18,654 research outputs found
Dagstuhl Reports : Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2011
Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Internet (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 11061) : Simone Fischer-Hübner, Chris Hoofnagle, Kai Rannenberg, Michael Waidner, Ioannis Krontiris and Michael Marhöfer Self-Repairing Programs (Dagstuhl Seminar 11062) : Mauro Pezzé, Martin C. Rinard, Westley Weimer and Andreas Zeller Theory and Applications of Graph Searching Problems (Dagstuhl Seminar 11071) : Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud, Stephan Kreutzer and Dimitrios M. Thilikos Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Sequence Processing (Dagstuhl Seminar 11081) : Maxime Crochemore, Lila Kari, Mehryar Mohri and Dirk Nowotka Packing and Scheduling Algorithms for Information and Communication Services (Dagstuhl Seminar 11091) Klaus Jansen, Claire Mathieu, Hadas Shachnai and Neal E. Youn
Using Metrics Suites to Improve the Measurement of Privacy in Graphs
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.Social graphs are widely used in research (e.g., epidemiology) and business (e.g., recommender systems). However, sharing these graphs poses privacy risks because they contain sensitive information about individuals. Graph anonymization techniques aim to protect individual users in a graph, while graph de-anonymization aims to re-identify users. The effectiveness of anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms is usually evaluated with privacy metrics. However, it is unclear how strong existing privacy metrics are when they are used in graph privacy. In this paper, we study 26 privacy metrics for graph anonymization and de-anonymization and evaluate their strength in terms of three criteria: monotonicity indicates whether the metric indicates lower privacy for stronger adversaries; for within-scenario comparisons, evenness indicates whether metric values are spread evenly; and for between-scenario comparisons, shared value range indicates whether metrics use a consistent value range across scenarios. Our extensive experiments indicate that no single metric fulfills all three criteria perfectly. We therefore use methods from multi-criteria decision analysis to aggregate multiple metrics in a metrics suite, and we show that these metrics suites improve monotonicity compared to the best individual metric. This important result enables more monotonic, and thus more accurate, evaluations of new graph anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms
Revealing Network Structure, Confidentially: Improved Rates for Node-Private Graphon Estimation
Motivated by growing concerns over ensuring privacy on social networks, we
develop new algorithms and impossibility results for fitting complex
statistical models to network data subject to rigorous privacy guarantees. We
consider the so-called node-differentially private algorithms, which compute
information about a graph or network while provably revealing almost no
information about the presence or absence of a particular node in the graph.
We provide new algorithms for node-differentially private estimation for a
popular and expressive family of network models: stochastic block models and
their generalization, graphons. Our algorithms improve on prior work, reducing
their error quadratically and matching, in many regimes, the optimal nonprivate
algorithm. We also show that for the simplest random graph models ( and
), node-private algorithms can be qualitatively more accurate than for
more complex models---converging at a rate of
instead of . This result uses a new extension lemma
for differentially private algorithms that we hope will be broadly useful
Quantification of De-anonymization Risks in Social Networks
The risks of publishing privacy-sensitive data have received considerable
attention recently. Several de-anonymization attacks have been proposed to
re-identify individuals even if data anonymization techniques were applied.
However, there is no theoretical quantification for relating the data utility
that is preserved by the anonymization techniques and the data vulnerability
against de-anonymization attacks.
In this paper, we theoretically analyze the de-anonymization attacks and
provide conditions on the utility of the anonymized data (denoted by anonymized
utility) to achieve successful de-anonymization. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work on quantifying the relationships between anonymized
utility and de-anonymization capability. Unlike previous work, our
quantification analysis requires no assumptions about the graph model, thus
providing a general theoretical guide for developing practical
de-anonymization/anonymization techniques.
Furthermore, we evaluate state-of-the-art de-anonymization attacks on a
real-world Facebook dataset to show the limitations of previous work. By
comparing these experimental results and the theoretically achievable
de-anonymization capability derived in our analysis, we further demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of previous de-anonymization attacks and the potential of more
powerful de-anonymization attacks in the future.Comment: Published in International Conference on Information Systems Security
and Privacy, 201
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