Equity REIT Property Acquisitions: Do Apartment REITs Pay a Premium?

Negotiation theory and implied agency costs provide the foundation for the research hypothesis that equity real estate investment trusts (EREITs) may have paid premiums when making real property acquisitions during the 1990s REIT boom. Using a simultaneous equations model and data from the Atlanta, Phoenix and Seattle apartment markets, this research finds that apartment EREITs have paid above market prices for property acquisitions. In Atlanta, a 26.1% premium was evident; in Phoenix, a 27.5% premium was evident; while in Seattle, a premium was not evident. At the property level, the returns to EREITs and private sector or non-securitized investors may differ substantially.

Protecting mobile money customer funds in civil law jurisdictions

The provision of financial services through mobile phones is a powerful tool to foster financial inclusion, and thus economic growth, in developing countries. However, it raises important regulatory issues. Given the vulnerability of most potential customers of these services, the protection of customer funds is important. In common law countries, trust accounts are an effective response to these concerns. In civil law jurisdictions however, in the absence of trusts, protection of customer funds is more difficult. This paper identifies the theoretical and practical problems that regulators in civil law jurisdictions might face when trying to protect customer funds and explores how fiduciary contracts, mandate contracts and direct regulation might be used to achieve this goal. It offers a series of practical recommendations for policymakers in developing countries that provide a range of regulatory options that combine private law and regulation

What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?

This essay, to appear in Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law (Miller & Gold, 2016), explores three ways fiduciary obligations might be like contractual ones: in the methods lawmakers use or should use to determine the content of the obligation; in the private voluntary acts that generate the obligation; and in the fact that the obligation is a default that parties have the power to alter. The thesis is that to the extent that these similarities exist, they are not especially revealing. Theorists who emphasize the similarities commonly treat contract law as a private power-conferring rule, then analogize the law of fiduciary obligations to it. In fact, the law of contract is more complex and serves a broader range of purposes than just giving private parties the ability to undertake legal obligations when they choose. Contract obligations are sometimes imposed for reasons other than party choice, and contract defaults and altering rules can be designed to serve other social purposes. A more nuanced understanding of the functions and design of contract law suggests that structural similarities between fiduciary obligations and contractual ones tell us less about the fiduciary obligations than we might have hoped. The explanation of why that is so, however, reveals important features both of contract law and of the law of fiduciary obligations

The Financial Services Reform Act 2001: Impact on Systemic risk in Australia

The rise of conglomerate banks and their interrelated balance sheets, pose new challenges to theories of financial regulation. We measure the impact of recent legislative changes in Australia upon systemic risk, for banking and near banking sectors, and demonstrate a significant reduction post the legislation. This is consistent with a major legislative goal, to promote global competitiveness, because it implies a reduction in the cost of equity capital. In addition, we find no evidence in support of the HIH collapse increasing systemic risk in the overall financial sector but a relatively small effect was detected in the banking sector.Ris, Banks, Disclosure, Regulation, Entropy