40,218 research outputs found
Incentive Design and Market Evolution of Mobile User-Provided Networks
An operator-assisted user-provided network (UPN) has the potential to achieve
a low cost ubiquitous Internet connectivity, without significantly increasing
the network infrastructure investment. In this paper, we consider such a
network where the network operator encourages some of her subscribers to
operate as mobile Wi-Fi hotspots (hosts), providing Internet connectivity for
other subscribers (clients). We formulate the interaction between the operator
and mobile users as a two-stage game. In Stage I, the operator determines the
usage-based pricing and quota-based incentive mechanism for the data usage. In
Stage II, the mobile users make their decisions about whether to be a host, or
a client, or not a subscriber at all. We characterize how the users' membership
choices will affect each other's payoffs in Stage II, and how the operator
optimizes her decision in Stage I to maximize her profit. Our theoretical and
numerical results show that the operator's maximum profit increases with the
user density under the proposed hybrid pricing mechanism, and the profit gain
can be up to 50\% in a dense network comparing with a pricing-only approach
with no incentives.Comment: This manuscript serves as the online technical report of the article
published in IEEE Workshop on Smart Data Pricing (SDP), 201
Offloading in Software Defined Network at Edge with Information Asymmetry: A Contract Theoretical Approach
The proliferation of highly capable mobile devices such as smartphones and
tablets has significantly increased the demand for wireless access. Software
defined network (SDN) at edge is viewed as one promising technology to simplify
the traffic offloading process for current wireless networks. In this paper, we
investigate the incentive problem in SDN-at-edge of how to motivate a third
party access points (APs) such as WiFi and smallcells to offload traffic for
the central base stations (BSs). The APs will only admit the traffic from the
BS under the precondition that their own traffic demand is satisfied. Under the
information asymmetry that the APs know more about own traffic demands, the BS
needs to distribute the payment in accordance with the APs' idle capacity to
maintain a compatible incentive. First, we apply a contract-theoretic approach
to model and analyze the service trading between the BS and APs. Furthermore,
other two incentive mechanisms: optimal discrimination contract and linear
pricing contract are introduced to serve as the comparisons of the anti adverse
selection contract. Finally, the simulation results show that the contract can
effectively incentivize APs' participation and offload the cellular network
traffic. Furthermore, the anti adverse selection contract achieves the optimal
outcome under the information asymmetry scenario.Comment: 10 pages, 9 figure
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems
The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.\ud
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In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum
A Hierarchical Game with Strategy Evolution for Mobile Sponsored Content and Service Markets
In sponsored content and service markets, the content and service providers
are able to subsidize their target mobile users through directly paying the
mobile network operator, to lower the price of the data/service access charged
by the network operator to the mobile users. The sponsoring mechanism leads to
a surge in mobile data and service demand, which in return compensates for the
sponsoring cost and benefits the content/service providers. In this paper, we
study the interactions among the three parties in the market, namely, the
mobile users, the content/service providers and the network operator, as a
two-level game with multiple Stackelberg (i.e., leader) players. Our study is
featured by the consideration of global network effects owning to consumers'
grouping. Since the mobile users may have bounded rationality, we model the
service-selection process among them as an evolutionary-population follower
sub-game. Meanwhile, we model the pricing-then-sponsoring process between the
content/service providers and the network operator as a non-cooperative
equilibrium searching problem. By investigating the structure of the proposed
game, we reveal a few important properties regarding the equilibrium existence,
and propose a distributed, projection-based algorithm for iterative equilibrium
searching. Simulation results validate the convergence of the proposed
algorithm, and demonstrate how sponsoring helps improve both the providers'
profits and the users' experience
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