3 research outputs found

    Improved Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of CLEFIA

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    This paper presents an improved impossible differential attack on the new block cipher CLEFIA which is proposed by Sony Corporation at FSE 2007. Combining some observations with new tricks, we can filter out the wrong keys more efficiently, and improve the impossible differential attack on 11-round CLEFIA-192/256, which also firstly works for CLEFIA-128. The complexity is about 2103.12^{103.1} encryptions and 2103.12^{103.1} chosen plaintexts. By putting more constraint conditions on plaintext pairs, we give the first attack on 12-round CLEFIA for all three key lengths with 2119.12^{119.1} encryptions and 2119.12^{119.1} chosen plaintexts. For CLEFIA-192/256, our attack is applicable to 13-round variant, of which the time complexity is about 21812^{181}, and the data complexity is 21202^{120}. We also extend our attack to 14-round CLEFIA-256, with about 2245.42^{245.4} encryptions and 2120.42^{120.4} chosen plaintexts. Moreover, a birthday sieve method is introduced to decrease the complexity of the core precomputation

    Improved Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of CLEFIA ⋆

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    Abstract. This paper presents an improved impossible differential attack on the new block cipher CLEFIA which is proposed by Sony Corporation at FSE 2007. Combining some observations with new tricks, we can filter out the wrong keys more efficiently, and improve the impossible differential attack on 11-round CLEFIA-192/256, which also firstly works for CLEFIA-128. The complexity is about 2 98.1 encryptions and 2 103.1 chosen plaintexts. By putting more constraint conditions on plaintext pairs, we give the first attack on 12-round CLEFIA for all three key lengths with 2 114.3 encryptions and 2 119.3 chosen plaintexts. For CLEFIA-192/256, our attack is applicable to 13-round variant, of which the time complexity is about 2 181, and the data complexity is 2 120. We also extend our attack to 14-round CLEFIA-256, with about 2 245.4 encryptions and 2 120.4 chosen plaintexts. Moreover, a birthday sieve method is introduced to decrease the complexity of the core precomputation. Key words: Block ciphers, cryptanalysis, impossible differential attack, CLEFIA
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