotional domain. In three joystick experiments, incentive valence (win/loss) and action type (approach/avoid) were signaled by distinct orthogonal stimulus features. By combining several design aspects, i.e., the use of bi-directional joystick movements, the inclusion of no-incentive baseline trials, and cue-locked versus target-locked valence and action signals, we tried to bridge between paradigms used in the emotional and motivational domain, and to understand previous, partly inconsistent results. In the first task variant (Experiment 1), we observed performance benefits for compatible mappings (win-approach; loss-avoid) relative to incompatible ones (loss-approach; win-avoid) when valence and action signals were target-locked, consistent with a fairly automatic response activation that can benefit or impair task performance. In contrast, cue-locked valence signals led to response facilitation (relative to a no-incentive baseline) more or less independent of actual valence (win/loss) and action type (approach/avoid), which is reminiscent of general facilitation effects of incentive cues across diverse cognitive tasks. Slight design variations did not change this main result pattern, indicating that it was neither driven by the close proximity between target and performance feedback (Experiment 2), nor by mere temporal coincidence of valence and action signals (Experiment 3), but rather by differences between preparatory (cued) and immediate (non-cued) effects of incentive valence. The present study provides novel insights regarding the nature of valence-action biases in the motivational domain and helps to integrate previous, partly inconsistent findings across domain

Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects

A menu of paired lottery choices is structured so that the crossover point to the high-risk lottery can be used to infer the degree of risk aversion. With "normal" laboratory payoffs of several dollars, most subjects are risk averse and few are risk loving. Scaling up all payoffs by factors of twenty, fifty, and ninety makes little difference when the high payoffs are hypothetical. In contrast, subjects become sharply more risk averse when the high payoffs are actually paid in cash. A hybrid "power/expo" utility function with increasing relative and decreasing absolute risk aversion nicely replicates the data patterns over this range of payoffs from several dollars to several hundred dollars

Determinants of Economic Development Incentives Offered by States: A Test of the Arms Race Hypothesis

This paper tests the arms race hypothesis, which postulates that states tend to increase their incentive offerings to new firms if such incentive programs are in use in other states that are perceived to be direct competitors. Using a pooled time-series/cross-section sample of twelve states covering the period from 1969 through 1985 and a model that controls for the effects of various economic and political factors, we find strong support for the arms race hypothesis. This result is robust to the alternative specifications of the incentive offerings and different measures of the degree of competition among states

Incentive Effects of Retirement Income Transfers

The paper explores the incentive effects of retirement income transfers – essentially, non-contributory cash transfers aimed at reducing poverty among the elderly. A literature review reveals how little academic analysis of the impact of these transfers has been completed. We begin with a taxonomy of retirement income transfers, differentiating between ex-ante and ex-post interventions and universal and targeted arrangements. This distinction allows important differences across designs to be highlighted. We then provide a simple framework for thinking about what the incentive impacts of the transfers might be, distinguishing between effects related to the transfer itself and those related to the financing mechanism. Thus, from theory and available empirical evidence we derive a few policy relevant findings. First, incentive effects will depend on the level of the transfer relative to average earnings and the degree of integration between the formal and informal sectors in the economy. In general, for modest transfers, negative impacts on savings and labor supply would be contained. Second, we highlight the tradeoff between maintaining low effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) to reduce distortions and keeping the program costs at affordable levels. This tradeoff suggests that universal programs are suboptimal. Third, in terms of design features, we emphasize the importance of implementing a gradual withdrawal of the benefit to avoid crowding-out contributory pensions among low income individuals and of indexing the eligibility age with life expectancy to contain costs. Finally we find that matching contributions can be a promising instrument to promote savings among individuals with limited savings capacity.Social pensions, Pension coverage, Retirement Insurance, matching contributions