Beyond rationality: images as guide-lines to choice

In this paper I will discuss a representation of the decision-making process that is based on images production, and exploitation, in order to propose theoretical refinement of the link between decisional behaviour and mental images in economic contexts. To do so, I will start by shortly presenting Beach and Mitchell' s model (1987). I will then extend it to economics, by comparing its implications with those deriving from two more traditional approaches, both the neoclassical one and those recently from Simon' s bounded rationality theory: The most significant consequences of an image-based model appear to be: i) wider cognitive foundations for the decision process; ii) the need to extend the concept of rationality by enlarging its relationship with that of imagination; iii) a new and fuller "image" of the economic agent.

A macroscopic analytical model of collaboration in distributed robotic systems

In this article, we present a macroscopic analytical model of collaboration in a group of reactive robots. The model consists of a series of coupled differential equations that describe the dynamics of group behavior. After presenting the general model, we analyze in detail a case study of collaboration, the stick-pulling experiment, studied experimentally and in simulation by Ijspeert et al. [Autonomous Robots, 11, 149-171]. The robots' task is to pull sticks out of their holes, and it can be successfully achieved only through the collaboration of two robots. There is no explicit communication or coordination between the robots. Unlike microscopic simulations (sensor-based or using a probabilistic numerical model), in which computational time scales with the robot group size, the macroscopic model is computationally efficient, because its solutions are independent of robot group size. Analysis reproduces several qualitative conclusions of Ijspeert et al.: namely, the different dynamical regimes for different values of the ratio of robots to sticks, the existence of optimal control parameters that maximize system performance as a function of group size, and the transition from superlinear to sublinear performance as the number of robots is increased

Economic Analysis of Knowledge: The History of Thought and the Central Themes

Following the development of knowledge economies, there has been a rapid expansion of economic analysis of knowledge, both in the context of technological knowledge in particular and the decision theory in general. This paper surveys this literature by identifying the main themes and contributions and outlines the future prospects of the discipline. The wide scope of knowledge related questions in terms of applicability and alternative approaches has led to the fragmentation of research. Nevertheless, one can identify a continuing tradition which analyses various aspects of the generation, dissemination and use of knowledge in the economy

Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory

The paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of "mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory.game theory; mechanism design; refinements of Nash equilibrium; antitrust law; John Harsanyi

Early aspects: aspect-oriented requirements engineering and architecture design

This paper reports on the third Early Aspects: Aspect-Oriented Requirements Engineering and Architecture Design Workshop, which has been held in Lancaster, UK, on March 21, 2004. The workshop included a presentation session and working sessions in which the particular topics on early aspects were discussed. The primary goal of the workshop was to focus on challenges to defining methodical software development processes for aspects from early on in the software life cycle and explore the potential of proposed methods and techniques to scale up to industrial applications

A Political Economy Model of Regulation Explained Through Fuzzy Logics

The basic problem of environmental regulation involves the government trying to induce a polluter to take socially desirable actions, which ostensibly are not in the best interest of the polluter. But the government may not always be able to precisely control the polluter. To further complicate matters the government faces a complex problem of determining exactly what level of pollution is best for society. In reality the government faces pressures from consumers and polluters. There are some important lessons to gather from the analysis of current models of regulation. One is that there are many imperfect links between the legislature and the pollution-generating process. In this case regulation may be excessively costly, may result in considerable cheating, and may result in excessive pollution. Another lesson is that legislature does not necessarily act as an efficient benevolent maximizer of social well-being. The authors intend in this paper to explain the current view of political models of regulation, analysing them for their complexity, and attempt to provide a reasonable explanation of their functioning recurring to fuzzy logics. Understanding how the browns and greens interact with the legislature and regulatory agencies can to some extent explain the current environmental regulations. The fuzzy approach, intends to allow for easier understanding of these interactions, and provide an answer for more effective decision making. Keywords: Environmental Regulation, Environmental Economics, Fuzzy Logics, Models, Pollution Control, Sustainability

Spillovers diffusion inside networks of cooperation: the role of temporary geographical and organisational proximities.

The objective of this article is to examine the diffusion of spillovers within technological cooperation. More precisely, we shall ask to what extent permanent geographic proximity, defined, as co-location by the geography of innovation, is really necessary to benefit from spillovers when agents cooperate. It turns out that co-localisation is not a sufficient condition; geographic proximity is often required but it can be temporary. This condition must be linked with organisational proximity to be effective. Then, it appears that spillovers are not “in the air(s)” but in networks.Spillovers; Technological cooperation; Geographic proximity; Organisational proximity; A-spatial network;

The history of transaction cost economics and its recent developments

The emergence of transaction cost economics (TCE) in the early 1970s with Oliver Williamson’s successful reconciliation of the so called neoclassical approach with Herbert Simon’s organizational theory can be considered an important part of the first cognitive turn in economics. The development of TCE until the late 1980s was particularly marked by treating the firm as an avoider of negative frictions, i.e., of transaction costs. However, since the 1990s TCE has been enriched by various approaches stressing the role of the firm in creating positive value, e.g., the literature on modularity. Hence, a second cognitive turn has taken place: the firm is no longer only seen as an avoider of negative costs but also as a creator of positive knowledge.transaction cost economics, Oliver Williamson, theory of the firm, modularity literature, cognitive turn

A SOCIO-COGNITIVE BASIS FOR STRATEGIC GROUPS: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE IN SWINE GENETICS

Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Livestock Production/Industries,

Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices

This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1) biological uncertainty 2) natural uncertainty 3) individual information, and 4) monitoring problem. The consequences of these four types of information insufficiencies on the choice of regulatory tools are explored. We discuss in this context three types of regulatory tools: land takings, environmental fees/charges, and contracts. The efficiency of each type of regulatory tools is shown dependent on the specific informational constraints that the regulatory faces.Biodiversity conservation, Information, Regulatory tools