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Rational Trust Modeling
Trust models are widely used in various computer science disciplines. The
main purpose of a trust model is to continuously measure trustworthiness of a
set of entities based on their behaviors. In this article, the novel notion of
"rational trust modeling" is introduced by bridging trust management and game
theory. Note that trust models/reputation systems have been used in game theory
(e.g., repeated games) for a long time, however, game theory has not been
utilized in the process of trust model construction; this is where the novelty
of our approach comes from. In our proposed setting, the designer of a trust
model assumes that the players who intend to utilize the model are
rational/selfish, i.e., they decide to become trustworthy or untrustworthy
based on the utility that they can gain. In other words, the players are
incentivized (or penalized) by the model itself to act properly. The problem of
trust management can be then approached by game theoretical analyses and
solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. Although rationality might be
built-in in some existing trust models, we intend to formalize the notion of
rational trust modeling from the designer's perspective. This approach will
result in two fascinating outcomes. First of all, the designer of a trust model
can incentivise trustworthiness in the first place by incorporating proper
parameters into the trust function, which can be later utilized among selfish
players in strategic trust-based interactions (e.g., e-commerce scenarios).
Furthermore, using a rational trust model, we can prevent many well-known
attacks on trust models. These two prominent properties also help us to predict
behavior of the players in subsequent steps by game theoretical analyses