41,760 research outputs found
Semantic Epistemology Redux: Proof and Validity in Quantum Mechanics
Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM. Because semantic epistemology must include this important theory, revision is necessary. The one I propose also extends semantic epistemology beyond the âhardâ sciences. The article ends by presenting and then refuting some responses QM theorists might make to my arguments
Against Conventional Wisdom
Conventional wisdom has it that truth is always evaluated using our actual linguistic conventions, even when considering counterfactual scenarios in which different conventions are adopted. This principle has been invoked in a number of philosophical arguments, including Kripkeâs defense of the necessity of identity and Lewyâs objection to modal conventionalism. But it is false. It fails in the presence of what Einheuser (2006) calls c-monsters, or convention-shifting expressions (on analogy with Kaplanâs monsters, or context-shifting expressions). We show that c-monsters naturally arise in contexts, such as metalinguistic negotiations, where speakers entertain alternative conventions. We develop an expressivist theoryâinspired by Barker (2002) and MacFarlane (2016) on vague predications and Einheuser (2006) on counterconventionalsâto model these shifts in convention. Using this framework, we reassess the philosophical arguments that invoked the conventional wisdom
Semantic analysis of field sports video using a petri-net of audio-visual concepts
The most common approach to automatic summarisation and highlight detection in sports video is to train an automatic classifier to detect semantic highlights based on occurrences of low-level features such as action replays, excited commentators or changes in a scoreboard. We propose an alternative approach based on the detection of perception concepts (PCs) and the construction of Petri-Nets which can be used for both semantic description and event detection within sports videos. Low-level algorithms for the detection of perception concepts using visual, aural and motion characteristics are proposed, and a series of Petri-Nets composed of perception concepts is formally defined to describe video content. We call this a Perception Concept Network-Petri Net (PCN-PN) model. Using PCN-PNs, personalized high-level semantic descriptions of video highlights can be facilitated and queries on high-level semantics can be achieved. A particular strength of this framework is that we can easily build semantic detectors based on PCN-PNs to search within sports videos and locate interesting events. Experimental results based on recorded sports
video data across three types of sports games (soccer, basketball and rugby), and each from multiple broadcasters, are used to illustrate the potential of this framework
The Truth about Sherlock Holmes
According to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional characters are possible individuals. Possibilist accounts of fiction do not only assign the intuitively correct truth-conditions to sentences in a fiction, but has the potential to provide powerful explanatory models for a wide range of phenomena associated with fiction (though these two aspects of possibilism are, I argue, crucially distinct). Apart from the classic defense by David Lewis the idea of modeling fiction in terms of possible worlds have been widely criticized. In this article, I provide a defense of a possibilist account against some lines of criticism. To do so, I assume that names for fictional characters are directly referential and a possible-worlds model that accommodates transworld identity. On this background, I argue, it is possible to construct an elegant model of fictional discourse using familiar models of information exchange in ordinary discourse, and I sketch how this model can be used to i) make a natural distinction between fictional and counterfactual discourse, ii) account for creativity, and iii) sustain a natural definition of truth-in-fiction that avoids certain familiar objections to possibilism. Though I set aside questions about the metaphysical commitments of a possible-world interpretation here, there is accordingly reason to think that the battle over possibilist treatments of fiction will have to be fought over metaphysical foundations rather than technical shortcomings
Metaphor in Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science
This article surveys theories of metaphor in analytic philosophy and cognitive science. In particular, it focuses on contemporary semantic, pragmatic and non-cognitivist theories of linguistic metaphor and on the Conceptual Metaphor Theory advanced by George Lakoff and his school. Special attention is given to the mechanisms that are shared by nearly all these approaches, i.e. mechanisms of interaction and mapping between conceptual domains. Finally, the article discusses several recent attempts to combine these theories of linguistic and conceptual metaphor into a unitary account
Introduction
Introduction to and overview over my book "Epistemic Contextualism. A Defense" (OUP 2016
What if God commanded something horrible? A pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics
The objection of horrible commands claims that divine command metaethics is doomed to failure because it is committed to the extremely counterintuitive assumption that torture of innocents, rape, and murder would be morally obligatory if God commanded these acts. Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong have argued that formulating this objection in terms of counterpossibles is particularly forceful because it cannot be simply evaded by insisting on Godâs necessary perfect moral goodness. I show that divine command metaethics can be defended even against this counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands because we can explain the truth-value intuitions about the disputed counterpossibles as the result of conversational implicatures. Furthermore, I show that this pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics has several advantages over Prussâs reductio counterargument against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands
Metaethical Relativism
Although relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating back to the teachings of Protagoras in the 5th century B.C., when it comes to contemporary philosophy, there is no consensus on what makes a view qualify as "relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views that up to a decade ago were described as ârelativistâ would be more accurately described as "contextualist" or even âexpressivistâ in light of the distinctions currenty drawn in philosophy of language and semantics. In this chapter, we distinguish two construals of relativism, developed in sections 2 and 3 respectively: the âmetaphysicalâ construal, based on the idea that there is no single, absolute, universal morality, and the âsemanticâ construal, based on the idea that the truth value of moral claims is relative to a set of moral standards, or moral practices, or some other suitable parameter. Section 1 introduces the core relativist ideas in an informal way, and warns against possible misinterpretations
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